THE Public Interest

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
SURPLUS - 3
DUPLICATE

NUMBER 76, SUMMER 1984, PRICE: $4.00

America's Defense Dilemmas: II

Systems Analysis and Rational Defense — *Stephen Rosen*

On the Making of Lieutenants and Colonels — *Theodore J. Crackel*

Women as Soldiers—The Record So Far — *Michael Levin*

Principle and Prudence in Foreign Policy — *Nathan Tarcov*

Defense Books — *Reviewed by Nick Eberstadt, Patrick Glynn, Diana West, Jeffrey Record, Mary Tedeschi, and Mackubin T. Owens*

The Timely End of the Sagebrush Rebellion — *Frank J. Popper*

Political Asylum in Theory and Practice — *Michael S. Teitelbaum*

Japanese Education: How Do They Do It? — *Merry I. White*

How To Make Bail Safer — *Martin D. Sorin*

The French Population Debate — *Richard Tomlinson*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE Public Interest

NUMBER 76, SUMMER 1984

CONTENTS

America's Defense Dilemmas: II
Systems Analysis and the Quest for Rational Defense — *Stephen Rosen* — 3

On the Making of Lieutenants and Colonels — *Theodore J. Crackel* — 18

Women as Soldiers—The Record So Far — *Michael Levin* — 31

Principle and Prudence in Foreign Policy: The Founders' Perspective — *Nathan Tarcov* — 45

The Timely End of the Sagebrush Rebellion — *Frank J. Popper* — 61

Political Asylum in Theory and Practice — *Michael S. Teitelbaum* — 74

Japanese Education: How Do They Do It? — *Merry I. White* — 87

Social Science and Social Policy
How To Make Bail Safer — *Martin D. Sorin* — 102

Social Policy in Europe
The French Population Debate — *Richard Tomlinson* — 111

Defense Books — *Contents* — 121

Contributors — 44

THE PUBLIC INTEREST (ISSN-0033-3557) is published quarterly by National Affairs, Inc. and appears in Spring, Summer, Fall, and Winter issues. Its office of publication is located at 10 East 53rd Street, New York, NY 10022. Subscription price: $16.00 for one year; $32.00 for two years. Add $2.00 annually for Canadian and foreign subscriptions. Unsolicited material cannot be returned unless accompanied by sufficient return postage. Second class postage is paid at New York, and at additional mailing offices. © 1984 by National Affairs, Inc. Postmaster: Please send all changes of address to: Public Interest Subscription Dept., 20th and Northampton Streets, Easton, PA, 18042.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Editors
Irving Kristol and Nathan Glazer

Publisher
Warren Demian Manshel

Publication Committee
Martin Feldstein (on leave)
Harry Kahn
H. J. Kaplan
Harry McPherson
Daniel P. Moynihan
Robert A. Nisbet
Leo Rosten
Martin E. Segal
Stanley Simon
Arthur L. Singer, Jr.
Roger Starr
Paul H. Weaver
James Q. Wilson

Executive Editor
Mark Lilla

Managing Editor
Tod Lindberg

Assistant Managing Editor
Mary Tedeschi

Assistant Editor
Diana West

Assistant to the Editors
Rita Lazzaro

Consulting Editor
Michael Andrew Scully

Editorial Office
10 E. 53rd St., New York, NY 10022

Subscription Department
The Public Interest
20th & Northampton Sts.
Easton, PA 18042

Newsstand Distributor
Bernhard DeBoer, Inc.
113 E. Centre St., Nutley, NJ 07110

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Systems analysis and the quest for rational defense

STEPHEN ROSEN

THERE have been serious problems with U.S. defense policy and with the performance of the U.S. armed forces over the last 20 years, and on more than one occasion these problems have been blamed on the methods of analysis and ways of thinking introduced by Robert McNamara during his tenure as Secretary of Defense. His approach, it is argued, inappropriately applied what were essentially economic tools of analysis to military questions. Weapons were purchased and military organizations reformed in the pursuit of cost effectiveness, with an accompanying disregard for practical military wisdom and experience. That reduced the actual strategic effectiveness of our armed forces. What was worse, it is argued, this outlook was adopted by the officer corps itself, partly in self-defense, partly because the tools of cost-effectiveness analysis were easier to learn and apply than the more traditional approaches that drew on personal experience, military history, and other non-quantitative sources. The bluntest statement of this argument has been made by Edward Luttwak:

> . . . under the internal pressure of civilians who know not war and think that it is reducible to economics, as well as of 'demilitarized' military men who have lost sight of the essentials of their profession, our Defense Department and the armed forces themselves are not merely distracted from the large issues of strategy by the petty questions of micro-management, but

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> they are in addition directed to pursue the wrong goal, namely civilian efficiency. It is not surprising to find, therefore, that the best of our forces are precisely those which are most obdurately traditional and least 'intellectual' . . . .[1]

Before we embark on new campaigns to improve our forces, it would be useful to ask what happened the last time there was an extremely vigorous effort to make the Pentagon more cost effective. Conservative folk wisdom suggests that the reform of any complex social organization is a slow business, full of the unexpected consequences of seemingly unexceptionable activities, and that reforms often appear to have more dramatic effects, either for good or for ill, than a closer examination of the facts can justify.

The early days of cost-effectiveness

Economic methods of analysis resembling those associated with the McNamara era have been a prominent part of the defense thinking of great powers at least since the introduction of large, steam-propelled warships. Each ship cost a lot of money, could be built to different designs, and, within the context of limited budgets, would use up the money that would otherwise be available to build other kinds of ships. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that we can find Winston Churchill, while chief of the British Admiralty, explicitly making some elementary cost-benefit analyses. He had in mind a picture of the kind of battle he wanted his ships to fight. He wanted the British fleet to be able to "cross the T" of the enemy fleet, so that it could bring more of its guns to bear on the target. The crucial "quantitative performance index," as the systems analysts say, was speed: If you could not overtake the enemy line of ships, you could not cut across it. Churchill therefore consciously reduced some other aspects of performance (such as the number of guns) to get more speed. Similarly, we can think of him as making decisions on what kind of "force mix" to buy, and looking to see how much money he had and how many ships of different kinds he could buy with his budget.

These kinds of decisions are not terribly different in form from some of the decisions the systems analysts brought into the Defense department in the 1960s: Quantitative measures of performance were assessed in relation to cost, in order to determine the number and kinds of forces to be procured in peacetime for possible use in war. In those decisions, interestingly enough, we also find many of

[1] Edward N. Luttwak, "Why We Need More 'Waste, Fraud, and Mismanagement' in the Pentagon," *Commentary* (February 1982).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

what are now thought to be the weaknesses of systems analysis. For example, in Churchill's own description of his procurement decisions, there is no serious discussion of the factors not related to equipment performance—no discussion, for example, of the *enemy's* concept of battle, and no discussion of how crew performance, the human factor, might affect the maritime balance. But both of these factors are now thought to have played a part in the unsatisfactory outcome of the only major surface ship battle of World War I.

The influence of economists and economic methods of analysis in military decisions grew with the rise of airpower. Like battleships, bombers and fighters were costly, so that the need for trade-offs was painfully obvious. The number of planes employed in battle was sufficiently small that their performance could be studied in some detail (which was not the case with infantry battles). One result of this was the emergence of something called "operational analysis" in the years before World War II. Civilian leaders were not satisfied with British air defenses, which the Royal Air Force (RAF) had neglected as a result of its preoccupation with offensive bomber capabilities. The RAF, they felt, needed to know how to set up an air defense system that utilized radars, and they brought in scientists such as H. T. Tizard and F. A. Lindemann to assist the Air Staff. As a direct consequence of this first use of operations research, Great Britain had 20 radar stations that could detect enemy aircraft, in place and in time for the Battle of Britain. Furthermore, these radars did function as a *system* in coordinating the air battle, as a result of the operational analysis.

Operations research was really meant to answer questions about how existing forces could best be utilized. The question of which forces to procure was not part of this field of study. Instead, battles or exercises were investigated to see how weapons had actually performed, and to find out how they could be employed more effectively. Although this often involved the researchers in fairly low level, technical issues—the best way to site anti-aircraft guns, for example—the operations researchers also became involved in one of the major American decisions of the war. The question was how best to use our bombers against Nazi Germany. This involved analysis of targets, and quite quickly became the province of economists. The American Embassy in London created an "Enemy Objectives Unit" in its Economic Warfare Division, in order to develop suitable sets of targets for U.S. bombers. According to Walt Rostow, a member of the group, this unit found itself at odds in its thinking with the military men whom it was supposed to assist. Those who

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

had drawn up target plans before the economists arrived were men "whose careers had never required them to formulate criteria for target selection in a strategic context and to apply them systematically by comparison of alternative target sets." The new group was led by a military man, Colonel Richard D'Oyly Hughes, and by a Harvard professor of economics, Edward Mason. The staff "were, by and large, trained as economists . . . . There was something of the Austrian theory of capital and Leontieff's input-output matrix in our ways of looking at things." Rostow described the task of the group in language that would become more familiar in the 1960s: "Briefly, we sought target systems where the destruction of the minimum number of targets would have the greatest, most prompt, and most long-lasting direct military effect."[2]

These economists did not have an impact on defense procurement policies, because there was simply no time for their recommendations to have an effect on production decisions before the bomber offensive was won—the new unit was not set up until the end of 1942. They did, however, have some influence over a question that was once thought to be the sole province of military men: how the forces were used. And even at this time, economists ran into some conflict with their military superiors because of their tendency *not* to emphasize the more intangible military factors when developing plans—a criticism that would later be leveled at McNamara's systems analysts. In particular, the economists recommended deep strikes against the German-controlled oil production facilities at a time when it was important for intra-service morale that the Army Air Force be seen as doing everything in its power to support the Normandy landings. As a military man later put it, "the intellectual niceties of planning" were far from the mind of the Army commander of U.S. bombers. "If Eisenhower had asked him, in writing, to drop his bombs in the Arctic Ocean on D-Day, he would have complied."

In short, many of the characteristics of the McNamara systems analysts were present in the operational analysts working on strategic bombing in World War II. They were young economists; they had a more or less pronounced disdain for the unsystematic thinking of the military men in the same line of work as themselves, and they looked at problems economically, in terms of maximizing utility functions, somehow defined, given fixed resources. Here, then, were the original "whiz kids." Indeed, Charles Hitch, the man generally

[2] W. W. Rostow, *Pre-Invasion Bombing Strategy: General Eisenhower's Decision of March 1944* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), p. 15.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

regarded as the father of post-war systems analysis, was involved in the post-war analyses of bombing strategy.

The McNamara years

It is necessary to remember that the candidate John Kennedy, who would later bring NcNamara to the Pentagon, defined his defense agenda by contrasting it with Eisenhower's policies. The Democrats claimed that Eisenhower had fixed what were essentially arbitrary ceilings on the defense budget; they, by contrast, would rationally determine how much was enough, and then buy it. To facilitate rational budgeting, budgets would be structured according to functional outputs, instead of by inputs. For example, instead of showing how much money was being spent on such "artificial" categories as personnel and procurement, the budget would show how much was being spent on strategic forces, and on other functional programs. Programs and program objectives would be devised *before* budgets were set, and resources would be allocated so as to achieve program goals at the least cost. This was the now familiar Program Planning Budgeting System—PPBS. The influence of systems analysis was heightened, first by setting up a systems analysis office in the Defense department's Comptroller's office (first headed by Charles Hitch), later by creating a separate Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis (an office first held by Alain Enthoven) in 1965. Hitch initially proposed that the analytical and budgetary mechanisms for implementing this more rational system be put in place over a period of 18 months. McNamara told Hitch to have the new system ready in six months, and Hitch complied.

In a series of lectures delivered in 1965 after he had left the government, Hitch attempted to specify the ways in which the pre-McNamara budgeting system had produced unwanted or irrational outcomes. Hitch argued that because Eisenhower's Defense department had allocated money to the services without specifying the functional goals to be pursued and without attempting any detailed monitoring of the services' programs, the

> consequences were precisely what could have been predicted. Each Service tended to exercise its own priorities, favoring its own unique missions to the detriment of joint missions, striving to lay the groundwork for an increased share of the budget in future years by concentrating on alluring new weapon systems . . . . The Air Force, for example, gave overriding priority to the strategic retaliatory bombers and missiles, starving the tactical bombers and missiles needed to support the Army ground operations . . . . The Navy gave overriding priority to its own nuclear attack

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

forces—notably the aircraft carriers—while its anti-submarine warfare capability was relatively neglected and its escort capability atrophied.[3]

But this statement is seriously misleading in two ways, and it reflects a profound mistrust of the services that would have unhappy consequences. To begin with, whether or not the emphasis on nuclear retaliatory forces at the expense of non-nuclear capabilities was a good idea, it was definitely not the result of service parochialism unchecked by strategic guidance. The explicit strategic doctrine of the Eisenhower years until 1958 was, it may be recalled, one of instant and massive nuclear retaliation to nuclear or non-nuclear attacks. If the Air Force built strategic bombers and fighter aircraft that were designed primarily to deliver nuclear weapons, it was in fact the result of clear guidance from the President. Likewise, the Navy's emphasis on nuclear-capable systems was also a response to the strategic doctrine of the era. Massive retaliation might not have made sense by 1960 (although what we now know about the size of the Soviet nuclear force then indicates that in the event of war, a U.S. nuclear strike might well have gone a long way toward disarming the Soviet Union). But whether or not the doctrine was sound, the rationality of the service programs, given this doctrine that they had not made, was obvious. Moreover, the "alluring new weapon systems" scorned by Hitch were, in the case of the Minuteman and the Polaris systems, the ones the Kennedy administration was proud to deploy in numbers even larger than those contemplated by Eisenhower. It is true that other systems proved to be unnecessary given the success of these two missiles, but it must be recalled that at the time of their initiation, both Minuteman and Polaris were extremely high risk projects (in the case of the Polaris, neither the propulsion system nor the guidance system nor the warhead had been proven in prototype before the decision was made to deploy the entire system). And so what may in retrospect have seemed wasteful was at the time simple prudence—having many alternative means of delivering nuclear weapons in development.

The second error in Hitch's analysis is the contention that the Eisenhower administration had simply let the services build what they wanted. For example, Arnold Kanter has analyzed the budget requests of the 1950s, to see whether the Defense department simply used budget ceilings as a blunt instrument to keep expenditures in line. He found that budget cuts were *not* allocated on the basis of

[3] Samuel A. Tucker, ed., *A Modern Design for Defense Decision: A McNamara-Hitch-Enthoven Anthology*, pre-publication edition (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 68-69.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"you have X per cent of the budget, you take X per cent of the cuts." Nor was the favored service, the Air Force, immune from disproportionately large shares in the reductions made in service requests.[4] In fact, Eisenhower intervened to compel the Air Force to spend less money on bombers and more money on strategic air defenses for the continental United States. Hitch simply assumes that because the Eisenhower Defense department did not have an overt capability for intruding into the nooks and crannies of the budget, it was exerting ineffective (or non-rational) control.

Politics and PPBS

But even assuming that it is good and necessary to exert detailed control over the service budgets, we must ask whether the fabled PPBS itself was able to do this. The impressive new system was more or less in place in time for the FY 1963 budget process. It instituted the functional "output" categories that would allow decision makers, according to the theory, to see how much money they were being asked to spend on the things they really cared about, like strategic forces and air and sea lift (instead of on the meaningless "input" categories like personnel). And it involved the systems analysts, who would gather information, analyze, and put a price tag on alternative programs for the Secretary of Defense. Because the systems analysts worked for the Secretary and not the services, they would not, according to the theory, be influenced by parochial institutional interests that conflicted with the national interest. They would draw up "Draft Presidential Memoranda" for the Secretary in various issue areas; these would state what the national security goals were, what the programs that would meet the goals would be, and what, roughly, they would cost. These Memoranda would be sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and through them to the services, and their views, according to the theory, would be obtained and integrated in a systematic fashion. The Memoranda would be circulated long before the budget for any given fiscal year had to be finalized—according to the theory, there was to be no setting of arbitrary budget ceilings *before* program requirements had been systematically and rationally considered. In theory, it was a beautiful system. But in practice, it did not work.

The first thing that fell by the wayside was the idea that programs could be determined without regard to financial limits. It is

[4] Arnold Kanter, *Defense Politics: A Budgetary Perspective* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), pp. 62-69.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

amazing, but well documented, that McNamara said both in public and in private that "we don't build the defense program against a *predetermined budget limit*," and that "*the recommended force* structure was based on requirements for national security and was not limited by arbitrary or predetermined budget ceilings."[5] But McNamara was no more exempt from the political and financial limits of the real world than anyone else. John Crecine, for example, has pointed to the fact that Bureau of the Budget was providing fairly precise budget guidelines for the Department of Defense long *before* any Draft Presidential Memoranda could generate a "rational" recommendation.[6]

It might be thought that the consequences of making such an impossible, and even slightly silly, promise—not to be bound by arbitrary ceilings—would be minimal. But, in fact, the whole premise of the McNamara/systems analysis project was to deal with the services harshly, but rationally. The services would be asked to give up the normal political stratagems they employed to protect themselves, and, in return, they would be made part of a rational force structure that was in the nation's best interest. The reality, though, was different. In December of each year, just before the submission of the budget to Congress, McNamara's staff was forced to make the usual hasty, arbitrary budget cuts to stay within their budget ceilings, and this soon became apparent to the services. As a result, the services continued to submit their budget proposals with the same sort of protective budgetary padding they had always added. In addition, the services retained throughout the 1960s the traditional "input" line items in their own budget submissions, and did not—in fact, could not—use the "output" categories dictated by PPBS. The Army continued to buy personnel, not General Purpose Forces. The net result was that the new system had relatively little impact on the way the services looked at the budget, and, consequently, little impact on the way they planned their forces. For them, it was business as usual, plus what they regarded as the new McNamara hypocrisy.

Another area of dubious effect was in the attempt to reduce "parochial" service interests. McNamara and the analysts were certainly successful in canceling programs like the B-70, and in limiting others like the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, which were greatly prized by the services. But they were equally capable of

[5] Kanter, *Defense Politics*, pp. 88-89; see also Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, *How Much Is Enough: Shaping the Defense Program 1961-1969* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), p. 325.

[6] John P. Crecine, *Defense Budgeting: Organizational Approach to External Constraints*, RM-6121-PR (March 1970), pp. 40-42, 51.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

safeguarding the parochial political interests of the Secretary of Defense and the administration that they served.

The failure of the F-111 fighter, generally considered (by critics) to be the result of analysts bent on pursuing cost-effectiveness, was actually something entirely different. From quite early on, the F-111 had serious problems. Its cost overruns, while large, were not much above the average for new aircraft of that era, but its main problems came from trying to employ too many unproven advanced technologies (swing wing, afterburning turbofan engines, advanced avionics, etc.). But as Robert Coulam has convincingly shown, the key decisions were made very early in 1961, before the systems analysts installed themselves in the Comptroller's office. The decision to go ahead with the aircraft was McNamara's, largely at the urging and with the support of the newly created office of Research and Engineering in the Pentagon.[7] The failure of the systems analysts, which came later, was their silence on the problems of an airplane closely associated with their Secretary of Defense. In addition, the systems analysts had an agreement with the Research and Engineering Office that they would not attack each other. It was not until 1968, after Robert McNamara had resigned, that the Systems Analysis Office put out its first report critical of the F-111. Until that time, they had been content to tell Congress simply that it had not been their fault.

The systems analysts also deferred to political interests during the Vietnam War. As Lyndon Johnson increased the number of troops stationed in Vietnam, the Joint Chiefs of Staff called for the mobilization of the Reserves in order to maintain the other parts of our defense—in particular, our strategic reserve. Johnson, remembering the call-up of the Reserves during the Korean War, and fearing the electoral consequences for himself if he repeated Truman's decision, told the services to find the men elsewhere. But they declined to provide him with such plans, and as Alain Enthoven proudly recalls, the Systems Analysis Office drew up the plans that provided the men for the war: The solution to that manpower problem was to take men out of units in Europe and the United States, and it helped create the "hollow Army" that we are still living with today.

This pattern—the systems analysts suspend critical judgment when the political interests of their bosses are at stake—has continued since McNamara. It is, in effect, built into the system: Without the Secretary's active support, the analysts would be isolated targets

[7] Robert F. Coulam, *Illusions of Choice: The F-111 and the Problems of Weapons Acquisition Reform* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 50-51, 108-109.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for the wrath of the services. When Leonard Sullivan became James Schlesinger's Assistant Secretary for Program Analysis and Evaluation (the new name for the Systems Analysis Office), a reporter asked him, "Do you analyze Secretary Schlesinger's own hobby horses as rigorously as you do the Services?" To which Sullivan replied, "That's a very good question. Not quite . . . . "[8]

This weakness was also apparent under Jimmy Carter. During his first three years in office, only very slow growth was programmed for the Defense budget, despite the steady growth in Soviet spending and the real declines in U.S. forces and spending during the 1970s. Russell Murray, the head of Program Analysis and Evaluation, was a better soldier for his bosses than he was an analyst. By 1982 and 1983, Murray was giving talks and publishing papers that called for defense spending increases of the size proposed by the Reagan administration, and allowed as how the studies supporting this had been completed during 1980. In fact, though, at the end of 1978 he staunchly answered the question of "how much is enough" defense spending by stating simply that the Carter administration was already spending enough on defense: "Making a better defense program at a higher budget level is child's play. Any damn fool can do that. Our objective is to demonstrate that we can, *at the same budget level*, shape a better program."[9] As one Defense department official put it, the systems analysts, by trying to put together the optimum defense program with inadequate money, were building a One Hoss Shay; it would collapse, but in a perfectly balanced way.

In all these cases, it was the political leadership of the United States that commited the basic error, not the systems analysts. Yet it was the claim of the analysts that they, unlike the military men they were displacing, "were not constrained to defer to rank, age, experience, or chain of command."[10] Their deference to manifestly poor policy decisions made that claim an empty boast.

Analyzing weapon systems

The record of the systems analysts in terms of the ultimate success or failure of programs they supported or attacked is also mixed. One of the military areas that was seemingly more amenable to the kind of quantitative analysis done by the systems analysts was that of strategic nuclear forces, in which mechanical systems and their per-

[8] Colonel R.D. Heinl Jr. (USMC Retired), *Detroit News* (August 29, 1974).

[9] Interview with Russell Murray II, by LuAnne K. Levens and Benjamin Schemmer, *Armed Forces Journal* (December, 1978): 24, emphasis added. See also *Washington Times* (January 19, 1984): 2.

[10] Enthoven and Smith, *How Much Is Enough*, p. 99.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

formance played a larger role, relative to human factors, than in conventional combat. Furthermore, Kennedy's campaign alleged that the Eisenhower administration was building bombers, land-based missiles, and submarine launched missiles without any attempt to see how the three forces related to one another.

In one way, the role of systems analysis appears to have been significant in Kennedy's subsequent efforts in this area. For example, systems analysts (including Alain Enthoven) produced the famous study showing that the curve of the number of Soviets killed and the percentage of industry destroyed by nuclear missiles would begin to flatten after a given number of missiles had been deployed. This provided the public rationale for McNamara's decision to limit Minuteman deployment to 1,000 missiles. This appears to have been a clear case of the influence of systems analysis, but the real story was more complex. McNamara had also been exposed to the doctrine of damage limitation and counterforce targeting. The number of Soviets killed by us was less relevant than how many Soviet bombers and missiles we could destroy before they were launched against us. McNamara appeared initially to embrace that doctrine, and gave a public speech propounding a "no-cities" targeting doctrine at Ann Arbor in 1962. Yet as Harry Rowen and Desmond Ball have argued, the consequences of that doctrine were Air Force proposals for a war fighting force of over 2,000 ICBMs. McNamara shied away from the budgetary implications of the counterforce doctrine, and used the systems analysis of the assured destruction doctrine to justify reductions in the Air Force program.[11] Systems analysis did not so much determine force levels as serve as a political tool in Defense department budget fights.

The systems analysts do have a number of clear successes to point to. Perhaps the clearest is in the field of strategic mobility. They were the ones who championed strategic airlift in the form of the unjustly maligned C-5. More important, they advocated the pre-positioning of war materiel in Europe and on mobile logistic ships, which is now the heart of our plan to reinforce our military position in Europe or in Southwest Asia. The systems analysts have been accused of stifling innovation by forcing every proposal to justify itself with marginal performance increases that match marginal cost increases. Yet it was McNamara and the systems analysts who

[11] Desmond Ball, *Politics and Force Levels: The Strategic Missile Program of the Kennedy Administration* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), pp. 160, 200-201, 202-209, 273-274. See also Aaron Friedberg, "The Evolution of U.S. Strategic Doctrine," in Samuel Huntington, ed., *The Strategic Imperative* (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1982), pp. 70-72.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

prodded a reluctant Army into the more rapid adoption of the concept of helicopter-borne airmobile troops. They recommended that the B-58, the B-70, and the SKYBOLT missile be cancelled, decisions that few people, if any, now question. They curtailed the Air Force's F-105 program and compelled the Air Force to buy the F-4, which was, in fact, better suited for the kinds of conflicts we have faced during the last 20 years than the F-105 would have been. Analysts in the Nixon administration's Program Analysis Office played a supporting role in advocating the F-16 light-weight fighter, which has been a success. The only major program decision that does not appear to have been wise was the systems analysts' opposition to the Navy's desire to equip the aircraft carrier Kennedy with a nuclear propulsion system. Even if the office was correct that the extra performance given by nuclear propulsion was not worth the extra cost (which is not clear even at this point), the years of delay incurred in getting the carrier *at all*, given the fight that the Navy and its congressional supporters were willing to make, surely outweighed any money that might have been saved. Curiously, the cost-benefit analysis behind the carrier decision had been highlighted as a classic of systems analysis in an anthology published in 1965; it is left almost unmentioned in Alain Enthoven's account of the period published in 1971.

This is not an unimpressive record, even when measured against the errors of omission and commission mentioned earlier. Yet the record of the ten years *before* the advent of systems analysis in the Defense department is at least equally impressive. The hydrogen bomb, long range ballistic missiles, a highly competent elite new arm of the Air Force (the Strategic Air Command), and nuclear-powered attack and missile-carrying submarines all were strikingly successful technical or organizational innovations. They were not created without struggles, but they were created without formal systems analysis.

After the heyday

If systems analysis did not introduce major *substantive* changes into the defense establishment, why did it have such a lasting impact on the minds of men inside and outside the government? Not least of the reasons was the high intellectual quality of the academics (largely economists and management experts) who were drawn toward government service under McNamara by the prospect of working closely with an activist Secretary of Defense. The quality of the military men who formed about one-third of the professional

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

staff of the Systems Analysis Office during the 1960s was also high. Stansfield Turner was an early member of the staff, for example, and by one estimate, 10 percent of the National Security Council staff members under Henry Kissinger were alumni of the Systems Analysis Office.[12] But as the importance of the office declined over time, and the special role that it had under McNamara ended, it became harder to draw the same kind of people into the office; it is now staffed by career civil servants.

This has its good and bad sides. The systems analysts made a deep impression because of their deliberate desire to make all latent disagreements over programs and operations explicit, so that they could be thrashed out, and because of their determination to tell the services that they were wrong, instead of finding less offensive ways to curtail certain military projects. This quickly created terrible civilian-military relations, including the impression among military men, as General Maxwell Taylor put it, that "either the civilian is showing dangerous overconfidence in his own military judgement or there is an incompetent military advisor."[13] Although the memory of the McNamara days still dominates people's perceptions, the character of the staff has changed. The fact that they are long-term civil servants makes them more aware of the need to get along with the services than the whiz kids were. Although Russell Murray, an engineer by training, insisted that new employees have training in the physical sciences, most of the staff in the section of the office that now reviews ground-forces policy consists of retired military officers. The institutional power of the systems analysts in the budget process has been diminished over the years in favor of the services, and it is now the services that originate the program objective memoranda that were once the province of the Program Analysis and Evaluation Office.

The intellectual impact of economic ways of thinking on the behavior of the U.S. defense establishment is harder to pin down. Eliot Cohen and others have ably analyzed the intellectual pitfalls inherent in this approach, most notably a tendency to make decisions on the basis of characteristics that can be quantified at the expense of others that cannot.[14] This potential error, which is acknowledged by systems analysts, is built into the system, and has curious consequences. One study has shown that the methods usually used by systems analysts to evaluate the combat potential of ground

[12] Benjamin Schemmer, "How Much is Enough Tells a Lot . . . But Not Enough," *Armed Forces Journal* (February 1, 1971): 41.

[13] Kanter, *Defense Politics*, p. 89.

[14] Eliot Cohen, "Guessing Game," in Huntington, ed., *The Strategic Imperative*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

forces demonstrate that Nazi Germany's invasion of France should have failed.

The real drawbacks

Service officers occasionally talk today as if they had internalized the rhetoric of systems analysis, though it is not clear whether they do so purely for public consumption, or because they genuinely think that way. But as the arguments I have presented above suggest, the major errors committed by the United States over the last 20 years—the Vietnam War, the decision not to maintain adequate defense budgets—were primarily *political* errors, made by a national leadership and then supported by the servants of the political appointees.

Still, it is useful to note three sources of error that can result from the unthinking application of economic modes of analysis to defense problems. The first is a tendency to neglect the way our enemies think about war. This is a national deficiency in the United States, and it is reinforced by systems analysis. One can read the most coherent history of systems analysis written by a systems analyst, Alain Enthoven's *How Much is Enough*, without coming across any serious discussion of how the Soviet Union looks at defense issues. What one does find is the occasional assertion that if we find a certain tactic or form of organization useful or not useful, then so will the Soviets, and the other way around. This is an assumption the pernicious consequences of which need not be belabored.

Second, there is singular failure to recognize that our military relation with our enemies, in peace and in war, is a dynamic one in which *timing* is important. One finds that certain programs have been dismissed because countermeasures to them are conceivable. But the question of how long it would take the enemy actually to develop and deploy these countermeasures is never mentioned, nor is the possibility that the enemy's organization and concept of operations might make him slow to change. That we might develop and deploy a new weapon while the enemy is reacting to our first weapon —this possibility is beyond the intellectual universe of the systems analysts, at least as it is manifested in their writings.

Finally, there is a hopeless ignorance of the actual nature of our own defense organizations. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that the dominant theme of the systems analysts is that if only our pilots did not like to fly fast airplanes so much, and if only our sailors did not like aircraft carriers so much, and if only our soldiers did not like big tanks so much, what an efficient military we would

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

have! It is a simple fact of life that whatever the optimal structure of our forces *might* be, we nevertheless must live with military institutions that have powerful organizational imperatives. It is rather a waste of time and effort to wish that they were not the way they are. One can try to change them slightly, over time, and try to reinforce their points of strength and slowly to curtail their less useful functions. But any successful reforms will have to be based on a sound knowledge of our military institutions as they are, not as we would wish them to be.

As to what these reforms should be, we should not expect systems analysis to give us the answer. But neither can we blame systems analysis for our failure in the last decade to make significant progress in this area. If civilians are to work intelligently and effectively with the services, the defense establishment at the highest level will first have to wrestle with a very basic question: What kind of wars do we think we will fight, and how do we plan to win them? Planning of this kind is very difficult—politically, intellectually, and psychologically—for us to perform, and the difficulty is magnified by the wide range of contingencies in which our strategic obligations may place us. But there is no alternative to serious war planning, planning that takes realistic account of our diminished strength relative to the rest of the world, of the nature of our enemy, and of the time it would take us to win any major war. Our success or failure in this endeavor, rather than the impact of systems analysis, will be the real determining factor for our future security.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

On the making of lieutenants and colonels

THEODORE J. CRACKEL

AMERICAN military education has at its heart two crucial processes—the making of lieutenants and the making of colonels. How we prepare young men to lead others into battle, and how we ensure that those who assume the highest commands are well-qualified, are issues that must be addressed with utmost seriousness, because failure here can have the gravest consequences.

Assessing these two processes is largely an examination of two sets of educational institutions one finds in the American military. To make a lieutenant, the Army, Navy, and Air Force each has its individual service academy, and an extensive Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) administered at many colleges throughout the country. The academies account for a thousand or so new officers per year for each branch, and the ROTC programs an additional 3,000 to 4,000 per year. At the highest level, colonels (or at least those colonels destined for further promotion) are first educated at the five "war colleges"—one each, again, for the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and two cross-service schools, the National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

Like schools in civilian life, these institutions, if they are to succeed, must fulfill two functions. First, they must prepare students to undertake new assignments and additional responsibilities—making

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sure that they have an appropriate sense of what assignments and responsibilities are important—and lay the groundwork for the further intellectual and professional development of their students. Second, of course, these schools must themselves be repositories of knowledge, homes of the highest thinking in their respective disciplines, and the source of vigorous intellectual inquiry. How well, we must ask, do American military institutions fulfill the two crucial functions of education in general?

Training lieutenants

A key ingredient in the appeal of officer training programs for young people (and their parents) is the prospect of what is essentially a free education. The academies provide fully paid schooling plus a monthly stipend, and ROTC scholarships provide similar benefits. In return, both programs require active duty in the services for as much as five years. To find suitable students in the days of the All-Volunteer Force, these programs have begun recruiting aggressively. Acceptance into any of them is based on high-school grades, college-board scores, and measures of leadership potential and a willingness to take responsibility—such as is evidenced by holding office in high-school clubs, playing on varsity sports teams, participating in scouting, or holding a part-time job.

The thousands of these prospective officers brought into the military each year must undergo a specified program of training and education before being commissioned. This preparation includes acquiring the basic military skills and knowledge that are fundamental to the profession, and which serve as the basis for the specialized training each officer will soon undergo. Some of this is accomplished at the service academies or in ROTC units during the school year, and the balance comes at summer camps or on cruises. In addition to this training, general education requirements provide the academic foundation necessary to support continued intellectual and professional growth. Indeed, though there is always time provided during the school day for the study of the military arts and sciences, and for drill, parade, and the like, most of a student's time is devoted to more general academic pursuits. At the heart of military education at this level is the young officer's attainment of a bachelor's degree. Some services go beyond this to require the completion of selected courses and, sometimes, specific majors.

The Navy and the Air Force in particular stress engineering and the "hard" sciences. The ROTC scholarships that these services provide go almost exclusively to students choosing such majors, and the same requirement is generally in force at their academies, which

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

have a long tradition of emphasizing math, science, and engineering. For the most part, students interested in other disciplines are restricted in their choice to the Army, which, historically, has allowed a bit more latitude—particularly Army ROTC, in which, as one critical study put it, "circus management is considered neither better nor worse than majoring in nuclear engineering." In spite of these traditional tendencies, both West Point and the Air Force Academy have recently liberalized their curricula, and now allow majors in other disciplines. Even the engineers, with the exception of those at the Naval Academy, get more courses in history and social sciences than most civilian colleges require (and more than most technical curricula allow). Interestingly, after some initial flirtation with other majors, a majority of cadets at West Point themselves now select the sciences. In the class of 1976 at West Point, less than one quarter chose engineering, or basic or applied science, as an area of concentration. More than half of the class of 1981 chose those fields. No matter which major is chosen, however, cadets and midshipmen at all of the academies get a substantial dose of mathematics, science, and engineering.

The Army in particular has gone a long way toward formalizing these general education requirements. It has recently introduced its Military Qualification Standards (MQS) package. MQS I deals with pre-commission training. (Parts II and III, which will guide the training of lieutenants and captains, will be added shortly.) In addition to ensuring that each young aspirant to a commission knows how to do such things as conduct an inspection and prepare an order, and is introduced to the customs, missions, and organization of the Army, MQS I also specifies the successful completion of college-level work—in some cases, beyond that required for graduation—in a number of fields: human behavior, written communication, military history, national security studies, and management. When a course of study at a particular college allows for little elective freedom, some of these requirements may be deferred; but all of them must be completed eventually.

There is, then, significant reason for satisfaction in the way the military educates those who are about to be commissioned. But it is still crucial for the military to have as large a pool of potential applicants as possible; only then will it be possible to be very selective, and to ensure that those entering these programs are good military material. Rather troubling in this context—especially given that the size of the 18-year-old age cohort is declining—is the fact that a large (and possibly growing) share of the nation's four-year colleges

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

offers neither an on-campus ROTC program, nor a cross-enrollment agreement with ROTC units at other schools. Thus graduates of many schools have had virtually no access to military commissions —something that is true not only of small, out-of-the-way schools but also of a number of the best universities in the nation. In general, the services have done little to remedy this problem. One exception has been the Marine Corps' Platoon Leader Course, in which training is conducted during a series of summer camps, thus making an on-campus program unnecessary. This has been a successful alternative at schools that do not allow the establishment of formal ROTC programs, and the other services would do well to examine it carefully. While there will probably always be enough eager and well-qualified candidates to fill the classes at the prestigious service academies, changing demographics may make it difficult to ensure high-quality people for other officer accession programs. The services need to maintain access to as many of the best qualified as possible, and that will require inventive programs to reach the hitherto untapped sources.

The American officer's special responsibility

The bachelor's degree that newly-commissioned officers have earned is rightly taken to be evidence of a capacity for the intelligent thought that is critical to the success of today's American officer. Officers are expected—even in the junior grades—to demonstrate sophistication and sensitivity.

Some have suggested that we follow an alternative approach in training new officers. Edward Luttwak has proposed adopting the Israeli model. "The technological-managerial education given to our young officers," he suggests, "has become less and less useful, if not actually counterproductive." Electrical engineering and economics are wasted, he argues, when what we really need is to prepare men to lead in combat. "Why not teach war and tactics instead, in a course lasting perhaps one or two years instead of the present four?" In due course, those who opt to continue their military service can "receive all the education they need, but only *after* they have done their junior duty in the realm of combat." The true marks of the junior leader, he posits, are "his willingness to take personal risks in order to reduce the risks imposed on his men, his greater knowledge of the hardware and software of soldiering, and his personal store of combat tradecraft."[1]

[1] Edward N. Luttwak, "On the Meaning of Victory," *The Washington Quarterly* (Autumn 1982).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

That list, so far as it goes, is a reasonable one, but it leaves out traits that are important in the American tradition. Sergeant Major John G. Stepanek catalogued, for a class of new officers, the characteristics their Non-Commissioned Officers expected in them. Heading his list were "unassailable personal integrity and the highest morals." "We expect you," he said, "to be fair—to be consistent—to have dignity, but not aloofness—to have compassion and understanding." "We expect you to have courage—the courage of your convictions . . . [and] courage in the face of danger." But, he added, "do not display recklessness and expose yourself and your men to unnecessary risks." In fact, Stepanek has a clearer perception of the challenges these young officers will be asked to undertake than many of those who view these officers only from an academic perspective.

The Israeli model is not adequate in the American context. The problems for which American officers must be prepared are quite different from those that their Israeli counterparts face. Israeli officers can be certain that they will fight within a limited geographical area, and will engage one or more of a small set of enemies. For them, tactical excellence is built on the comprehensive knowledge of the terrain in which they have fought previously, and in which they may have to fight again. Israeli officers will fight a non-nuclear war, with only the remotest prospects of its being otherwise. They bear little or no responsibility for maintaining world peace; virtually nothing they do will have profound consequences outside the immediate region, and the possibility that a war there might erupt into a broader world confrontation rests in judgments made outside of Israel and the region.

By necessity, American officers bear broader responsibilities. It is not enough for the American military to prepare tactically proficient officers; at the same time, these officers must be taught to consider the broader issues with which they will be involved—something that is as true for the junior officer as for the senior. This is not to say that we should give our officers anything less than the best possible tactical training, nor is it to say they should not be as technically proficient in their roles as possible. It is simply to insist that we cannot afford to ignore the broader concerns with which our officers are routinely required to cope. The skills American officers require are not found solely in some "tactical proficiency kit."

The young officer

Once an officer has been commissioned, the services still have a responsibility to continue their educational efforts. The Navy has

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

outpaced the other services in developing a comprehensive training scheme for its junior officers—particularly for those of the surface fleet. Its Personnel Qualification Standards program (PQS) (which served as a model in the early development of the Army's MQS) guides Naval officers' training. It defines the training or qualification requirements for each watch and duty station a naval officer is expected to master, and provides for orderly, progressive individual training and qualification.

For Naval surface-warfare officers, PQS provides an outline of the various subjects to be mastered in order to attain qualification in their specialties. (The Navy's submariners and aviators have other proficiency programs.) For each specialty, there is a "standards booklet" that contains questions to be answered, and skills to be demonstrated. An officer's "qualification card" is a check list of what has been accomplished. As officers demonstrate the skills enumerated in the standards booklet, their supervisors mark the qualification card. The ship's captain, when personally satisfied after a rigorous process of written and oral examination that an officer is "qualified," certifies the officer's proficiency. The captain is the one who is ultimately responsible for the qualification program aboard a ship, and he must notify the Bureau of Naval Personnel if an officer fails to become qualified in the allotted period, and provide an explanation.

The Navy's PQS was fully instituted about eight years ago, and is reported to have produced a marked improvement in the technical performance and professional development of young Navy officers. Evidence of that improvement was reflected recently in shifts in the advanced course at the surface warfare school—a significant amount of material, which officers were now mastering aboard ship, was eliminated, and more advanced work was substituted. Of course PQS (and MQS) are not magical formulas, and there remains much room for improvement and modifications, but these efforts seem promising.

While the Navy program is concerned largely with military skills and knowledge, the Army's MQS has additional requirements in the area of professional military education. The section on military skills and knowledge reflects the training required for an officer to perform successfully in his specialty—infantry, armor, signal, quartermaster, etc.—but this professional development segment is required regardless of specialty.

For lieutenants and captains the essence of the professional military education component is nothing more inventive than a reading program. Officers, under the watchful eye of their commanders,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

are to select a given number of books from reading lists. These may cover the officer's branch specialties, works of contemporary interest to all officers, and the military classics. Commanders are charged not only with monitoring this process, but with guiding the younger officer's understanding of what he has read.

There is a danger in such a program, in that it may unnerve a substantial number of the company and battalion commanders who must administer it, and who likely have not read much more than the officers they are to tutor. And there is, in fact, an obvious institutional bias against such study, which will have to be overcome. Only a few years ago, for example, a program that was to encourage reading in military history and military classics, at the Army's mid-career Command and General Staff College, was trimmed to make more time available for physical training.

But it is possible that the Army has stumbled upon a very good idea in the MQS reading requirement. It would be gratifying to see these young officers and their commanders reading such works as are apt to be listed. What is more, colonels and generals may themselves be forced to do some reading. The smart money may say that colonels and generals are more likely to kill the program than to read, but optimism does deserve its day. As Emory Upton wrote a century ago, officers in peacetime should not be allowed to be consumed by the day-to-day routine, but rather should "devote . . . time to study strategy, grand tactics, military history, and the movements of armies." The real lesson here may be that the Army (and the other services, which are even farther behind) should take a hard look at what officers are doing *instead* of reading.

The education of a colonel

Promotion brings new and greater responsibility and challenges in both command and staff assignments, but does not automatically bring wisdom or broader horizons. Officers who are to assume higher command and take on key assignments in major headquarters, and who must function effectively in planning and in policy-making positions at the seat of government, require development as true "generalists." Building on the foundation of earlier education, this becomes one function of the senior service institutions, the five "war colleges." Admission to these ten-month courses is by the selection of a review board, and being picked for attendance (in all but the Navy, which does not attach much importance to the colleges) is a sure sign that the officer stands high among his colleagues. The war college admission lists, in fact, are more selective than the lists that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

announce promotions to colonel. For the lieutenant colonels ordered to the war colleges, promotion to colonel is almost sure to follow, and for all those selected, it is a sign of being considered for further advancement. Very few people become generals who have not been selected to attend a war college. It is here that the specialist is forced to become a generalist, and consider such subjects as the military as a profession and its community of professionals, the nature of the American civil-military relationship, and the admixture of foreign affairs and national interests.

Obviously this requires a very high level of sophistication in the curriculum and among faculty. Unfortunately, there is more than a little evidence to suggest problems here. Both the Air and Army War Colleges (and particularly the latter) have suffered from major curricular turbulance. Wrenching changes in the academic program at Carlisle Barracks, home of the Army War College, have become an annual event, and faculty members spend so much time organizing the courses they will teach the following year that they have little time to devote to the courses they are currently teaching.

At the root of this turbulence is a generally felt dissatisfaction with the quality of the academic program and the instruction at the school (a dissatisfaction openly expressed by students). A few years ago, in response to such criticism, a school attempted to introduce more "rigor" into the program by increasing the amount of written work required of the students. Here is a classic example of missing the point. More rigor might have meant an increased work load for the students—as a byproduct—but rigor could not be attained simply by increasing that load. Quality (or rigor) is obtained not by doing more, but by doing better.

The missing and crucial ingredient is a faculty that complements the truly outstanding students brought to these schools each year. What is called for is a faculty that is competent to explore and develop ideas in new and greater depth, a faculty that could bring thoughtful understanding into the classroom, and challenge the thinking of the students. But the sad truth is that none of the war college faculties is in the forefront of developments in any of the military disciplines they teach. (This is also true of the service academies, not one of which can boast of a renowned uniformed military historian, or military geographer, or leader in the military application of meteorology or oceanography, or any other discipline.) In the senior service schools there are too few scholars of distinction, and virtually none of these is in uniform. There are, for example, no recognizable strategic thinkers in the departments that teach strategy, as

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the record of published scholarship attests—little of it originates in the faculties of military schools.

All of this is the result of a long-time reluctance on the part of the services to invest the resources that are required. It is not a matter of monetary resources—the services have been quite generous in providing academic facilities—but in what amounts to a systematic discouragement of thinkers in uniform. Academic excellence in the military arena requires the long-term investment of carefully selected officers, but the Army and the Air Force policy of "dual tracking"—keeping each officer qualified in two specialties—and the Navy's traditional view that nothing really counts but command at sea, clash head-on with such long-term investments in the thinker's role. The Air Force and Army have never brought themselves to admit that really good officers should be invested—for the long term—in military education. And the Navy so depreciates higher learning (except in the sciences), and education in general, that it has turned over its institutions—the Naval Academy and the Naval War College—to civilians. If Clausewitz and Jomini had served in the American military, they would have been counseled to serve no more than a single three-year teaching assignment, and to escape sooner if possible. The schools are now anything but a safe haven for the select few who should be allowed to turn gray thinking and recording profound thoughts about their profession. Men so inclined, as General David Jones, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has observed, retire as lieutenant colonels, having discovered that the think-tanks in and around Washington are a more congenial environment.

"A mile wide, an inch deep"

In trying to deal with their faculty problems, the services must immediately recognize one crucial mistake. At all of these schools except the Naval War College, the sole prerequisite for appointment to the faculty is a war college diploma. (The number appointed otherwise is so small as to prove the general rule.) At first blush, this may seem to make some sense. After all, his selection for attendance as a student has meant that an officer has passed through the most selective sieve the services construct prior to selection to general or flag rank. Each must have served with distinction in a variety of assignments—in staff and command at several levels—and though the services do not like the term "ticket punching," the fact is that an officer whose ticket has not been properly punched will not be sent to school at a war college. This suggests the problem. Being picked to attend a war college is prima facie evidence that an officer

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

has not spent the time or effort necessary to develop the depth of knowledge that should be required of those who *teach* there. The lack of intellectual curiosity among the faculty should come as no surprise; it has been consciously bred out. The common analogy used (most often, by students) describes the programs at these schools as rivers "a mile wide and an inch deep."

Part of the problem is attitude. A few years ago, in one of the periodic reviews to determine the appropriate number of faculty members, a form was circulated in the Army schools; on it, instructors were asked to indicate how much time they spend at various tasks. There were blanks for time spent in the class room, for time spent counseling students, for time spent in curriculum development, and even for time spent in the gym. But nowhere was there a blank for recording time spent in reading and reflective thought, in deep and serious consideration of the military profession as an intellectual discipline faculty members are expected to teach.

Each new study of the faculties of the academies and the senior service schools insists that these institutions do more to "encourage faculty development by allowing time for research, writing, and publication." But for all of the studies, the evidence suggests that none of the several war colleges has been willing to do more than go through the motions. The Army War College, for example, instituted a prize for faculty writing, in an effort to provide an incentive. Each year it has dutifully published an embarrassingly thin list of new contributions, from which the winner is chosen. In fact, a majority of the teaching faculty have nothing at all to list—not even a book review. Only the Naval War College can claim to do better, though it has little enough to boast about on this score. When West Point was chastised for its dearth of faculty writing, the school created some tenured positions dedicated to research and publication. It is hard to escape the impression that it was easier to create new positions dedicated solely to scholarly publication than to demand performance from those already on hand. In all fairness, it should be pointed out that West Point and the Air Force Academy have recently nearly doubled the number of tenured faculty in the academic departments, to about 15 percent of the total, and that scholarly output has also increased. These are long overdue and welcome developments, but they are really only first steps.

Strategy studies in peril

Perhaps the most alarming feature of this state of affairs is the level to which strategy studies—the study of the orchestration of operations and the use of force—have sunk at the war colleges. Fac-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ulty quality is particularly crucial in the study of strategy. We expect first-class civilian universities to feature faculty members who are renowned in their fields, but, as John Collins has observed, our "military service colleges cannot make a similar claim." There may be only one exception in our history. Alfred Thayer Mahan made a monumental mark as a strategic thinker at the Naval War College, but that was nearly a century ago. It is a damning indictment of the system to admit that Collins is essentially correct. The services have produced no strategic thinkers at all. This, even, is not the worst of it. "Many strategy instructors," Collins writes, "have been no more than one step ahead of their pupils. Some have been one step or more behind." Collins notes that he himself had known "exactly nothing" about military strategy "when designated Director of Military Strategy Studies for the National War College . . . ."[2]

Once when I complained aloud that the military did little to develop strategic thinkers, an officer with whom I was talking remarked indignantly that he supposed he would have to give up the 6Z (pronounced "6-zulu") coding tag that the Army had placed in his file, thus denoting him a "strategist." It occurred to me then that in the American military establishment, strategists are neither made nor born, but simply appointed. One who chooses to call what he writes "strategy" is a strategist. No one has ever insisted that strategists produce "good" strategy.

But we should not confuse such strategists with strategic thinkers, whose development requires vastly more than a "6-zulu" tag in the files. It is possible that some have had little formal education, but none has developed his abilities without the expenditure of considerable thought or without the availability of time to think. Clausewitz spent a dozen years at the Military Academy in Berlin, and at his death had only partially completed his remarkable *On War*. Jomini, who had begun his first important work in 1805 while with Napoleon, was retained in leisure by the Russian service for years, thus giving him ample time to devote to his work; his *Summary of the Art of War* was not completed until 1837. Even the American, Alfred Thayer Mahan, spent six years developing the lectures that became *The Influence of Seapower upon History*. Such enterprises simply cannot be rushed. In an era when American officers are usually assigned to teach for a maximum of three years, with time off for skillful bureaucratic manipulation, it is no wonder that we have produced few profound military thinkers and writers.

[2] See John Collins, *U.S. Defense Planning, A Critique* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The military, if it is ever to attain the essential depth in its schools, is simply going to have to manage its intellectual assets differently. The alternative is to "civilianize," as the Navy has done. The argument against that lies in the historical record. No military establishment has ever retained its vitality after surrendering its intellectual destiny to those in mufti. Officers with both the capacity and the propensity to think will have to be nurtured.

An American education corps?

This will ultimately require the development of some career track in education in each of the services, a track in which assignment and advancement are unhooked from the main service line. The education corps of the British Army is a possible model. The U.S. Army once had an "education" specialty, but abandoned it a few years ago because it did not lend itself to central management in the same way that other specialties did. Individual officers in the Army and Air Force have sought, and sometimes obtained, repeat assignments to the faculty of the various service schools, but they are the exception and have done this at much risk to their careers. An education career track would provide a nucleus of officers capable of making a sustained contribution to professional military education and to military scholarship. Entry into this career track should occur in the middle of an officer's career, and then only after he has demonstrated exceptional potential in his subject area, and a marked facility for teaching it. (For some, such as strategists, teaching ability may be secondary.) The management of this career track would have to be decentralized, and schools and departments could largely do their own recruiting; lists of specialists would serve only as a guide to school search committees.

These professional military educators could serve in virtually all the service schools, including specialty schools and schools for enlisted men—perhaps an increasing proportion of professional military educators should be allotted as the level of the school increases. A substantial proportion of most departments at the war colleges could be filled by these professional military educators; schools for junior officers would provide billets for a proportionately smaller number. Even tactics, communication, and maintenance-management programs could be improved if they were directed by a person who had amplified his own experiences by sufficient reflection and study. We have far too many instructors whose knowledge is no deeper than their own limited experience. And if one reflects for a moment on the facts that the Air Force has done no strategic bombing, that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Navy has fought no naval engagements, and that the Army has conducted no battles at a level higher than division during the career span of most of today's officers, then experience alone seems a weak reed indeed.

Only when the services begin to manage their intellectual resources effectively will military schools begin to serve the nation as they should. The service academies, because of their inherent independence, have made many of the adjustments necessary in setting young officers on their way (though they too would benefit from the increased emphasis on military scholarship that such a program would encourage). But past that level, the situation is very bad. Fields such as the formulation of strategy can never be satisfactorily addressed until some provision is made to develop military scholars who are strategic thinkers. With the creation of military education specialties within the services, the nation might one day be able to turn to the services again for intellectual expertise in areas that fall naturally within the military realm—like strategy, tactics, military history, and military geography—rather than turning, as now, to scholars from think tanks and academia, whose influence is out of all proportion to their experience and their ultimate responsibility for the actual conduct of vital military affairs.

Optimism on this score is not easy to come by. I often think of the Leavenworth Lamp, the symbol of the Army's Command and General Staff College. It is the lamp and flame of knowledge, surmounted by an upright mailed fist—the conjunction of these two symbols representing education in a martial setting. To me, however, it has always seemed that the mailed fist is poised to beat out the flame. There is little in the American experience to suggest otherwise.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Women as soldiers— the record so far

MICHAEL LEVIN

In the last dozen years one of the major aims of military manpower policy has been to place great numbers of women in the services and to direct them toward "non-traditional" military occupational specialties (MOSs). The immediate occasions of this revolution were the end of conscription in 1973, and, simultaneously, the anticipated passage of the Equal Rights Amendment. The end of the draft ended a guaranteed supply of men, and most legal experts agreed that the ERA would end differential treatment of women in the military, particularly their exclusion from combat or any MOS. Faced with these political constraints, the Pentagon prepared to accommodate unprecedented numbers of women. Air Force and Navy women were and still are forbidden combat assignment by Title X of the U.S. Code, and Army women remain barred from combat by internal Department of the Army regulation. This combat exclusion policy was the only limit on the expansion of the female presence in the military between 1973 and 1981.

Otherwise, the Armed Forces proclaimed themselves "Equal Opportunity Employers" and made every effort to live up to this new promise. Recruitment advertising was targeted to young women. The iconography of official Pentagon publications became scrupulously unisex. The Women's Army Corps, the WAVES, and the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Women Marines were abolished. The Army dropped, as "discriminatory," its requirement that female enlistees be high school graduates. At the same time, a steady narrowing of the definition of "combat" opened more MOSs to women, and women were assigned to such elite units as the 82nd Airborne Division. The service academies were opened to women in 1976 by the Stratton Bill, an act of Congress that typified Washington's equivocal attitude toward women in the military: While ostensibly intended to create "equal opportunity" for women, it also permitted "minimal" adjustments in existing standards to accommodate "physiological differences" between the sexes. To make it even clearer that the real meaning of "equal opportunity" was that women must enter the academies, whether qualified or not by some neutral standard, Congress further mandated approximately a 10 percent admissions quota for women —a peculiar step in view of the combat exclusion, since the main purpose of the academies is to train combat officers. Indeed, with "equity" having become a dimension of manpower policy, the federal courts took a hand. In 1978, Judge John Sirica ordered the Navy to place women on non-combat ships, arguing that such service was necessary to guarantee women job-training opportunities to which they are entitled under the equal-protection clause of the 14th Amendment (*Owens* v. *Brown*).

The Carter and Reagan build-ups

The pace of sex integration accelerated during the Carter years. President Carter himself advocated registration of women for the draft, and his appointees pushed hard for repeal of the combat exclusion. In 1978, the Defense department integrated the Army's basic combat training. By the end of Clifford Alexander's tenure as Carter's Secretary of the Army, only 38 of the Army's 349 MOSs were classified as combat related, thus excluding women. When it left office, the Carter administration was projecting that the armed forces would be 12 percent female by 1985, including an Air Force as high as 15 percent female and an Army employing 87,500 female enlisted personnel and 12,500 female officers.

In early 1981, however, the Reagan administration "paused" in these integration efforts, on the grounds that the Carter projection "was not based on any empirical analysis." It set a ceiling of 65,000 enlisted women for the Army, and stabilized female recruitment for the other services. It reintroduced separate ("gender-pure") basic training in 1982 because the lower standards adopted upon integrating were failing to challenge male recruits. According to the director of Army Initial Entry Training at Ft. Monroe:

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> You get a group of young males together who want to prove their manhood and we found they would go beyond the criteria. We call this the 'stretch factor.' We found the women couldn't keep up . . . because of [their] physical structure.[1]

To be sure, this "pause" may perhaps more accurately be called merely a deceleration; shortly after the pause was announced, the Army raised its female recruitment ceiling to 70,000, and by October 1983 the ceiling was 72,500. By mid-1983 the Defense department was projecting a 10 percent female active-duty officer corps in the armed forces as a whole for 1987, and 12 percent for the Army.[2] It also drew up legislation authorizing conscription of female medical personnel.

The expansion of the female role in the military has been a smashing success by numerical standards, the Reagan pause notwithstanding. Whereas in 1971 only 1.3 percent of the active-duty enlisted personnel in the armed forces were female, by the end of FY 1982 that figure was 9.1 percent. The Air Force's enlistees are now 11 percent female, while the Army's 70,000 female enlistees represent more than a seven-fold increase since 1965. Inevitably, the very criteria by which the military judges itself have now begun to change. Combat training at Ft. Benning now includes a course on sexual harassment. Cadets at West Point are instructed to refrain from bad language to plebes and are rated on "attitudes toward equal opportunity." I have been told by officers requesting anonymity that filing a field report raising questions about the performance of women can have an adverse effect on an officer's career. Indeed, there would appear to be some evidence to suggest an effort to paper over the difficulties that have arisen: "WAC 77," the report on the performance of women during the 1977 REFORGER war-games exercises, managed to conclude both that "10% women has negligible impact on unit performance in a 10 day field exercise for the types of companies tested," and that "a number of leadership and management problems involving women were observed." These changes in criteria have made it difficult to form an objective assessment of the Pentagon's unprecedented experiment.

Unprecedented it is, and radical, when viewed in historical perspective. Contrary to a widespread misconception, no nation, not even Israel or the USSR, has employed women to anything like the extent to which they are now employed in the American military.*

* The USSR has 10,000 women in a total active force of over 4,000,000, performing traditionally female medical and clerical chores, and the paramilitary branches of the KGB are virtually all male. There is not a single female general officer in the Soviet forces. Israel has fewer than 3 percent women in its military, all of whom are used in traditional ways. Deeply committed to sexual equality, Israel sent women into battle

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

No doubt every woman must pick up a gun when the enemy is charging through the gates—East Germany, with no women in its military, has plans for drafting women in case of "national emergency"—but the sexual integration of the American military is not analogous. It marks the first massive peacetime increase in the number of women in any army, and the first indiscriminate mixing of the sexes in military units.

Coping with physical shortcomings

Despite the optimistic face put on events by the Defense department, the Reagan administration paused because problems had emerged by the late 1970s. Since women (such as those in the Signal Corps) had been stationed so near battle zones, heavy female casualties appeared inevitable in the event of war in Europe. A far more concrete problem, though, was the female strength deficit. Commanders of combat support and combat service support units were encouraged to use women in unit training programs, but to exclude them from grenade training, for example, because most women have difficulty throwing a grenade far enough. Not only were women holding back men in basic training, they were proving insufficiently strong to perform many of the "non-traditional" MOSs to which they had been assigned. Two articles in the *Army Times* in March 1977 by retired Brigadier General Theodore Metaxis brought this problem into focus, and General Metaxis recommended the development and administration of scientific strength tests to prepare women more efficiently for military jobs.[3] In May 1981 the Army undertook just such a review of its assignment of women to physically demanding specialties, and to positions near combat. Its results were published in November 1982 as *Women in the Army Policy Review* (known as WITA).

WITA documented difficulties that could have been predicted on the basis of physiology. Female upper body strength is on average only 58 percent that of males.[4] Due to the lower muscle/fat ratio in female bodies, women perform 20 to 40 percent below men on strength tests (when body weight is controlled for). Extended training does not narrow the male/female difference in muscle strength and aerobic power.[5] These physiological differences, one might think, would severely constrain female participation in the military:

in the relatively low intensity 1948 war, and withdrew them in three weeks—which sexual egalitarians interpret as Israel's failure to be "committed to equal opportunity for women." The Soviets used women in combat in World War II, but relatively sparingly, and only after losing several million men at the start of the war. Moreover, these women served in all-female units.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Army's standard light machine gun, the M-60, weighs 28.9 pounds, and those doubting a soldier needs strength should try to carry an M-60 for an hour. WITA found, in fact, that over 90 percent of Army MOSs call for upper body strength, that 74 percent of Army personnel must lift at least 65-85 pounds, and that a number of "Very Heavy" MOSs require lifting over 100 pounds, with frequent lifting of 50 pounds. Even though only 3 percent of women can perform "Very Heavy" tasks, as opposed to 80 percent of men, the Army had assigned 42 percent of its women to "Very Heavy" jobs.[6] About 50 percent of women assigned to "Heavy" or "Very Heavy" MOSs attrite, compared to 31 percent of the men. (In general, female attrition runs about 50 percent ahead of male attrition.) In light of these findings, WITA recommended the development of a "gender-neutral" Military Entrance Physical Strength Capacity Test (MEPSCAT) to help in assigning MOSs to recruits. It also recommended closure of 23 additional MOSs due to the probability that soldiers assigned to them "will routinely engage in direct combat."

These modest proposals generated much angry opposition from egalitarian lobbies, such as the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS), a civilian body charged with advising the Pentagon, and the Women's Equity Action League. They charged that the WITA report ignored the possibility of equipment redesign, and of alternative ways of performing tasks that would offset the strength gap. A woman unable to lift a 100-pound truck tire, it was argued, might be able to roll it—although no new methods emerged for dragging an unconscious 180-pound soldier from a burning helicopter. DACOWITS demanded that a *new* study group study WITA, in order to offset an alleged erosion in female morale caused by WITA and the end of co-educational basic training.[7] On the whole, Reagan officials tended to agree. Sharon Lord, the Pentagon's top equal opportunity officer, said that the end of co-ed basic training was "highly unfortunate [and] smacks of the old argument of 'separate but equal.'"[8] Other administration officials were, at best, defensive. Lawrence Korb, the Defense department's Assistant Secretary for Manpower, promised "career-enhancing assignments" for women—including "close monitoring" of the promotion of women, lest the combat exclusion slow their rise through the ranks—and he expressed, obliquely, opposition to the combat exclusion itself. Even before WITA appeared, Ronald Reagan himself, when quoting from George C. Marshall in a speech at West Point, had carefully replaced all of Marshall's references to "men" with "men and women."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The second thoughts expressed in the WITA report led in the end to very little. In October 1983 the Army reopened 13 of the MOSs closed by WITA, while closing one additional specialty. It also announced that MEPSCAT, the physical strength test, would go into effect in October 1984 "only as a guideline":

> For example, prospective enlistees may be unable to lift the 80-pound weight found to be the best predictor of success in jobs classified as "heavy" or "very heavy" in terms of their physical demands. If they chose [sic], the prospective enlistees may still enlist for jobs in that category if other classification criteria permit.[9]

The Army had thus come to allow the "opportunity" to pursue a career regardless of any test results indicating unfitness.

Changing the standards

The reception of the WITA report illustrates the obstacles now in place even to the evaluation of purely physical characteristics. Such evaluations are invariably attacked as "discriminatory" when, as they must, they reveal sex differences. Sharon Lord objected to the end of co-ed basic on the grounds that "the male soldier might feel apprehensive being supported by a woman who did a different training"—as if it were unreasonable to be apprehensive about support troops who would have failed the ordinary training.[10]

This attack on *military* job standards is certainly related to the view of civilian job standards put forth by the judiciary, and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, in interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. In *Griggs* v. *Duke*, the Supreme Court held that job standards which disparately affect a protected minority, however unintentionally, are discriminatory if they are not "reasonably related" to the job itself. Indeed, sexual egalitarians are pressing this Title VII test for the military. A counsel for the Women's Equity Action League told the author that a possible route to "equal opportunity" would be to challenge the WITA task analyses via Title VII lawsuits.[11] In a similar vein, Carter's Air Force Under-Secretary Antonia Chayes recently told the Senate Judiciary Committee that, under ERA, physical standards in the military that resulted in fewer qualifying females than males would have to be "justified" and "demonstrably related" to job performance: "I would ask whether 40 push-ups or 60 push-ups are required to do most jobs."[12]

As I have noted, the services themselves have shunned a "sex equity" conceived as a maximal standard for all, instead holding women to lower standards, or lowering all standards to accommodate women. When a federal court found height and weight require-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ments for police candidates discriminatory under Title VII, West Point immediately eliminated height and weight requirements. Since few women can do chin-ups, West Point requires its female applicants to perform one "flexed arm hang," while continuing to ask 6 chin-ups from male applicants. West Point women do not take hand-to-hand combat training with men, and when only 14 percent of the females at West Point proved able to achieve a passing time on the 2-mile run—as opposed to 96 percent of the males—West Point decided to allow women to "pace themselves." The Air Force Academy has eliminated push-ups from its training, and has lowered its obstacle course so that women can clear it. The Army trains men with M-14's and women with the lighter M-16, with bolt pressure reduced from 8 to 5 pounds.

WITA also highlights, if less directly, the cost of combing the female population for a few standouts when more than enough capable males are available. There is, after all, little information to be gained from a test that only 3 percent of an antecedently identifiable subpopulation can pass—assuming Title VII considerations did not thwart the test at the outset—and it is not clear why one should spend millions of dollars finding the one woman in a thousand able and willing to lift heavy truck tires when there will always be someone who can lift truck tires in an all-male motor pool.

The point is even clearer in the case of combat. Despite confident assertions to the contrary, there are no tests for combat capability—nor have any such tests been needed for male armies. One wonders why it is necessary to develop expensive predictors—which can only be validated, too late, in combat itself—when men, plenty of whom are available, are known to form effective fighting units. Searching out the thousand or so women who would place in the top million of a demanding strength-aggression test would violate the military maxim that means must be economized. It is certainly not clear that these unusual women have a "right" to be recognized, and if it is said that unusual women must be sought out because insufficient numbers of men volunteer for service, that is as much as to accuse the All-Volunteer Force of failure.

The new "friction factors"

Speaking more generally, the United States has already spent a great deal of money on a vast variety of special provisions for women essential to sustaining the proposition that the sexes are militarily interchangeable. Most of these are necessitated by physical differ-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ences between the sexes, which do not end at strength. The smaller skeleton and wider pelvis of the female makes her less well-suited to the 30-inch stride basic to all military drill and marching. Combined with the greater narrowness of the female heel, this has meant that, even in narrow sizes, the standard Army booting, which has proved satisfactory for men, has created proneness to injury in women, and so has been changed.[13] Prolonged sitting in standard helicopter seats was found to cause back pain in women, necessitating the redesign of the seats. Lost time due to urinary tract infection, to which females are prone in the filth incidental to field conditions, has necessitated the redesign of underwear and trousers. Among other items that have required redesign are flak vests, gas masks, helmets, gloves, cold-weather jackets, and uniforms (maternity uniforms have also been added). The formerly male-oriented supply system has had to be amplified to include a wider range of uniform sizes. Problems have been created by weapons such as the .45 caliber pistol, which is too large and heavy to be fired effectively by many women. (The Army Office of Public Affairs told the author that the contemplated abandonment of this pistol, which has been in use since 1912, has nothing to do with difficulties women have in handling it.)

The requirements of female privacy have led to the duplication of field clothing exchange units, baths, and latrine facilities. Shipboard living quarters have had to be altered so that male personnel do not routinely pass through female latrine and sleeping quarters. Female soldiers serving in isolated areas must be protected, adding to the troop strength that must be deployed, paid, equipped, and maintained. The reduced stamina of some women during their menstrual cycles increases the workload on male soldiers, a problem exacerbated by the tendency of women in groups to synchronize menstruation involuntarily. The medical support base of the military has had to be increased to include physicians with expertise in gynecological problems. To all this might be added the $20,000 budgeted at Ft. Jackson to teach female recruits how to apply makeup.

But by far the most pervasive "friction factor"—to use Clausewitz's phrase—unique to a sexually integrated military is pregnancy. At any one time, 10 to 15 percent of the females in the Army are pregnant. Pregnancy is no longer grounds for discharge, and NATO has had to contend with female soldiers who do not report for duty because they are unable to find babysitters. It has been said that the orderly rooms in Europe at midnight resemble nurseries. In the event of emergency, pregnant soldiers in critical positions will have to be evacuated, and others will be absent from duty, seeking shelter for their babies. Such a prospect corrodes unit morale and degrades

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

readiness, yet the issue of pregnancy has yet to be faced by the Defense department.[14] WITA avoided the issue on the grounds that it is an issue for all the services, not just the Army, and advised the Defense department to initate a "Joint Study effort."

The placement of pregnant women alongside "traditional" male soldiers brings to mind, by means of defying, a more recent military axiom: that the capabilities of every soldier will be critical in the next war. This axiom runs counter to the egalitarian claim that women have the "right" to the "important opportunity" of combat, or that combat is a burden that women must bear to achieve "true equality."[15] By far the most popular argument for this claim is that combat has changed, that the old skills and motivations needed in hand-to-hand combat are now passé. This argument has persuaded some in the Defense department, which has assigned women to NATO ground-launched cruise missile crews. DACOWITS, the advisory committee, is pressing hard for the assignment of women to MX crews. The argument is nonetheless ill-founded. Modern technology has changed only the levels of firepower that can be brought against individual soldiers. Mutual nuclear deterrence has made long-distance strategic exchanges far less likely than conventional warfare, and at the operational level, accurate tactical atomic weapons have ended the long-term massing of troops. The Army imagines future wars to be highly improvisational, with the outcome resting on "*initiative, depth, agility and synchronization . . . maneuver and surprise* . . . leadership, unit cohesion and effective independent operations."[16] Casualties will be heavy in what are nominally "support" areas. The recent Falklands campaign has confirmed this basic picture. While Argentina had the preponderance of futuristic weapons, the British had morale, leadership, and—what proved to be decisive—traditional infantry stamina.[17]

The fluidity of modern warfare, the blurring of the distinction between forward and rear, prompts egalitarians to urge repeal of combat exclusion. Some say that women need "protection" from being plucked from their assignments once the shooting starts. Others, like Antonia Chayes, argue that since women are bound to be casualties in great numbers anyway, they may as well be allowed to better their chances for promotion by fighting: "It is time to recognize the fact that women have performed well, and are here to stay . . . If we want to protect women from high risk of casualty, we will have to bury them underground."[18] But, of course, if combat is no place for women, and the combat zone is indefinite, the logically correct conclusion is to keep women from all "combat zones," defined as broadly as necessary.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Morale

All competent observers concede that morale problems threaten to abrade a sexually integrated military. "Sexual harassment," for instance, is now a major Defense department target, and the subject of Army regulations that refer complaints of harassment through the chain of command. Of course, what is perceived by women as "harassment" may well be the sort of hazing that men have undergone for centuries in order to be psychologically fit during war, a hazing that has no counterpart in female groups.[19] Another morale problem comes from the reluctance of many men to subordinate themselves to women, a difficulty that may arise when female officers and NCOs are placed in command over male personnel. Orders given by women may lack the psychological weight that attends orders given by men who are seen as being capable of backing up words with more tangible measures; this is an important consideration in situations of great stress. Moreover, the vernacular used by male NCOs to galvanize male soldiers may be seen as anomalous when used by women.[20] Female officers thus may have to rely more heavily upon the code of military justice than "leadership by example"; in fact, military publications explicitly urge female officers to secure obedience by using their rank.[21]

But competition among men for women is the morale problem least enthusiastically addressed by egalitarians. Conventional military wisdom takes male-female bonding to be a disruptive matter of chemistry, against which regulations are powerless. If so, there is nothing to be done about sexual fraternization beyond eliminating the conditions of its occurrence. This course does not recommend itself to egalitarians. Sue Berryman finds it "self evident" that sexual rivalry can be reduced by "constituting units with roughly equal numbers of men and women."[22] As for males protecting females in disregard of unit goals, she suggests that "we may have already observed the limits of [protectiveness] in past wars with all-male combat units." She speculates further that bonding may be an adaptation to sex-neutral roles, which women will display as soon as they are given the chance. The egalitarian orthodoxy maintains that sexual integration presents "management problems" no different from the problems presented by racial integration.[23]

It would misstate the issue to observe that neither the egalitarians nor their critics have made a definitive case. In fact, the egalitarian case is distinctive in its dependence on extrapolations, analogies, and suppositions for which it offers not a scintilla of evidence. It is unsettling enough that many of these analogies are patently

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

absurd: How can sexual relations be compared to race relations when white males are not prone to fall in love with black males? Given that the world's military establishments have always operated on the premise that men function best when teamed with other men, a mere scattering of suppositions ought not qualify as a cogent alternative. A strongly pro-egalitarian article in the U.S. Army's official magazine summarized the case for "the complete integration of women in military service" in this way: "Just because it has never been done doesn't mean that it couldn't or shouldn't be done."[24] Nothing more positive could be found, evidently, in favor of "complete integration."

The egalitarian diversion

Ultimately, of course, the pressure to integrate the military is part of a general social movement toward sexual equality. In both its general form and its military application, this egalitarianism can only be understood as a straightforward denial of innate sex differences beyond the obvious anatomical differences. DACOWITS, the official advisory group, asserts categorically that "Women have the same skills and talents as men."[25] On the supposed female aversion to killing, "I think that this is a cultural concept that really does not necessarily accord with the truth now . . . I do not think there is any sex difference . . . look at the Amazons."[26] At the same time, even egalitarians recognize some statistical differences; the egalitarian response is to assimilate these differences to differences between men, and then to disregard them:

> Oriental men are also significantly lighter and shorter than Caucasians on the average, but this in no way precludes their use in the military, nor has it precluded various Asian nations from fielding very effective fighting forces.[27]

The male advantage in aggression becomes a similar non-issue:

> We do not know how much men and women of the ages relevant to combat differ in aggressive behaviors. More important, the implications of any differences for using women in combat are not clear . . . variations *among males* are not felt to affect combat effectiveness.[28]

I have noted in passing some of the inconsistencies that develop when one denies the very existence of sex differences while urging their irrelevance to policy. Betty Friedan, invited to speak at West Point, enthused later over girls there "playing soldier like the boys . . . without trying to turn themselves into men."[29] At times the essential contradiction becomes quite clear. In November 1979, Antonia Chayes told the House Armed Services Committee that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> It is not sensible to shut out 50 percent of a dwindling manpower pool . . . The Air Force would be pleased to exceed its goal. Many of the most critical shortages—engineers, scientists, pilots—can be filled by qualified women.

In December 1979 she told a private conference on the AVF that

> The fact is, we don't find large numbers of women to fill the technical areas, neither enlisted nor officers. It's very hard to find women engineers. This, I think, is a product of our educational system and cultural bias.[30]

The ERA, again before Congress, remains the principal instrument for imposing this amalgam of ideas on the military. Antonia Chayes—picked by ERA proponents as the person best able to represent them on military matters—told the Senate Judiciary Committee that ERA would

- outlaw male-only draft registration, male-only conscription, combat exclusion, the treatment of pregnancy as anything but a "disability," and the segregation of men and women no matter what disciplinary problems were created by placing them together;
- require the academies to admit males and females on an equal basis;
- place all military standards, even neutral ones, under Court scrutiny;
- eliminate all gender-based distinctions in military law and policy *and* permit "affirmative action," including relaxed promotional standards, for women.

It is well to remember that this country's previous "noble experiments" were undertaken with some antecedent agreement about criteria for success or failure. It was possible to repeal the Volstead Act because, once it became clear that Prohibition was strengthening organized crime, all sides agreed that this was undesirable. Alas, there is no similar consensus on criteria for success or failure of a sex-integrated military. The very consequences deplored by critics are likely to be greeted as boons by egalitarians. Miss Chayes has urged passage of the ERA "not *despite* its consequences for national security, but because it will strengthen our ability to meet all military requirements and eradicate a remaining bastion of inequality in our society."

When, in the past, the issue was the place of women in the military, the ground rules were clear: Women in all-female units have served with distinction, but the ultimate test for female service was whether it freed men to fight. The intrusion of these feminist notions of equity obscure this truism. As Clausewitz insisted a century and a half ago, "the whole of military activity must . . . relate directly or

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

indirectly to the engagement. The end for which a soldier is recruited, clothed, armed and trained, the whole object of his sleeping, eating, drinking and marching is simply that he should fight at the right place and the right time." This precept has been ignored for the last dozen years by the civilian authors of military policy.

NOTES

[1] Allen Carrier, "Defense EO Chief Decries End of Army Coed Basic," *Army Times* (July 12, 1983).

[2] Randall Shoemaker, "Women Officers Expected to Increase to 12%," *Army Times* (June 13, 1983).

[3] Theodore Metaxis, "How Realistic Are Female PT Standards?", *Army Times* (March 21, 1977); and "WAC Training Needs Scientific Evaluation," *Army Times* (March 28, 1977).

[4] D. Woal et al., "Analysis of Attrition, Retention and Criterion Task Performance of Recruits During Training," US Army Medical Research and Development Command Technical Report T2/82 (Washington, D.C.: 1982).

[5] W. L. Daniels et al., "The Effects of Two Years of Training in Aerobic Power and Muscle Strength," US Army Institute for Environmental Medicine, Report No. M-12/80 (Washington, D.C.: 1980).

[6] See *Army Times* (April 11, 1983).

[7] Larry Carney, "Panel Recommended to Review WITA Actions," *Army Times* (April 28, 1983); Larry Carney, "DACOWITS Seeks Halt to Plans that Bar Women," *Army Times* (June 27, 1983).

[8] Carrier, *Army Times*.

[9] Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), News Release No. 522-83 (Washington, D.C.: October 20, 1983).

[10] Carrier, *Army Times*.

[11] Interview, June 15, 1983.

[12] Antonia Chayes, Testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, November 1, 1983.

[13] D. M. Kowal, "Nature and Causes of Injuries in Women Resulting from an Endurance Training Program," *The American Journal of Sports Medicine* 8, 4 (1980): 267; reprinted as Appendix C of WITA.

[14] See Michele McCormick, "Soldier-Mothers Create a Feeling of Concern," *Army Times* (July 4, 1983).

[15] See American Civil Liberties Union, *Women's Rights Report*; also, statement of the National Organization for Women, February 21, 1980. See also WEAL's amicus brief in *Goldberg* v. *Rotsker* (1980).

[16] United States Army, FM-100-5, (revised August 20, 1982), pp. 1-2.

[17] See William Fowler, *Battle for the Falklands: Land Forces* (London: Osprey, 1982).

[18] Antonia Chayes, Testimony.

[19] See Judith Mann, "Is It Really Discrimination, or Just Hazing?" *Philadelphia Inquirer* (June 3, 1982).

[20] See "Male Voice Carries Authority, Says Study," *New York Times* News Service (February 5, 1981).

[21] See, for example, Marianne Lester, "When The Boss is a Woman," *The Times* (January 14, 1980).

[22] Sue Berryman in "The Social Composition of American Enlisted Forces" (New York: Ford Foundation, February 1983), p. 105.

[23] See, for example, the ACLU *Women's Rights Report*.

[24] Sgt. Maj. Bruce N. Bant, "Working Together: The Army's Assault on Sexism," *Soldier* (October, 1980): 6.

[25] Marietta Tree, "Report of a Visit to a Military Center by a DACOWITS Member" (November 17, 1979).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

[26] Antonia Chayes, *Women in the Military*, pp. 65-6.

[27] Federal Judge Max Rosen writing for a three-judge panel that overturned male-only draft registration in *Goldberg* v. *Rotsker* (1980), a decision reversed by the Supreme Court in 1981.

[28] Berryman in "The Social Composition."

[29] "Reality Test at West Point," in Betty Friedan, *The Second Stage* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982).

[30] Antonia Chayes, quoted in Martin Anderson, ed., *Registration and the Draft* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution, 1982), p. 42.

• CONTRIBUTORS •

THEODORE J. CRACKEL is a Senior Fellow in Military Studies at the Heritage Foundation in Washington, D.C.

MICHAEL LEVIN is a Professor of Philosophy at the City University of New York.

FRANK J. POPPER teaches in the Urban Studies, Urban Planning, and Geography Departments at Rutgers University.

STEPHEN ROSEN is a member of the National Security Staff.

MARTIN D. SORIN is Director of the Sorin Research Institute in Cooperstown, New York. His research was supported by grants from the National Institute of Justice. The views expressed in his article are his own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Institute.

NATHAN TARCOV is an Associate Professor of Political Science and an Associate Professor in the College at the University of Chicago.

MICHAEL S. TEITELBAUM is Program Officer at the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation in New York. His article was written while he was Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

RICHARD TOMLINSON is a Harkness Fellow from the United Kingdom. He recently completed a Ph.D. at Cambridge University and the Institut National d'Etudes Demographiques, Paris, on the history of French population policy.

MERRY I. WHITE is Director of the Project on Human Potential at the Harvard Graduate School of Education, and a sociologist specializing in Japanese education.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Principle and prudence in foreign policy: the founders' perspective

NATHAN TARCOV

A political community that achieved independent existence through armed struggle, the United States of America is founded on principles that justify and regulate the use of force. Its policies for developing and employing its capacities to use force have been defended and attacked at home in part on the basis of those principles. Geopolitical facts and technological innovations, as well as strategic and tactical imperatives common to political communities of widely differing principles, may be more important in shaping precisely *how* force is used and *what* capacities to use it are developed. But the distinctive, fundamental political principles of a political community are especially important in shaping why force is used and why the capability to use it is acquired. *Why* force is used in turn critically influences *when*, if not always directly how, it is used. Once force is used war may have its own logic, but in peacetime the ability to use force has an effect on events that depends decisively on what ends or principles are understood to justify and regulate its use.

Appreciating a country's basic political principles does not enable one to predict the particular outcomes of its debates about defense

The original version of this article was prepared for the Kenyon College Public Affairs Conference Center. This is printed here with Kenyon's kind permission.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

policy, but can enable one to understand the meaning for the society both of those debates themselves and of any particular policy outcome. As we consider the efforts of the United States to deal with the defense dilemmas of a late twentieth-century nuclear superpower, we can still find guidance in examining the principles expounded and applied by the founders of the American republic.

Realism v. idealism: the misleading dichotomy

An effort to take seriously the principles of our founding as the fundamental context of U.S. defense policy may seem to smack of flagrant idealism as opposed to the realism appropriate to the realm of force. Realists are supposed to look only at facts, realities, and interests, whereas only idealists look at values, ideals, and principles. Realists claim that countries always use force or threats in their own interests on the basis of real facts—or at least when countries fail to do so (and realists often find that America fails to do so) realists tend to become contemptuous or even angry. But a country's principles (or "ideals" or "values" or "political culture" as they are designated in other interpretations) do make a difference. They shape what it considers to be its true interests and even what it sees as the relevant and real facts about the world, and whether and when and how long it thinks those interests should be pursued by force.

But it is not my intention to argue against what is called realism on behalf of what is called idealism. On the contrary, perhaps the greatest obstacle to clarity in thinking about foreign affairs is this dichotomy, the widely shared notion that, at least when it comes to foreign policy, and especially as it approaches or involves the use of force, our choice is and must be between idealism and realism. According to this view, one alternative is a kind of moralism that pays little or no attention to interests, risks, power, geography, the variety of facts and circumstances, and the necessity of gaining and sustaining consent at home and abroad for policies no matter how right they are. It would either do without force, as if every other country were also a liberal democracy or the world as a whole were one big loosely federal liberal democracy, or it would employ force to produce these conditions. The other alternative is supposed to be a kind of cynicism that pays no attention to principle, treats the necessity of gaining consent as a mere matter of manipulation, and uses force as if a liberal democracy like ours were no different from the rest of the realistic world.

This symmetry—one treats the world as if it were or could soon be made just like us, while the other treats us as if we were just like

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the rest of the world—manifests a radical similarity. Both are, I believe, dangerously abstract. They both abstract from the salient political reality: the differences between different political regimes. They both abstract from our character as a liberal democracy differing from the non-liberal and non-democractic regimes with which we must deal, and from the world as a whole, which always contains differing and competing regimes. Both so-called idealism and so-called realism assume that American principles could apply to the world only if we treat the world as if it is already informed by those principles, or try (if necessary by force) to impose them on recalcitrant foreign matter. (The only difference is that realism recoils in gentle contempt or righteous indignation from such naiveté or hubris, and concludes that principles are therefore altogether irrelevant.)

This dichotomy affects not only those who study national security policy but those who conduct and officially expound it as well. For purposes of simplification, if not caricature, one could label the practical versions of the two alternatives "Carter" and "Kissinger." The dichotomy therefore does indeed have some descriptive value—not, as I see it, as an articulation of the sensible and sound choices we should make, but as an aid in the diagnosis of pathology. For a more sober understanding of the relation of American principles to the use of power in a world where America was the only nation explicitly dedicated to those principles, I turn to our founding. For America had the great good fortune to be founded at, and thus to preserve, that truly golden moment between Machiavelli and Kant when political philosophy tried to restore the dignity of justice without abstracting from experience.

Prudence complements principle

The Declaration of Independence is the most famous and fundamental American statement of the principles justifying and regulating the use of force. Its principles have been so important for the peaceful conduct of our domestic affairs that we may almost forget that it was in large part a justification of our armed struggle. Most urgently, it proclaimed our independence to foreign countries so they could recognize our right, as the conclusion runs, "as free and independent states" to "have full power to *levy war*, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, and do all other acts and things which independent states may of right do [emphasis added]."

Was that Declaration idealistic or realistic? It certainly justified our independence and the associated policies of war and alliance on the basis of abstract principles explicitly announced in a universal

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

form that applied to all men and all peoples. But it did so in an effective way well calculated to create and promote that most fundamental national interest of national independence (it reassured potential foreign allies that their aid would not result merely in a reconciliation within the British empire). More specifically, the Declaration not only states those universal principles of the equality of men, inalienable rights, government by consent, and the right of revolution, but in its very next word invokes *prudence*. The Declaration proclaims that all peoples have the right to alter governments that fail to secure their rights; it does not require every people in such a situation, as almost every people then was and most remain, to exercise that right immediately. It declares the right of every people connected by political bands to another people to dissolve those bands when necessary; it does not demand that every colonial people actually assume at once a separate and equal station among the powers of the earth. It absolves the United States from all allegiance to the British crown because, after George III had committed "every act which may define a tyrant" and become therefore "unfit to be the ruler of a free people," every other appeal had been exhausted; it does not insist that every people subject to a monarch depose him.

In all these respects (and others) the Declaration's abstract universal principles leave room for prudence. Universal principles may teach us what our rights are, but prudence must teach us whether and when and how to exercise them. A doctrine of rights necessarily leaves great scope for prudence—certainly more than does a doctrine of imperatives. The founders therefore would not accept our dichotomy of idealism and realism; they would offer instead the complementary relation of *principle and prudence*. From their perspective the relation is not dichotomous but complementary, a relation of application and judgment. Principles are not self-applying: They do not tell you what to do. They require prudence and judgment for their application. Prudence is not self-sufficient either; it requires principles for guidance.

In the view of the founders, the justification of the use of force has both aspects: a universal principle of rights and a set of prudential judgments. One first must accurately judge whether rights have been violated, and then the significance of that violation for one's other rights in the context of other actions, including most importantly the response to one's peaceful appeals. One must also judge whether vindicating one's rights is worth it; the mere fact of violation does not establish that. Prudence indeed dictates not only that long-established governments should not be changed, but more generally that force should not be used "for light and transient causes."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This dual character of the Declaration's justification of the use of force can be clarified by looking at one of its sources: the *Second Treatise of Government* of John Locke. That source also makes clear that the exercise of the right of revolution or resistance involved in the Declaration is merely one particular case of the more general case of the justifiable use of force or the right to make war. Locke repeatedly emphasizes that justified resistance is against rulers who "put themselves into a state of War with their People" which is "very little different" in its effects from foreign conquest. Indeed, Locke seems to provide his general discussion of the state of war for the practical purpose of explaining the particular case of the right of resistance. It is not, therefore, a mistake to take the right of revolution or resistance in the Declaration also as the model for the justification of the use of force in other cases, such as foreign wars. The American instance was not simply one of a people resisting its own government, but of the separation of one people from another which, therefore, becomes as foreign "as we hold the rest of mankind, enemies in war, in peace friends."

Whether discussing the state of war between individuals, between peoples, or between a people and its rulers, Locke makes clear that war results from an actual or threatened violation of one's rights that renders peaceful appeals ineffectual. The ultimate justification for the use of force is self-preservation, a response to a threat to one's life, but the point of Locke's theory is to build fences against that ultimate threat. Proximate justifications for the use of force, therefore, include the defense of liberty and property, the rights to which are the most secure fences around the right to life. One must judge whether one's rights are threatened in this way. But that is not the only judgment required to justify the use of force. One must be sure not only that "he has Right on his side" but also that it is "a Right too that is worth the Trouble and Cost" of fighting for, including the mischiefs thereby inflicted on "any part of Mankind." One may also have to judge whether the precedent and consequences of the violation of others' rights threaten one's own rights. One must also prudently judge whether one has the power, courage, and opportunity to vindicate the violated rights by force. Thus, the Lockean justification of the use of force involves both universal principles of right and prudential judgments in a complementary relationship.

The limits of Doctrines

American justifications for the use of force have typically repeated this pattern. One side is emphasis on the vindication of American rights. In 1812, James Madison proposed that the United States "op-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pose force to force in defense of their national rights" in response to British violation of "the sacred rights of persons" through impressing seamen sailing under the American flag, "violating the rights and the peace of our coasts," and showing "hostility to the commercial rights and prosperity of the United States."[1] James Polk alleged that our citizens had been "plundered of their property and deprived of their personal liberty if they dared insist on their rights" by Mexico even before she supposedly "became the aggressor by invading our soil in hostile array and shedding the blood of our citizens."[2] Similar actual, threatened, or alleged violations of American rights have been invoked to justify the use of force in later cases. Americans would rather cite violations of rights by others than our own opportunities to gain advantages, promote interests, or acquire territory or glory. The fundamental presupposition that only the violation of rights justifies the use of force gives American attitudes on this matter a peculiarly legalistic cast as well as a defensive tone. American strategy and tactics in the use of force have not always been defensive, but our initial justifications for it have always been so. The claim that we are using force only to vindicate violated rights may even give the actual use of force once initiated an especially punitive or offensive character.

The premise that only the violation of rights justifies the use of force also may make it hard to prepare to use force in peacetime. It should not, however, make us reluctant to recognize a violation for fear that such a finding necessarily commits us to forceful vindication, because the other side of deliberation is properly the prudent judgment whether to exercise the right forcibly to vindicate violated rights. There is indeed no right to do so without having conscientiously weighed the costs to all innocent parties, the precedents and consequences, and the power, will, and opportunity to win. Daniel Webster, for example, argued that it was "our duty to oppose, from the earliest to the latest moment," any innovations, such as the doctrine of the Holy Alliance claiming the right of forcible interference in the affairs of other states (the Brezhnev doctrine of its day), "which shall bring into doubt or question our own equal and independent rights." But he insisted equally on the universality of that duty and on the prudent application of it to policy:

> The near approach or the remote distance of danger may affect policy, but cannot change principle. The same reason that would authorize us to protest against unwarrantable combinations to interfere between Spain

[1] James Madison, Message to the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States, June 1, 1812.

[2] James K. Polk, Second Annual Message to Congress, December 8, 1846.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> and her former colonies, would authorize us to protest if the same combination were directed against the smallest state in Europe, although our duty to ourselves, our policy, and wisdom, might indicate very different courses as fit to be pursued by us in the two cases.[3]

In that same spirit of distinction-yet-relation between universal principle and prudent policy he explained the Monroe Doctrine:

> It is doubtless true . . . that this declaration must be considered as founded on our rights, and to spring mainly from a regard to their preservation. It did not commit us, at all events, to take up arms on any indication of hostile feeling by the powers of Europe towards South America. If, for example . . . an armament had been furnished by the Allies to act against provinces the most remote from us, as Chili or Buenos Ayres, the distance of the scene of action diminishing our apprehension of danger, and diminishing also our means of effectual interposition, might still have left us to content ourselves with remonstrance. But a very different case would have arisen, if an army, equipped and maintained by those powers, had been landed on the shores of the Gulf of Mexico, and commenced the war in our own immediate neighborhood. Such an event might justly be regarded as dangerous to ourselves, and, on that ground, call for decided and immediate interference by us.[4]

Thus it was possible to assert the universality of the rights whose violation justifies the use of force, and at the same time prudently to weigh dangers and opportunities and consider the facts of power and geography when judging whether or how to vindicate those rights.

This example of Webster's interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine does, however, indicate the existence of the contrary tendency he argued against, and with which we have become all too familiar. That is a tendency to absolutize or dogmatize particular policies into "Doctrines" that commit us to the use of force without apparent scope for prudent weighing of various and changing circumstances. It has recently become almost traditional for each new president to put his name on some such Doctrine. (The Nixon Doctrine is the exception that proves the rule: an effort to reintroduce and doctrinalize a role for prudence and limitation in our commitments.) This tendency is made both more attractive and more dangerous by the belief that it is only through such unlimited and questionable commitments to use force for specific objectives that we can deter others from using force—and that the absence of such commitments is an invitation to aggression. Since in fact prudential considerations—of cost and distance and prospects for victory, as well as weighing of

---

[3] Daniel Webster, "The Revolution in Greece": A speech delivered in the House of Representatives of the United States, January 19, 1824.

[4] Daniel Webster, "The Panama Mission": A speech delivered in the House of Representatives of the United States, April 14, 1826.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

competing needs and commitments—do come into play at least once we initiate the use of force, the proclamation of absolute doctrine serves only as a self-fulfilling prophecy of lost credibility (at least to the degree to which others do not discount our doctrines in advance in the direction of prudence and limitation). Webster reminds us of an earlier way of thinking that tries to distinguish clearly between fundamental universal principles, such as the rejection of the Holy Alliance's Doctrine, and particular policies, such as the use of force in specific circumstances, that must always involve and be understood to involve prudent judgments and limitations. That view is also part of the basis of the old and still-continuing American aversion to permanent military alliances.

Peaceful appeal—and when to stop

Another duality—similar in some of its effects to, but different in character from, the complementary relation of universal principles and prudential judgments—is between the insistence on exhausting peaceful appeals before resorting to force and the need to act before it is too late. The Declaration of Independence made clear that we had appealed to "our British brethren" but that they had been deaf to our appeals, and that we had petitioned the King "in the most humble terms" and been "answered only by repeated injuries." It came only after repeated appeals to both the King and the people of Great Britain to "restore that harmony, friendship and fraternal affection between all the Inhabitants of his Majesty's kingdoms and territories, so ardently wished for by every true and honest American," appeals "filled with sentiments of duty to your majesty, and of affection to our parent state."[5] Americans had proclaimed themselves "required by indispensable obligations to Almighty God, to your Majesty, to our fellow subjects, and to ourselves, immediately to use all the means in our power not incompatible with our safety, for stopping the further effusion of blood, and for averting the impending calamities that threaten the British Empire."[6] These peaceful appeals were part of the proof that we revolted only from "necessity." If we departed from reverence in our language in these appeals it was only from the "impossibility of reconciling the usual appearances of respect with a just attention to our own preservation."

[5] "To the People of Great-Britain from the Delegates Appointed by the several English Colonies . . . to consider of their Grievances in General Congress" (October 21, 1774), and "Petition to the King" (October 25, 1774); see also "The Twelve United Colonies by their Delegates in Congress, to the Inhabitants of Great-Britain" (July 8, 1775) and "The Olive Branch Petition" (July 5, 1775).

[6] "The Olive Branch Petition."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

That same concern for self-preservation ultimately led to the Declaration of the Causes and Necessity for Taking Up Arms and a year later to the Declaration of Independence itself. But, first, Americans announced themselves to be "compelled by the overruling principles of self-preservation" to adopt measures of commercial coercion through export and import embargos, which had worked before in securing repeal of the Stamp Act. It remains the American preference as a commercial people to try to substitute the granting or withholding of commerce for the use of force, even though such measures have rarely been any more successful than the measures of 1774-1775.

The emphasis on exhausting peaceful appeals was balanced by a sense that it was "prudent to anticipate the consequences" of the violation of "the rights of Mankind." The whole point of the revolution for Americans was to expose and frustrate *before* it could be successful "a design to reduce them to absolute despotism" evinced by the "long train of abuses and usurpations" described in the Declaration. In this respect also they conformed to the doctrine of the right of resistance in Locke's *Second Treatise*, which taught that people must act before "it is too late, and the evil is past Cure," that to be "secure from Tyranny" men must "have not only a Right to get out of it, but to prevent it." Locke therefore had taught that force may be used when "a long train of Abuses, Prevarications, and Artifices, all tending the same way, make the design visible to the People." Peaceful appeals are a duty only until the tyrannical design is visible.

Both the need to exhaust peaceful appeals and the justification of the use of force "before it is too late" apply to foreign wars as well as to resistance against domestic tyranny. In 1812, Madison reported that the United States had "in vain exhausted remonstrances and expostulations" with "unexampled forbearance" and being "anxious to make every experiment short of the last resort of injured nations" had tried commercial sanctions and enticements before resorting to force. Polk may have protested too much that "all honorable means were resorted to to avert" the War with Mexico during "years of endurance of aggravated and unredressed wrongs on our part," a patient endurance "without a parallel in the history of modern civilized nations." He simultaneously took credit for the "kindness and forbearance," "magnanimity and moderation," shown by Jackson and Van Buren in the face of Mexican violation of American rights, and concluded that "had the United States at that time adopted compulsory measures and taken redress into their own hands, all our difficulties with Mexico would probably have been long adjusted

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and the existing war have been averted." The Reagan administration in its public statements has both blamed the preceding years of detente for encouraging Soviet aggression and used them as evidence of American goodwill.

The other side of this duality, the need to anticipate designs of oppression, also applies to foreign dangers: We have to fight in Indochina so as not to have to fight in California; we have to fight in Central America so as not to have to fight along the Rio Grande. We remain almost as alert for designs to enslave us by foreign tyrants as the founders were to those same designs they discerned in George III. We attempt to combine these two aspects by a policy of "dialogue and deterrence." We attempt to combine peaceful appeals with the ability and expressed willingness to resist with force the first move that might ultimately endanger us, hoping thereby to preserve both peace and freedom.

The latitude of consent

One more duality pertaining to justification of the use of force can be seen from the perspective of the founding. This is the relation between the fundamental principles themselves invoked in the Declaration. The dichotomy between idealism and realism obscures the tension that exists on the level of principle. The theory of American liberal democracy is not derived from a single principle, but is a complex theory of complementary principles of individual rights and popular consent.

The Declaration of Independence presents individual rights first and as more fundamental: It is to secure individual rights that governments are instituted by popular consent; it is when those rights are threatened that the people may alter or abolish any form of government and institute new ones. Popular consent may thus be only the *means* to serve the end of securing individual rights—but it is *the* means to do so, the just means. Equality dictates both equal individual rights and the justice of deriving power from the consent of all the governed. But though popular consent is properly meant to secure individual rights, the two do not always in fact go together. A government might secure individual rights even though it does not enjoy popular consent. A government that does enjoy popular consent may nonetheless fail to secure, and may even violate, individual rights. A passage in Jefferson's Declaration draft not used by Congress complained of the British people that "when occasions have been given them, by the regular course of their laws, of removing from their councils the disturbers of our harmony, they have, by

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

their free election, re-established them in power." In another such passage he pointed out that Americans themselves kept their slaves deprived of the sacred right of liberty.

This possible tension between the properly complementary equal rights of all men and the right of popular consent was, of course, the great theme of the greatest series of debates in the history of American domestic policy: the Lincoln-Douglas debates. But it also bears directly on some of the most difficult and chronic dilemmas of the use of force abroad. Is it sufficient, for example, to justify the use of force to support the government of another country that they hold popular elections, or must individual rights be actually secure? Conversely, can we justify "covert" support for the use of force against a government because individual rights there have been violated, even if that government enjoys popular support? These urgent questions of objectives and justifications must be answered, not only to maintain popular consent at home for the direct or indirect use of force abroad, but also to decide how to use that force, and when or on what conditions to stop.

These and other dilemmas become more complicated when we consider one final duality within the principle of popular consent itself. When the Declaration of Independence says that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed, its primary meaning is what theorists sometimes call "original consent." As the next and last of the self-evident truths makes clear, it refers not to regular elections, to any one particular form of government—democracy—but to the right of the people to alter or abolish "any form of government" that fails to secure their rights and to "institute new government, laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness." In the same way, Locke's doctrine of the "consent of the majority" was one of original (and revolutionary) consent: The majority may retain their original legislative power "and then the *Form* of the Government is a perfect *Democracy*: Or else may put the power of making Laws into the hands of a few select Men, and their Heirs or Successors; and then it is an *Oligarchy*: Or else into the hands of one Man, and then it is a *Monarchy*" hereditary or elective, or they "may make compounded and mixed forms of Government, as they think good." The important thing for Locke was "the ends for which Government was at first erected," not "ancient Names, and specious Forms."

It seems that if one is to take seriously the people's fundamental right to consent to their form of government, then they must have

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the right to choose any form that shall *seem to them* most likely to effect their safety and happiness. A theory of consent cannot specify the only legitimate outcome and still remain a theory of consent. Thus, paradoxically, the most fundamental principles of liberal democracy are not strictly and specifically democratic as they bear on forms of government rather than on (*a*) equal rights and (*b*) original and revolutionary consent. Nevertheless, if one is to take seriously the people's fundamental right to consent to their form of government, then it also seems that they cannot have unlimited latitude in their choice. They cannot consent to do away altogether with consent. Although the Declaration asserts the right of the people to alter any form of government and to institute such form as seems most effective to them, it is not, therefore, entirely latitudinarian about forms of government. It specifies incidentally to its catalogue of grievances that the people have an inestimable "right of representation in the legislature," and by contrast implies that taxes must not be imposed without legislative consent, judges must be independent, standing armies must not be kept without legislative consent, and the military must be subordinate to the civil power. (The last two complaints show how important it is that government be structured so that the use of force should itself be subject to consent.)

But this set of limitations on the latitude of popular consent still does not amount to specifying a purely democratic form of government as the only legitimate object and form of popular consent. It requires only that one branch of the legislature be popularly elected. It permits, for example, a hereditary executive and one hereditary branch of the legislature. That explains why the Declaration and the founders generally (apart from such doctrinaire radicals as Thomas Paine) did not attack the British constitution as illegitimate, but recognized and admired it as an example of free government, possessing one, but only one, democratic branch. They attacked instead the particular abuses committed by what they regarded as a tyrannical king, corrupt ministers, and a supine or unfeeling people. Therefore, despite the limitations, considerable latitude remains for choice among legitimate forms of government. It would, of course, have been very strange for a document, in large part addressed to foreign nations of widely differing regimes, to have insisted that only democratic republics were legitimate.

Where rights and consent converge

If we add the distinction between individual rights and popular consent to that between original and regular consent, we come up

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with three principles, each fraught with implications for foreign policy: (1) individual rights; (2) the right of every people to choose its own form of government; and (3) free elections as the means whereby a people can choose representatives to serve as the whole or part of their government. All three are undeniably founding principles of American liberal democracy, but they do not always point in the same direction, especially as they bear on foreign policy and the use of force.

The first principle, that of individual rights, seems to be most fundamental and the end for which the others are ultimately means. The third, the democratic principle, seems most important for shaping our own political institutions. But it is the second, intermediate principle of consent to the form of goverment, understood in our century as the right of self-determination, that is most relevant to the conduct of foreign and defense policy. It was the denial and violation of that principle under its Doctrine, not the absolutist regimes of the Holy Alliance, or their oppression of their own citizens, that most concerned American foreign policy in the 1820s and that provoked American threats to use force. It is or should be the denial and violation of that principle by the Soviet empire that most concerns American foreign policy today, not the violation of human rights or the nature of the regimes within the empire itself.

Opposition to aggression should have priority in foreign and defense policy, not because individual rights are unimportant or improper as a concern of foreign policy, but because they are most properly secured by each people's establishing or altering its own government. Nor is it because democracy is merely a cultural preference rather than the best means of securing individual rights in our situation, but because the choice of form of government is properly a matter for each people. This is not selfish or indifferent isolationism or amoral relativism or unprincipled realism, but an implication of the principle of consent itself. The promotion of individual rights may serve as the basis for diplomatic demarches or public protests, or even as a criterion for economic aid. The spread of democracy may be a goal of public information programs or of aid directed at building the infrastructure of democracy. It is true that only the spread of democracy and the securing of individual rights can ultimately prevent aggression and protect the right of each people to choose its own government. And it is true, furthermore, that these connections, between the opposition to aggression and the defense of democracy and individual rights, prevent liberal democracies from agreeing with illiberal regimes as to what in every case constitutes aggression and what constitutes liberation.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Nevertheless, it is foreign interference with popular consent, rather than the more properly domestic matters of individual rights or democratic government, that is the most proper concern of foreign and defense policy, that can best serve as a common ground for the different regimes we seek to rally, and that can, above all, serve as the best justification for the use of force. This priority is the modern liberal-democratic equivalent of the classical, Greco-Roman view that, while the political community exists for the good life, in extreme situations mere existence and independence become more urgent than higher moral principles.

Principled differences in American history

The relation between these principles can be clarified by considering some more examples from the early history of the republic. This will also make clear that what is often inadequately dichotomized into idealism and realism is more accurately understood as a tension on the level of principle itself or as divergences in the prudent application of complementary principles.

Historians treating the American debates over policy toward the problems posed by the French Revolution often characterize as "idealistic" the Jeffersonian sympathy with the Revolution and fidelity to the French Alliance, and call Hamiltonian neutrality "realistic." As always, there is something to those characterizations, but it was also a debate on the level of principles as well as a divergence in prudential judgment of the situation. In the Declaration of Independence, the United States had appealed to the world (and above all to France) for aid and support of our revolution on behalf of the rights of men. Now the tables were turned, as they have been so often since. How do the principles we invoked on our own behalf apply to us when others invoke them? Jefferson, of course, could appeal on behalf of the French Revolution to the rights of all men and the right of revolution proclaimed in his Declaration. But Hamilton too could stand on the principled ground of the Declaration. He wrote in the *Pacificus* papers defending the Neutrality Proclamation: "Under every form of government rulers are only trustees for the happiness and interest of *their* nation, and cannot, consistently with their trust, follow the suggestions of kindness or humanity toward others, to the prejudice of their constituents." This is far from being simply realistic indifference to principle. For Hamilton, that people secure their rights through instituting governments that derive their just powers from the consent of the governed seems to mean that governments owe primary responsibility to securing the rights of those whose

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

consent they enjoy. They have not been given the right to secure the rights of those whose consent they do not enjoy. In a more extreme form, John Randolph complained that John Quincy Adams's Panama Mission message was "a doctrine that goes to take the whole human family under his special protection," and asked: "Who gave him, the President of the United States, the custody of the liberties, or the rights, or the interests of South America, or any other America, save only the United States of America, or any other country under the sun?"[7] John Quincy Adams himself said that although America "is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all," she is "the champion and vindicator only of her own."[8]

Hamilton, however, was not arguing against any possibility of intervention or support on behalf of others' rights, which would have made a mockery of our own plea for such support in the Declaration. He made a distinction entirely in the spirit of the Declaration's complementary principles. He distinguished between assisting a nation that "is in the act of liberating itself" (presumably as the French had aided the American Revolution), which assistance he called "justifiable and meritorious," and the French Revolutionary policy of holding out "a general invitation to insurrection and revolution . . . judging when the citizens of a foreign country have been vexed for the cause of liberty by their own government," and issuing a decree that "it will treat as enemies the people who, refusing or renouncing liberty and equality, are desirous of preserving their prince and privileged castes." According to Hamilton, because France had itself gone from aiding peoples in the act of liberating themselves to attacking peoples who refused to do so, she had forfeited the right to our assistance under either the principles of consent or our defensive alliance. In the same vein, Henry Clay, arguing for supporting the Spanish American Revolutions, said, "I would not seek to force upon other nations our principles and our liberty, if they did not want them. I would not disturb the repose even of a detestable despotism. But, if an abused and oppressed people will their freedom; if they seek to establish it; if, in truth, they have established it; we have a right, as a sovereign power, to notice the fact, and to act as our circumstances and our interest require."[9] Some would argue that any people subject to despotism can be presumed to will their liberation, whether by an armed vanguard or a foreign intervention. But precisely because, in the absence of either

[7] John Randolph, Speech on the Panama Mission (March 30, 1826).
[8] John Quincy Adams, Address of July 4, 1821.
[9] Henry Clay, "Emancipation of the South American States": A speech delivered in the House of Representatives of the United States, March 24, 1818.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

free elections or resistance, it is difficult to tell whether a people consents to its government, that difficulty cannot automatically entitle a third party to use force on their behalf.

More recently, it has been said that we were never told why we were fighting the war in Vietnam. This question cannot have been meant literally, because the speeches of American officials during that war were full of reasons why we were fighting. Too many reasons. Was it to build democracy in Vietnam? To stop aggression from the North and prevent Hanoi from imposing a government on the people of the South? Was it to fulfill a pledge? To maintain our credibility? To preserve our strategic position in Asia? Or, finally and pathetically, to get back our POWs? In part the complaint was that our military objectives were unclear, that we did not know what our troops were supposed to accomplish on the level of strategy. But in part the complaint was that we did not know which principle we were supposed to be obeying in our effort. Without clarity in principle, we could not achieve clarity in strategy; the different principles invoked dictated different strategies and required different sets of facts to be true in order to be relevant.

Clarity about principles will not solve all our problems. But we do need a general sense of what our principles are and which of them is most appropriate to justify the use of force. In specific cases of the use of force, we must be clear as to what principle we understand to dictate our struggle. And we need to recognize that in each specific case, even and precisely with all possible clarity about principle, we still need prudence to judge whether we can truly use force to serve our principles.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The timely end of the Sagebrush Rebellion

FRANK J. POPPER

PRIMARILY through the Interior Department's Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the federal government owns 86 percent of Nevada. The state has long resented the federal landlord, particularly because of the environmental and natural resource regulation it imposes. In 1979, the state filed a lawsuit claiming the BLM land, and the Sagebrush Rebellion was born. Arizona, New Mexico, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming, all with large federal ownerships and state grievances, made similar claims through legislation. The legislature of Alaska, then the state with the highest federal ownership (96 percent), endorsed what it called "the efforts of the Western states to gain control of their lands." The Rebels sought to put large parts of the federal holdings—the public lands of the West—into the hands of states, localities, individuals, and corporations. It was a populist land reform promoted by rural conservatives against their age-old enemy, the federal government.

When asked about the Rebellion in 1980 while campaigning in Salt Lake City, Ronald Reagan said, "Count me in." He won every Western state but Hawaii. He appointed James Watt, a prominent Rebel, as Interior Secretary. The new administration moved quickly and effectively to achieve the Rebellion's goals—but mainly by loosening federal regulation rather than transferring the ownership

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of federal land. The Rebellion eventually disappeared—as did Watt—but the landholdings and the landlord remained. This story of mingled federal support and betrayal, as old as the settlement of any region of the United States, reveals the permanent predicament of American land history.

The West as federal fief

It is still possible to surprise an East or West Coast resident with the fact that the federal government owns nearly one-third of the nation's land. The vast bulk is in the West, from the Sierra-Cascades to the Rockies, and in Alaska. And it is all but uninhabited.

Public lands contain a prodigious share of America's resources. Forest Service land, mainly in Oregon, Washington, and northern California, produces 40 percent of the nation's salable timber and 60 percent of its softwood sawtimber (wood for building houses). Roughly 14 percent of American livestock—primarily cattle and sheep—graze on BLM and other public lands. These lands hold a third of the nation's known coal reserves, a third of its uranium reserves, and 80 percent of its oil shale. Public lands supply most of the nation's copper, silver, asbestos, lead, and geothermal energy; much of its oil, natural gas, antimony, beryllium, molybdenum, phosphate, potash; and all its national parks, monuments, and wildernesses.

These national storehouses are often state and local headaches. The governments of Alaska, Idaho, Nevada, Oregon, and Utah have no formal jurisdiction over more than half of their territories. Arizona, California, Colorado, New Mexico, and Wyoming lack jurisdiction over more than one-third of theirs. The average citizen of a Western state cannot live, work, or even vacation on much of the federal land, let alone buy, sell, or develop it. State and local committees advise the federal land agencies, but in the end, land-use regulations and policies made in Washington, or in the regional offices of federal agencies, are often the main influence on Western patterns of grazing, forestry, energy and other mineral development, tourism, recreation, and water development. (The last is especially vital in the vast arid stretches of the West, where less than 20 inches of rain fall each year.)

As a land reform movement, the Sagebrush Rebellion involves not only Western individuals and corporations but also Western state and local governments struggling against the federal landlord. Almost every city and town in the intermountain West and Alaska amounts to an urban island in a sea of public land. Federal land-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

holdings around cities such as Anchorage, Las Vegas, and Santa Fe have the direct or indirect effect of constraining urban growth, raising land and housing prices, and forcing construction into environmentally risky areas. The federal holdings sometimes determined where the cities were located in the first place. Western real-estate agents are always amused when transplanted Easterners try to buy seemingly cheap, abundant rural land—the wide open spaces—and find that none is available. The 1970s energy boomtowns—such as Rock Springs, Wyoming, or Colstrip, Montana—are still overcrowded, slumlike, and expensive, in part because they cannot expand to surrounding public land.

Federal land policies have enormous effects on Western economies, public treasuries, and the public-service demands on them. Small changes in federal logging contracts, mineral leases, grazing permits, recreation fees, irrigation allowances, and the procedures for deciding on them can have boom-or-bust, live-or-die consequences for Western localities, particularly the smaller ones. Some Western towns exist essentially at the sufferance of federal agencies.

There are, however, compensations. The federal government rarely charges high prices for the Western industries' use of the public lands, and the charges often amount to subsidies. Federal agencies pay states and localities large sums to replace lost property taxes, and royalties for the resources extracted from the lands. The federal agencies also pay for what would otherwise be state and local public services. In places such as Albuquerque, Boise, Denver, Phoenix, and Salt Lake City, the national parks and forests are practically local playgrounds. Grand Canyon, Yosemite, Yellowstone, and other national parks anchor local economies based on tourism and recreation.

Nevertheless the federal landlord, a remote but intrusive force that is locally uncontrollable, is resented. The public lands pit state and local interests against federal and national ones. The rural West's objections to the federal government's role as a super zoning board, development agency, and sugar daddy to the West have led to resistance movements such as the Sagebrush Rebellion, raising three valid questions: Why does the federal government own so much land? Why is almost all of it in the West? Should the federal presence be reduced?

Manifest Destiny

Although the federal government now owns nearly a third of the country, in days past it owned four-fifths. As one of the compro-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mises leading to the signing of the Articles of Confederation, New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia agreed to cede to the federal government their trans-Appalachian land claims—amounting to all or almost all of what is now Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin, Alabama, Mississippi, and Tennessee. As the United States expanded across the continent, most of its land acquisitions entered the nation as public land that became part of territories and, later, states. The main Western exceptions, Texas and Hawaii, previously had been independent nations with little public land on entry and little today—2 and 10 percent, respectively.

Next to slavery, the public lands were 19th-century America's dominant domestic issue. The 1803 Louisiana Purchase doubled the nation's size, and more than tripled its stock of public land. Further acquisitions followed: for instance, the 1846 Oregon Compromise (Oregon, Idaho, Washington, parts of Wyoming and Montana) from Britain; the 1848 Mexican Cession (California, Nevada, Utah, most of Arizona, parts of Colorado, New Mexico, Wyoming); and the 1867 Alaska Purchase from Russia. The acquisitions had to be defended not only against the Indians, but also the French, Spanish, Mexicans, British, and Russians. The nation, desperately poor, needed what we now call economic development. Its Eastern cities were full of immigrants with rural backgrounds, its Eastern farms full of farmers who wanted better land. The territory stretching from the Appalachians to the Pacific spelled personal and national opportunity. Nineteenth-century America called it Manifest Destiny.

Thus was born the largest regional development project in American history, the settlement of the West—a huge real-estate transfer, aimed at pulling the public lands out of federal hands. The federal government happily cooperated in a long series of successful Sagebrush Rebellions. Between 1818 and 1833, Alabama, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, and Missouri asked Congress to cede them the states' public lands, and soon enough all the Midwestern and Southern states, their residents, and their corporations got nearly everything they wanted. Later in the century, the federal government gave Florida more than 24 million acres—over two-thirds of the state's land area. Later still, California, Oregon, and Washington gained much of their public lands west of the Sierra-Cascades.

Throughout the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth, there were sales and grants to states (including the land-grant colleges), localities, railroads, road and canal companies, farm and ranch companies, veterans, squatters, homesteaders, and other con-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Public Interest

is not some kind of pre-existing, platonic idea; rather, it emerges out of differences of opinion, reasonably propounded.

—from the Editor's prospectus for The Public Interest

If you would like to subscribe, enclose payment and send to:

THE PUBLIC INTEREST
Subscription Dept.
20th & Northampton Sts.
Easton, PA 18042

☐ one year $16.00 ($18.00 Canadian and Foreign)

☐ two years $32.00 ($36.00 Canadian and Foreign)

Name_____

Address_____

City_____

State & Zip Code_____

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cerned citizens. There were special giveaways of swamps, deserts, mining and timber land. In 1811, the federal government received 7 percent of its income from the sale of public land; in 1836 it received 36 percent. Thereafter its terms became increasingly liberal. As time went on, claimants were putting up less money for more land with easier credit, and they were likely never actually to pay for it. After the 1862 Homestead Act, individual claimants could get a plot of 160 acres for free if they signed an often-nominal agreement to live on it for five years, farm and improve it. The federal government wanted the West settled.

The Manifest Destiny land rush was greedy, gory, and grim —what the eminent critic Vernon Parrington called the "Great Barbecue." In the nineteenth-century West, life was frequently unrewarding to the overworked cowboy, to the uprooted Indian, and to the many homesteaders who could not make a go of it. Still, by the turn of the century, their sacrifices meant that the West was being won. The giant land transfer was working.

It was also slowing down. Because of what we would now term the environmental excesses of the land rush—the abundant herds of Western buffalo, for instance, were extinguished in a few decades, as were billions of passenger pigeons, other bird populations, and the Upper Midwest pineries—the federal government began to set aside land for national parks in the 1870s, forests in the 1890s, fish and wildlife refuges in the 1900s, and wildernesses in the 1920s. A great deal more land proved nearly uninhabitable, except for scattered, physically and financially chancy mining and ranching ventures. The desert in general had few takers, and they rarely lasted. It did not matter that much of the West's land was free; it was so arid and infertile that it could not be farmed economically, or otherwise occupied. Homesteading, which had become the most symbolic and widespread act of settling the West (and accounted for the settlement of an eighth of the entire United States), peaked in 1910. The bulk of the successful claims were not in the intermountain West or the Great Plains, but in areas with more rain —the Pacific Slope, the Midwest, and the South, where farms of the allowed 160 acres could work. The amounts were later increased to 320 and 640 acres, but these were still not enough for successful Western farming.

Most intermountain and plains homesteading was wiped out by the small size of the farms, a train of droughts and rural depressions, and finally the Great Depression. To this day the descendants of the failed homesteaders form a sort of hidden ethnic group in the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

West. In the end the federal government intervened—the 1934 Taylor Grazing Act largely abolished homesteading by ending the federal transfer, established what later became the BLM, and created the boundaries and legal form of most present public lands. The federal government owns large parts of the West mainly because the settlers rejected the BLM lands—to a lesser extent, because it preserved the national forest, park, fish and wildlife, and wilderness lands. The vast bulk of Western federal holdings have been public land for as long as they have been part of the United States. They are the leftovers of the Great Barbecue.

A consensus for reform

The rise of the Sagebrush Rebellion in the late 1970s was predictable. The basic outlines of the public lands and their management had not changed in 45 years or more, while prices for the commodities they produced—especially energy and timber—had risen rapidly. The West was growing fast, becoming the wealthiest and by some measures the most urban part of the nation, no longer a poor-relative region that needed special federal tutelage. Political conservatism was reviving, environmentalism was losing its bloom, and federal regulation was increasingly seen as onerous, particularly in the rural West. The federal lands—their size, their state and local consequences, and the restrictions on their use—appeared an anomaly, a throwback.

Some elements in the West, notably the ranching and mining industries and their allies in state government, had always been reluctant to see the Great Barbecue end, and had continued to believe they should acquire more federal land. Wyoming, Idaho, and Colorado attempted a small Sagebrush Rebellion in the 1890s, and most of the Western states took part in a larger, again unsuccessful one in the 1910s. In 1930, even as federal transfers and homesteading were in steep decline, a presidential commission with many Western business executives recommended to Herbert Hoover that federal lands be divested to the states and the private sector, though not necessarily for homesteading. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, cattle and sheep ranchers sought in effect to repeal the Taylor Act by selling public grazing lands—whether held by the BLM, the Forest Service, or other federal agencies—to the stockmen and the states for about ten cents an acre. In 1970, the Public Land Law Review Commission, an important federal advisory group, recommended against the concept of future large-scale disposals, but Arizona and Nevada petitioned the Commission for land anyway.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Sagebrush Rebellion could count on some tacit support outside the West. Those parts of the rural East with heavy federal holdings have traditionally shared many of the Rebels' complaints. In the late 1970s, northeast Minnesota fought a long battle against Forest Service wilderness designations in the million-acre Boundary Waters Canoe Area. A 1981 Appalachian Regional Commission report quoted a resident of Swain County, North Carolina (80 percent federally owned), as saying that although the Great Smoky Mountains National Park "is the most visited national park in the U.S., it doesn't really help our economy any." County residents have reportedly set fire to land in the Great Smokies as a way of harassing the Park Service. Residents and vacation-home owners on North Carolina's Outer Banks object to restrictions on their driving 4.5 miles through Virginia's Back Bay National Wildlife Refuge on their way to Virginia Beach or Norfolk when the alternative route off public land is up to two hours longer. Often Eastern sentiment against land-use regulation, environmental laws, the federal government, and its landlord role is as strong as Western sentiment.

The federal government was a self-admittedly mediocre manager of its Western holdings. In 1975, the BLM estimated that 83 percent of its rangeland was in environmentally "unsatisfactory" or worse condition because of overgrazing. The Forest Service's figures showed that its timberland yields were less than 40 percent of what the same land could produce were it managed by private corporations—which might also find it profitable to allow considerable recreational use. Many national parks were decrepit and overextended, some national wildernesses overused by seekers of solitude. Large parts of the public lands produced neither the commodities nor the amenities they should have. In a practical economic sense they were ownerless, and passively operated. The Sagebrush Rebellion appealed to its supporters because it suggested the lands could have large numbers of active owner-operators. It outraged its opponents for the same reason.

By 1979, conservative Republican congressmen from the West were introducing far-reaching Sagebrush Rebellion bills. Utah's Senator Orrin Hatch proposed a Western Lands Distribution and Regional Equalization Act that would have transferred 544 million acres to the states—almost all the federal Western holdings. Nevada's Representative Jim Santini offered a similar bill that excluded the national forests. New Mexico's Senator Harrison Schmitt suggested that the states be allowed to select federal public lands in exchange for state lands in federal military holdings; since the state

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lands were effectively under federal control, the result would be a something-for-nothing trade in favor of the states.

Thus the Sagebrush Rebellion seemed historically justifiable, economically sensible, regionally equitable, and politically powerful. It appeared to be (even if it was not) a new wrinkle in the settlement of the West: a right-wing land reform movement. Yet in September 1981 James Watt told the Western Governors Conference, meeting in Jackson, Wyoming, that the Rebellion was over: "I'm a rebel without a cause. You hardly hear about the Rebellion in Washington anymore." The governors cheered. The Rebellion was suddenly past history, an abortive episode. What had gone wrong? Why did the Rebellion end?

The Rebellion redirected

The Sagebrush Rebellion did not fail—it ended because it achieved many of its goals. The Reagan administration rapidly found clever, politically appealing ways to start to transfer some public lands without having to ask Congress for new legislation. Watt's Interior Department undertook a "good neighbor policy" that allowed state and local governments to request the department's "surplus" lands. The initiative was soon broadened to an Asset Management Program whereby all federal agencies could sell their excess land in the West and elsewhere; the eventual sale of 35 million acres—an area the size of Iowa—was expected. Separately, the Forest Service prepared to sell up to 17 million acres. The federal land agencies sped up the transfers to Alaska's state government and Native Americans authorized by the 1958 Statehood Act, the 1971 Native Claims Settlement Act, and the 1980 National Interest Lands Conservation Act. The BLM experimentally revived homesteading in the Kuskokwim Mountains in central Alaska. Numerous federal-Western state land exchanges were in exploratory stages, and seemed most advanced in Utah.

At the same time, some of the Rebellion's objectives on examination proved impractical, alienated possible supporters, and were abandoned by the Rebels. The Western governors, for instance, quickly noticed that if they became responsible for the public lands, they would also acquire new costs and duties, and would eventually lose the federal replacement payments and public services—which were generous subsidies, not easily duplicated from beleaguered state treasuries. The governors realized that they were having a hard enough time managing existing, often extensive state lands,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and they did not need new ones, especially considering the scandals the state lands had caused in nearly every Western state. State agencies might be no better managers than federal ones.

Rural, conservative Republican Westerners—the natural supporters of the Rebellion and the people who knew the land best—also had second thoughts. It was unclear how the land would be disposed of, what prices (if any) would be charged for it, or whether neighbors harmed by the disposals would be compensated. Most rural land and housing markets were already down; additional available land would depress them further. If much of the land ended up in the hands of states and localities, it would still be controlled by the public sector. When it was politically convenient, rural Westerners might espouse states' or local rights in preference to federal ones, but they were not interested in replacing the federal landlord with a state or municipal one. As for corporate landowners, they were even more likely than the federal government to lock up the land, to keep the public from using it. Perhaps the federal holdings were not so bad after all.

After the election of Ronald Reagan, the federal land agencies began to regulate less stringently and pay more attention to state and local complaints and advice. Oil, gas, coal, other mineral, and timber leasing were accelerated, and more land was opened to such leasing. Parkland and wildlife refuge acquisitions were frozen, wilderness designations were delayed, and private conservation efforts were encouraged as alternatives to public ones. Hard, short-term economic considerations were overriding soft, long-term environmental ones. For many Westerners sympathetic to the Rebellion, restraining federal regulation became an acceptable substitute for selling federal land.

When the federal agencies actually tried to sell the land, there was little demand for most of it. The Asset Management Program, for instance, fell far short of its targets; after almost two years of operation, it sold under 20,000 acres—less than 30 square miles—of federal land, much of it in the East or in urban areas. Federal agencies were reluctant and slow to designate land for the program, the real estate market remained soft, and many Western state and local governments were too strapped financially to consider even bargain-price purchases of land that could relieve their growth difficulties. Western timber, energy, and mineral companies, in near-Depression straits because of production gluts, were largely uninterested in buying, leasing, or even acquiring Forest Service and BLM land so that they could produce more. Western ranchers, traditionally eco-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nomically marginal, were equally indifferent to the idea of acquiring grazing land they were already renting cheaply.

There was also no true political support for selling the land. Western state governments were dubious. The state and national associations of the Western timber, mining, oil, gas, cattle, and sheep industries were universally opposed for economic reasons, as environmental and recreation groups—state and national—always had been for aesthetic and moral ones. A typical local comment came from Ray (Slim) Keefer, a south-central Montana rancher and leader of hunting expeditions on Forest Service land in the Crazy Mountains, who told *Newsweek*: "If they sell our livelihood, they'll make outlaws of us all." An early Rebel, Idaho's Republican Senator James McClure, changed his mind, appealed to President Reagan to do likewise, and declared—sounding an environmental note—that "an across-the-board policy of selling lands is not wise stewardship." The Rebellion had become an abstract ideological cause—a libertarian fantasy—with few practical economic or political possibilities. To most Western conservatives the impulse was attractive, the reality prohibitive.

As the 1984 election approaches, the Reagan administration, anxious to maintain its Western base, has stepped away from the Rebellion. Watt curtailed the Interior Department's participation in the Asset Management Program. In June 1983 he told the Western governors, this time in Kalispell, Montana, that his plans for massive land sales had been "stupid. We did a miserable job in 1982. Have I been harsh on myself for 1982? I want to be harsh." In October, after the last of a series of famously tasteless ranch-style remarks, he resigned. His replacement, William Clark, has no previous identification with the Rebellion or the public lands. As the Rebellion wound down, the Nevada lawsuit that began it was rejected by a federal district court in Reno in 1981; and the state was unsuccessful in its appeal. To Western state and local officials, the politics of the Rebellion had always been uncertain, for in truth it was hard to tell what the Western public thought. Washington's voters rejected the state's Sagebrush Rebellion legislation in a referendum in 1980, a crucial time for the movement. Arizona's and Alaska's voters supported their legislation in 1982 referenda, but they were too late to make a difference. Polls have shown that the only state that consistently and heavily supported the Rebellion was Nevada; nevertheless, in 1981 Reno's Republicans refused to support a Sagebrush Rebellion plank. It was political wisdom not to resist the Rebellion's end.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The return to slow disposal

Today the Sagebrush Rebellion is a dead issue. Even so, the West will probably see more land transfers over the next few decades, and the Sagebrush Rebellion will have helped make them possible. Dean Rhoads, the Nevada state legislator and rancher often considered the father of the Rebellion, now supports allowing cattle and sheep raisers to buy surface rights to public land, keeping the mineral rights in federal hands, and letting the states take over day-to-day management and regulation. The 1982 report of the President's Commission on Housing advocates "townsteading" on public land. Others have suggested the creation of public-private development corporations, long-term leasing to private interests for terms as long as 100 years, or—most sensibly—a series of experimental programs on relatively small tracts to test different approaches. The BLM grazing system created by the 1934 Taylor Act originated with such an experiment in the Mizpah-Pumpkin Creek area in southeast Montana in the late 1920s.

We are almost certainly entering a new phase of America's growth into its gigantic physical setting. From the Articles of Confederation to the Taylor Grazing Act, federal policy essentially was designed to acquire and dispose of public land. From the Taylor Act to the advent of James Watt, it was designed to retain it. The Sagebrush Rebellion marks a transition back to what will probably be a lengthy period of disposal brought on by new land demands, and new extraction and construction technologies. Nevertheless, the environmental movement, its laws, and its protective technologies are deservedly here to stay. Many public lands—all the national parks, monuments, and wildernesses, some national forests, other high-grade recreation areas—are politically and physically sacred places that disposal policies cannot and should not touch. But disposal of the more numerous, less distinctive BLM lands could take place gradually, so as not to invite fraud, disrupt local land markets, or overburden states and localities. A key problem will be weaning Western governments and resource-based industries from their dependence on federal subsidies. A more important one will be finding ways to dispose of the land slowly and on a small scale.

The primary obstacle to large-scale, rapid disposal is that there is no true economic use for most of the land. The little farming or ranching in such public-land locales as southern Utah, eastern Oregon, or central Alaska is hard to supply with water and only intermittently profitable. Present public land policies allow the timber, energy, mineral, and recreation industries ample land resources,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and they do not want the obligation of buying, receiving, or paying taxes on new ones. Discoveries of new resources or technologies seem unlikely to change these situations soon. Most Rebels probably never wanted to buy new lands anyway. If they had, the Rebellion would not have been so easily satisfied by simple regulatory adjustments on lands that remained federal. Those few Rebels who actually wanted to buy large amounts of new lands were quickly dissuaded by the basic finances of watering them.

Large-scale, rapid disposal is not possible today, though someday it may be. The public lands are perhaps best conceived as a federal reserve, a national land bank account put aside against a future land emergency. For now, the public lands simply constitute the great mythic West of big skies and cattle drives, lonesome roads and oasis towns, energy boomers and water shortages, cactus and steppe and tundra. There may come a time generations hence when the nation will want to dispose of many of the public lands: the year after a major West Coast earthquake, a nuclear disaster, overwhelming population pressure from Latin America, or an inconceivable economic, biological, climatic, or military event. If the emergency never comes, well enough—there was no compelling use for much of the land anyway. If it does, though, the nation will be glad it had the foresight to retain the lands. But a less speculative and more likely possibility is small-scale, slow disposal: incremental, tract-by-tract, year-by-year disposal that goes unpublicized but has serious local and cumulative regional consequences. The federal government has continually made small-scale disposals, even in periods when it opted against large-scale ones. Since 1926 the Interior Department has conducted a highly effective program to transfer land to local governments, corporations and individuals for recreation and other public purposes. In 1947, over a decade after the Taylor Act largely abolished homesteading, the federal government allowed it near the Buckeye Gillespie Dam on southwest Arizona's Gila River. Because of legal delays, the federal government in 1981 transferred 11 Western homestead sites to latter-day settlers, whose ancestors had first filed applications before 1934; as of late 1982, the government was still processing similar applications on 178 more sites —84 in Alaska, 64 in Montana, 14 in South Dakota, 13 in Nevada, 3 in Idaho. The 1976 Federal Land Policy and Management Act permits small-scale transfers and prescribes procedures for them. Modest increases in such disposals, most of which would presumably transfer BLM land near cities and towns, would, when combined with the ongoing federal-state land exchanges and Alaska

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

land transfers, offer a direct and practical way to reduce the federal holdings. The problem of the public lands has always been the problem of disposal; the trick has been to find those whose opportune disposal benefits both the disposee and the nation.

Our permanent frontier

It is extraordinary that after more than two centuries of often feverish pioneering and large-scale disposal, huge portions of the West remain almost untouched. According to the BLM, 383 million acres of Western public land (17 percent of the country) have never even been surveyed, and more than 50 million additional acres were surveyed inadequately over a century ago. According to the 1980 Census, over a quarter of the United States—all in the West, all in or near public land—falls in counties with less than 2 people per square mile. This is the same density standard the *1890* Census used to define the frontier. We are no longer a frontier nation, but we are a nation with a frontier. It is a gift of history, a part of our endowment, one of the reasons we are a lucky country. The frontier survives, to produce periodic characteristic outbursts such as the Sagebrush Rebellion. They begin by urging us once again to undertake frontier tasks in a frontier way. They proceed by overreaching in the frontier manner. They end by shying back from their reformist ambitions, thus showing why we never totally settled the frontier. But in the long intervals between the short outbursts, we nearly forget that we have a frontier. So we have not developed a clear national idea of what to do with it.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Political asylum in theory and practice

MICHAEL S. TEITELBAUM

NINETEEN hundred Haitians languish behind wire fences, go on hunger strikes, threaten mass suicide. Pakistani travel agents organize unusual package tours to West Germany, with only one-way air tickets but including legal advice upon arrival. Salvadorans cross the U.S.-Mexico border clandestinely, and then present themselves voluntarily to the U.S. Border Patrol for processing. These bizarre occurrences of the past several years have only one thing in common: The people involved are intent upon claiming asylum.

Asylum, from the ancient Greek word for "freedom from seizure," has usually been considered a rather abstruse provision of human rights laws. Yet in recent years it has entered forcefully into the real world of American domestic politics. It is a highly emotional political issue in the Federal Republic of Germany, and is beginning to appear on the agendas of several other major countries. The reasons for this recent metamorphosis warrant examination in their own right, and are also closely related to vigorous debates on foreign affairs and on immigration and refugee policies.

In American law, an applicant for asylum must meet the same legal criteria defining a "refugee." The difference is simply that a refugee application is submitted from outside the country, while an asylum-applicant applies having already entered the country (legally

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

or illegally) or at a border crossing or port of entry. Under the U.S. Refugee Act of 1980, the definition of a "refugee" was revised to conform to international law as follows:

> any person who is outside of any country of such person's nationality . . . and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion . . . .

Despite the fractured English, it is clear that the meaning in law of "refugee" or "asylee" is quite different from that used by the media or in everyday parlance. A person fleeing earthquake, flood, drought, civil or international war, abject poverty, discrimination, or indeed any terrible condition cannot qualify as a "refugee" or "asylee" unless he has been persecuted or has "a well-founded fear of persecution."

While there is no universal agreement on the meaning of "persecution," a threat to life or freedom on grounds of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group would surely qualify. It would also be generally agreed that persecution must be deliberate, and essentially must meet the same kind of test as "with malice aforethought" in criminal law. Hence, in legal terms there cannot be "refugees" from an earthquake in one country or "asylees" from the random violence of a civil war in another, since neither "acts of God" nor generalized violence are usually considered to constitute persecution.

These legal distinctions are often misunderstood, but they are far from trivial. For in poverty-stricken and violent areas of the world, hundreds of millions of people live out their lives in truly desperate conditions. Meanwhile, those who can qualify as bona fide refugees often are eligible for important benefits and rights wholly unavailable to others. These include legal protections from deportation or other forceable return to the country of origin (the so-called "non-refoulement" protection); often preferential access to resettlement in third countries; and direct and substantial economic assistance not available to other international migrants.

However substantial these provisions may be, refugees still are not the most privileged of international migrants. For additional preferences of even more substantial magnitude are accorded to those seeking asylum.

The asylum option

The number of refugee admissions represents a tiny fraction of those who qualify under the basic definition of "refugee." As of 1983,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

there were at least 7.8 million officially recognized refugees in the world.[1] Meanwhile, the Refugee Act of 1980 contemplated a "normal flow" of 50,000 annually through fiscal year 1982—less than one percent of the world total. In the words of the act's sponsor, Senator Edward M. Kennedy, "In the future, as in the past, the United States will be able to accept only a small fraction of those refugees who wish to settle in this country."

Thus a general qualification as a "refugee" carries with it no entitlement to admission for resettlement in the United States. From the pool of many millions who qualify, the law requires the President, in consultation with the Congress, to identify groups that are "of special humanitarian concern to the United States." But applicants for asylum, although they must meet the same general refugee definition, need not satisfy this second criterion for admission. Hence the refugee selection process mandated by U.S. law may be circumvented by filing an asylum claim after clandestine or fraudulent entry, instead of a refugee claim from outside the United States.

The asylum option is attractive for other reasons as well, including recourse to the American judicial system. It has always been understood that many applications for admission by bona fide refugees will have to be denied. Once denied, these applicants cannot appeal. But lawyers representing asylum applicants have discovered that very extensive administrative and judicial appeals are available to their clients. Under the current judicial system, these appeals can take many years, during which the client often is released from detention, finds employment, and fails to appear at subsequent hearings. Moreover, after appeals stretching over many years, courts often have failed to order deportations even when the process finds that the asylum claim lacks validity. The necessary legal advice is often provided without cost to the asylum claimant through financial support from well-intentioned church groups and other nonprofit organizations.

In effect, a prospective immigrant or refugee would be (and often is) well-advised to attempt to enter the U.S. clandestinely or on a tourist visa, with the intention of claiming asylum immediately or if apprehended. Under present American practice, such a strategy provides good chances of lengthy residence and even eventual citizenship, whatever the validity of the original claim.

A third advantage of the asylum option is that there are no numerical limits on the admission of asylees. In contrast, immigration

[1] U.S. Committee for Refugees, *World Refugee Survey 1983* (New York, 1983), pp. 60-61.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is subject (however ineffectively) to some numerical constraints, and the number of refugees to be admitted is set annually through consultations between the President and the Congress.

Fourth, asylum seekers do not have to wait in line. Some legal immigrants must now wait several years for admission, and refugees granted admittance from some regions often have to wait at least several months for their numbers to come up. Not so for asylum, for here the waiting begins *after* entry (legal or illegal) has already been accomplished. Asylum seekers are typically allowed to work, claim certain income transfer benefits, and are otherwise protected during the usually long-delayed completion of the adjudication and appeal proceedings. No such benefits accrue to prospective refugees or immigrants waiting abroad for their admission number to come up.

These advantages are now well-known among prospective migrants and their lawyer-advocates, and in recent years have led to what might be termed the "asylum strategy of immigration"—the use of asylum claim and appeals to circumvent restrictions on immigrant and refugee admissions.

Asylum as a growth industry

The issue of asylum used to be considered a minor policy matter. In part this was true simply because the numbers involved were small: By far the majority of those seeking admission as refugees applied from outside the United States, and hence for them the issue of asylum never arose. The few asylum seekers tended to be individuals who found themselves in the U.S. at the time of a political change in their own country, or politically-active persons fleeing the revolutionary ascendency of their opponents. The cases were handled on a one-by-one basis; the issues of "mass asylum" did not arise.

Over the past few years, however, this situation has changed dramatically. Four years ago, there were some 5,000 asylum cases pending; now there are nearly 160,000. (The current figure includes some 120,000 Cuban and Haitian claimants from the influxes of 1980, most of whom will probably be regularized on a group basis, for reasons of both politics and practicality.[2]) In addition, there are likely to be hundreds of thousands of Salvadorans, Haitians, and others who are here illegally but may eventually seek asylum. The "asylum

[2] Data from Immigration and Naturalization Service, "Asylum Cases Filed with District Directors . . ." (Washington, D.C.: February 1984); see also Refugee Policy Group, "Political Asylum: A Background Paper on Concepts, Procedures and Problems" (Washington, D.C., mimeographed release, December 1982).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

strategy" has become well-known in countries of out-migration, and increasing numbers of persons ineligible for refugee or immigrant admission are choosing to enter the country illegally (or on temporary visitors' visas) in order to claim asylum.

Results of this new phenomenon are profoundly disturbing. There is, first, the now-lengthy backlog of asylum adjudications, which has been severely criticized for being inhumane, for indicating administrative incompetence, and for showing that the American government has lost control of the situation.

Second, the large-scale flow of Haitian "boat people" to the beaches of southern Florida, many of whom immediately claimed asylum when denied entry, resulted in a "deterrence" response by the U.S. government that so far has only yielded:

- the detention of 1,900 Haitians who have filed court appeals upon being denied asylum;
- a federal court decision that the detained Haitians must be released;
- a Coast Guard cutter patrolling the Windward Passage under an unusual bilateral agreement between the governments of the United States and Haiti, with arrangements to determine if there is any reasonable basis for an asylum claim before returning boat people to Haiti;
- claims by some civil rights advocates that racism undergirds the handling of Haitian migrants, based in part upon the irrefutable fact that 130,000 Cubans were admitted shortly after a smaller number of Haitians had been subject to exclusion proceedings (an argument undercut by the fact that a large proportion of these Cubans was also black).

In the end, these inconsistent policies, decisions, and claims only sharpen the impression that U.S. immigration policy as a whole is "out of control"—a characterization now routinely used by American leaders as diverse as Attorney General William French Smith and Father Theodore Hesburgh, President of Notre Dame and former Chairman of both the Civil Rights Commission and the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy.

The German example

Much can be learned from the experiences of other liberal democracies in dealing with the growing pressures for asylum. The country whose recent asylum experience is most analogous to that of the United States is West Germany. From 1977 to 1980, applications for asylum within West Germany were doubling each year. About

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

16,000 asylum claims were filed in 1977; 33,000 in 1978; 51,000 in 1979; and 108,000 in 1980.[3] The reasons for this rapid growth are similar to those in the United States: the existence of well-defined pathways of international migration to West Germany established by the large "guest worker" (*gastarbeiter*) program of the 1960s; and the liberal provisions of German asylum law. Indeed, in West Germany the right of asylum is guaranteed in the constitution, or Basic Law: "The politically persecuted shall enjoy the right of asylum."

In practice, German law has provided that asylum claimants whose petitions are denied could "reject" this decision and ask for another administrative review, followed upon second rejection by extended judicial appeals. Frequently this process stretched out over eight or more years. These German procedures were even more open than American procedure, in that asylum applicants were immediately granted not only work permits (necessary to obtain employment in Germany, where employment of illegal aliens is a serious offense), but also immediate access to the income transfers of the generous social welfare system.

As the openness of German policy to asylum claims became known in countries of out-migration, there appeared a new pattern of relatively well-planned resort to asylum claims. In many cases such claims were made by people (mostly Turkish nationals) who had previously held guest-worker permits and were unable to obtain new ones, or by others seeking the economic opportunity provided earlier by the *gastarbeiter* programs. Other asylum applicants came from countries such as Pakistan and Bangladesh, which had not been sending countries in the *gastarbeiter* programs, but in which the economic attractiveness of employment in West Germany was overwhelming.

There were also substantial numbers of migrants from countries such as Ethiopia, where poverty, civil unrest, and international conflict generated large numbers of both economic and bona fide refugees. So commonplace did the asylum strategy become that the German government form required to claim asylum was reprinted in Turkish newspapers, and a market developed in South Asia for "package tours" that included one-way air fare and legal advice on how to claim asylum immediately upon arrival.

After several years' delay, such trends led to powerful political reactions within West Germany. All major political parties agreed

[3] Personal communication, Ministry of the Interior, Federal Republic of Germany (June, 1983).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that the asylum provisions were being manipulated and abused, and needed substantial reform. In late 1980, a series of administrative changes began. Work permits were no longer given routinely to asylum claimants. The welfare system continued to provide housing and food, but not always in the form of cash payments; instead, hostels or non-cash vouchers for rent and food were provided in some states. In addition, cash payments were offered to asylum claimants who agreed to depart voluntarily.

Finally, in July 1982, legislation was passed to reduce the ability of asylum claimants to stretch out the asylum process. Under these reforms, all applications are handled by a federal office, the decision of which cannot by "rejected" by the applicant. Appeals to Administrative Courts are allowed, but must be completed "as quickly as possible," and the applicant must be "helpful to the authorities" in so doing. Work permits are not available for two years (one year for East Europeans), during which time only assigned hostel accommodations and/or non-cash housing and food vouchers are available.

The effect of such measures was to reduce by one-half the number of asylum claims within the first year of the purely administrative changes, to 49,000 in 1981. After the 1982 passage of reform legislation, the number of asylum claims dropped further, to 38,000 in 1982 and to a projected total of about 20,000 in 1983.[4]

Most other Western countries have not experienced the flood of asylum claims seen in the United States and West Germany, largely because of their more restrictive procedures for dealing with such claims. In Australia, for example, asylum appeals are considered only by administrative tribunals; no judicial appeal is available. In Canada, appeal to the courts is available only in cases involving the legality of the administrative procedures followed, not on the substance of the claims. In France, the only appeal is to a higher administrative committee of the government. In Great Britain, those claiming asylum after illegal entry or visa-violation are prohibited from appealing their cases to the courts. As a result, all of these Western countries are able to complete their adjudicative process relatively promptly (in at most a year to two years) when compared with the extended delays in the U.S. and Germany.

Coping with mass claims and "bootstrapping"

The provision of full, fair, but prompt adjudication of individual asylum claims is clearly a problem for American policy, but based on the experience of other liberal democracies, it is a manageable

[4] See footnote 3.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

one. What is needed is legislation that provides adjudication that is impeccably fair, but also prompt enough to deter the use of asylum claims to obtain temporary access to the U.S. job market.

A more serious problem arises from providing the fullest possible hearing of individual asylum claims when claims are being made *en masse*. Given the terrible consequences of returning a bona fide asylee to his homeland to persecution and even death, few Americans would want to see anything but careful and scrupulous review of claims. What, then, is to be done if an "asylum strategy of immigration" is adopted by persons who cannot qualify, but who are well advised that the individualized claim procedure is so careful and time-consuming that a claim virtually guarantees several years residence in a high-wage economy, and may eventually lead to permanent residence and citizenship? Who can blame desperate people seeking opportunities for themselves and their families from acting upon this excellent legal advice? And what is to be done when advocates for one or another migrant group promote the filing of mass asylum claims in order to overwhelm an adjudication system designed for small numbers of individual cases?

An appropriate answer to such mass asylum problems need not differ from the treatment of individual claims, and much can be learned from the West German experience. There must be procedures in law and regulation that provide for administrative reviews that are impeccably fair and equitable to the applicant, but at the same time sufficiently expeditious so as to reduce the attractiveness of the asylum "strategy." Both applicants and advocates must be assured that legal stratagems can achieve only a few months' delay for bogus asylum claims. At the same time, sufficient surety bonds should be required to assure that any asylum applicants released from custody pending final adjudication will appear at subsequent hearings. Since such releases often involve the sponsorship of voluntary agencies or individuals, a surety bond could be required of such sponsors as well as of the individual applicant.

Finally, to the extent possible the asylum applicant should be denied access to the U.S. labor market, thereby reducing the "pull" of the high-wage U.S. economy for such claims. In practice, however, this is quite impossible at present, since it is wholly legal for an American employer knowingly to employ illegal aliens. The enforceability of such a provision would therefore depend upon the institution of the so-called "employer sanctions" prohibiting the knowing employment of illegal aliens, as proposed under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1983.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Of course, if employment were effectively denied to asylum claimants, some means of support would have to be provided. Here again the West German model of providing in-kind housing and food would provide less incentive for frivolous claims than would the use of the American welfare system, whose cash benefits are high enough to be attractive to those from low-wage countries willing to live in low-cost accommodations. Under such a system, the asylum claimant would be assured the basic necessities of life, but not cash inducements.

A second fundamental problem for U.S. policy arises from claims by asylum applicants that their departure and asylum claim in the United States render them suspect in their homeland, and that therefore they fear persecution or imprisonment if returned home. This approach is known by the *cognoscenti* of asylum claims as the "bootstrapping" strategy. Leaving aside the important questions of whether such treatment upon return does occur, and whether if it does it constitutes "persecution" under international or U.S. law, such claims raise rather basic definitional problems: If the principal reason for mistreatment (or even "persecution") of a repatriated asylum claimant is the *fact* of his departure and asylum claim, is he thereby entitled to the benefits accorded to a bona fide asylee or refugee?

It can be argued that such departure and claim of asylum constitute an act of political opposition to the person's government, and thereby qualify him as an asylee/refugee if he is likely to be imprisoned upon return, since such imprisonment would therefore be based on "political opinion." On the other hand, departure and a filing of a claim for asylum may be based on a rational judgment that such actions provide the best chance for better economic opportunites; in such an interpretation, the claim of asylum is spurious, since the imprisonment (if it occurs) derives entirely from the self-determined decision of the individual to seek opportunity in another country, and does not constitute persecution.

An appropriate response to this problem requires both legal good sense and humanitarian concern. In the cases of both individual and mass asylum claims, a fair assessment must be made not only of each individual's claim of "persecution," but also of the prevailing political environment in the country of origin. The circumstances are likely to be rare in which the mere act of departure will result in genuine "persecution" that would qualify the asylum claimant for asylum. In such cases, the full weight of diplomatic pressures, both bilaterally and through the various organs of the international system, should be brought to bear on the offending government so that "boot-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

strappers" can be returned safely. Those returned must then be followed to assure that later persecution does not occur. Such follow-up should be done by agencies such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as well as the State Department, to preclude both the reality and the appearance of foreign policy considerations affecting the determinations. Only in cases of flagrant persecution of returnees despite the full pressure of diplomacy does the "bootstrapper" argument deserve to be taken seriously.

Temporary policies become permanent

A third problem concerns those who seek temporary refuge from life-threatening civil wars, random violence, or natural catastrophes. Obvious recent examples are provided by Cambodians, Salvadorans, Eritreans, Lebanese, and many groups fleeing drought in the Sahel. It is clear that most such migrants do not qualify as "refugees" in international law. However, such temporary refuge is granted by a considerable number of Third World countries, in part out of humanitarian concern and in part because there is only a small risk that the receiving country will be found so attractive that the temporary stay will become permanent. Indeed, it was the fear that the Vietnamese boat people *might* become permanent refugees that led the governments of Thailand and Malaysia to refuse first asylum, until the United States assured them that it would provide almost unlimited resettlement in the United States.

Such temporary refuge is the status accorded most "refugees" in countries of first asylum, such as Vietnamese and Cambodians in Thailand or Ethiopians in Somalia. There is also a similar status (known as "B-status") for temporary refugees in a few European countries, such as Austria. B-status refugees are not entitled to permanent residence, eventual citizenship, or significant welfare benefits, and are expected to return home or depart for third countries as soon as possible. Thus refugee status in such settings differs fundamentally from that in the United States, West Germany, France, and many other Western countries.

Should there be such a formal "temporary refuge" status in the United States and other Western countries? The difficulty is that in these relatively wealthy and high-wage countries, the economic advantages of converting such temporary status to permanence may prove overwhelming. Hence there is legitimate concern that the availability of such temporary refuge might serve as a "magnet" attracting prospective migrants seeking opportunities for temporary employment or permanent residence.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In the American case, temporary refuge is sometimes provided via an administrative expedient known by the inelegant title "extended voluntary departure." This is used, often at the initiative of the Department of State, to delay temporarily the required departure by aliens from countries experiencing internal instability (recent examples include Poland, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, and Iran). But recent experience suggests that this temporary expedient may unexpectedly be stimulating large numbers of claims for permanent asylum. Such claims have arisen, sometimes accompanied by acrimonious charges of political or racial discrimination, when the "extended voluntary departure" status is terminated because the temporary internal problems that led to it are judged to have stabilized. Hence "temporary" refuge policies, like "temporary" migration policies before them, may be proving more permanent than temporary.

Can Simpson-Mazzoli preserve asylum?

The difficulties and dilemmas of U.S. asylum policy are now high on the political agenda, if not widely appreciated by the public at large. Many reform proposals have been made, the most widely-supported of which were those incorporated in the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1983 (the so-called Simpson-Mazzoli bill). Briefly summarized, this bill would require that asylum cases be heard by immigration judges with special training in international law and foreign affairs; negative determinations would be appealable to a special nine-member U.S. Immigration Board; and negative decisions by this Board would be appealable to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals on grounds specified in the bill.

The heightened concern over asylum reform in general has led to widespread support for the procedures embodied in the Simpson-Mazzoli bill. While some of the Simpson-Mazzoli proposals on illegal immigration have received unrelenting criticism from a few special interest groups, the asylum proposals have been relatively non-controversial.

Such a consensus is timely, for over the past several years the difficulties posed by asylum policy have become painfully apparent. The ideal—a case-by-case scrutiny of claims with copious legal due process to minimize errors of judgment—has been overwhelmed by the sheer numbers of claims, by "bootstrapping" and other strategies employing asylum claims to circumvent immigration and refugee laws, and by the needs of hundreds of thousands for temporary refuge. The most obvious recent results of the failures of past policies

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

are the detention camps and the resulting charges of racism, the interdiction on the high seas, and the vigorous political debate in Germany on restricting asylum claims.

More significant and less transient, however, is the damage inflicted on the high-minded concept of asylum itself. Use of the word is now tinged with sarcasm in Bonn, in Miami, in Washington, even in the halls of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. A noble concept is being debased before our very eyes. Of course, the goals of the debasers are easily understood: Exploitation of legal provisions to gain otherwise unavailable economic opportunity, circumvention of numerical limits on immigrants or refugees admitted, support for ethnic brethren, and similar such benign motives prevail. And who can criticize people experiencing desperately poor economic or political conditions for taking advantage of such a situation?

Nevertheless, those in the United States who feel that there is value in preserving an openness to genuine asylum claims must recognize the debasement of the concept that has occurred. Bogus claims are especially dangerous now, since the number of genuine asylees is no doubt increasing along with the number of genuine refugees. None of the available choices is wholly desirable, but neither is the deteriorating status quo. Openness to bona fide asylum claims cannot be sustained if asylum provisions are heavily manipulated for other purposes. Those who engage in such practices or support them—however benign their motives—will bear a heavy moral responsibility to those in the future who have genuine claims but find the United States and other Western countries unreceptive.

What seems minimally necessary is a revision of the asylum adjudication process to assure prompt and fair assessment of claims, thereby eliminating the stratagem of extended delay. Fortunately, the proposals incorporated in the Simpson-Mazzoli bill represent a balanced approach in this direction (although the litigiousness of American judicial proceedings does raise doubts as to whether prompt resolution of claims is possible).

In addition, however, there is a need to assure both the reality and the appearance of even-handedness in responding to future mass asylum claims. One of the main dynamics underlying the claims of racism in excluding the entry of 40-60,000 Haitians lay not in the Haitian cases per se, but rather in the nearly simultaneous admission of 130,000 Cubans who were migrating to the United States for substantially similar reasons. In fact the aberrant case was not the Carter administration's exclusion of the Haitians, but rather its ad-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mission of the Cubans—something done outside U.S. law, and driven largely by foreign policy and domestic political considerations unrelated to the migrant flow itself.

In the future, then, decisions about one mass asylum crisis cannot be based on foreign policy or domestic political considerations alone. Instead, its implications for other current or potential mass asylum claims must be considered and weighed against the particular circumstances of the case in question. Moreover, serious consideration should be given to measures aimed at internationalizing mass asylum flows to the United States. Such an effort achieved substantial success in the case of the Indochinese "boat people," and there is no logical reason why similar international responsibilities should not apply to Eritreans or Haitians.

That asylum now poses profound difficulties cannot be doubted. While there are no ideal solutions, the problems are controllable given good will and good sense. The stakes are high—maintaining the availability of asylum for those genuinely deserving it—and warrant greater and more balanced attention over the coming year.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Japanese education: how do they do it?

MERRY I. WHITE

JAPAN has become the new reference point for the developing nations and the West, and comparisons with Japan cause increasing wonder and sometimes envy. Travel agents continue to profit from the curiosity of Americans, particularly businessmen, who take regular tours of Japan seeking the secrets of Japanese industry. They come back with photographs and full notebooks, convinced they have learned secrets that can be transplanted to their own companies.

Even the Japanese have entered the pop-sociological search for the secrets of their own success, and suggesting that they emphasize problem *prevention* while Americans make up for their lack of prescience and care through *remediation* (in the case of cars, recalls for flawed models). The explanation given by a European Economic Community report—that the Japanese are workaholics willing, masochistically, to live in "rabbit hutches" without complaint—was met with amused derision in Japan. But it seems that those who do not look for transportable "secrets" are nonetheless willing to believe that the source of Japanese success is genetic, and thus completely untransferable. There are alternatives to these positions, and an examination of Japanese education provides us with a backdrop for considering them.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The social consensus

The attention given to the decline of both American industry and American education has not yet led to an awareness here of the close relationship between the development of people and the development of society, an awareness we see everywhere in Japanese thought and institutions, and whose effects we can see in the individual achievements of Japanese children. If Americans realized how powerful the relationship is between Japanese school achievement and social and economic successes we might see the same kind of protectionist language aimed at the Japanese educational system that we see directed at their automobile industry. ("The Japanese must stop producing such able and committed students because *it isn't fair.*")

The Japanese understand how important it is to have not just a high level of literacy (which they have had since well before modernization), but also a high level of education in the whole population. It has been said that the Japanese high school graduate is as well educated as an American college graduate, and indeed it is impressive that any worker on the factory floor can be expected to understand statistical material, work from complex graphs and charts, and perform sophisticated mathematical operations. This consensus that education is important, however simple it may sound, is the single most important contributor to the success of Japanese schools. Across the population, among parents, at all institutional and bureaucratic levels, and highest on the list of national priorities, is the stress on excellence in education. This is not just rhetoric. If the consensus, societal mobilization, and personal commitment—all focused on education—are not available to Americans, the reason is not genetic, nor are we locked in an immutable cultural pattern. We simply have not mobilized around our children.

There are clear advantages to being a Japanese child: a homogeneous population focused on perpetuating its cultural identity; an occupational system where selection and promotion are based on educational credentials; a relatively equal distribution of educational opportunities; a universal core curriculum; highly trained and rewarded teachers; and families, especially mothers, devoted to enhancing the life chances of children and working cooperatively with the educational system. Finally, there are high standards for performance in every sector, and a carefully graded series of performance expectations in the school curriculum.

It is clear from these assertions that the measurable cognitive achievements of Japanese education represent only part of the pic-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ture. The American press stresses these achievements and accounts for them in terms of government expenditures, longer school years, and early use of homework. While the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA) test scores certainly indicate that Japanese children are testing higher than any children in the world (especially in math and science), and while some researchers have even claimed that Japanese children on average score 11 points more than American children on IQ tests, the social and psychological dimensions of Japanese education are similarly impressive and are primary contributors to cognitive achievement. The support given by family and teachers to the emotional and behavioral development of the child provides a base for the child's acquisition of knowledge and problem-solving skills. But beyond this, the Japanese think a major function of education is the development of a happy, engaged, and secure child, able to work hard and cooperate with others.

Inside the Japanese school

In order to understand the context of the Japanese educational system, some basic information is necessary:

1. Education is compulsory for ages six to 15, or through lower secondary school. (Age is almost always correlated with grade level, by the way, because only rarely is a child "kept back" and almost never "put ahead.") Non-compulsory high school attendance (both public and private) is nearly universal, at 98 percent.

2. There is extensive "non-official" private education. Increasing numbers of children attend pre-schools. Currently, about 95 percent of the five-year olds are in kindergarten or nursery school, 70 percent of the four-year olds and 10 percent of three-year olds. Many older children attend *juku* (after school classes) as well. These are private classes in a great variety of subjects, but most enhance and reinforce the material to be learned for high school or college entrance examinations. There are also *yobiko* (cram schools) for those taking an extra year between high school and college to prepare for the exams.

3. While competition for entrance to the most prestigious universities is very stiff, nearly 40 percent of the college-age group attend college or university. (The rates are slightly higher for women, since many attend two-year junior colleges.)

4. Japanese children attend school 240 days a year, compared to 180 in the U.S. Many children spend Sundays in study or tutoring, and vacation classes are also available. Children do not necessarily see this as oppressive, and younger children often ask their parents

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to send them to *juku* as a way of being with their friends after school. Homework starts in first grade, and children in Japan spend more time in home study than children in any other country except Taiwan. In Japan, 8 percent of the high school seniors spend less than five hours per week on homework, compared to 65 percent of American seniors.[1]

5. Primary and lower secondary schools provide what we would call a core curriculum: a required and comprehensive course of study progressing along a logical path, with attention given to children's developmental levels. In elementary and lower secondary school, language learning dominates the school curriculum, and takes up the greatest number of classroom hours, particularly from second to fourth grade. The large number of characters to be learned requires an emphasis on memorization and drill that is not exhibited in the rest of the curriculum. Arithmetic and math are next in number of class hours, followed by social studies. The curriculum includes regular physical education and morning exercise as part of a "whole-child" program. In high school all students take Japanese, English, math, science, and social studies each year, and all students have had courses in chemistry, biology, physics, and earth sciences. All high school students take calculus.

6. Computers and other technology do not play a large role in schools. The calculator is used, but has not replaced mental calculations or, for that matter, the abacus. There is no national program to develop high technology skills in children. Americans spend much more money on science and technology in the schools; the Japanese spend more on teacher training and salaries.

These features should be seen in the context of a history of emphasis on education in Japan. To begin with, an interest in mass (or at least widespread) education greatly antedated the introduction of Western schools to Japan. Literacy, numeracy, and a moral education were considered important for people of all classes. When Western style universal compulsory schooling was introduced in 1872, it was after a deliberate and wide-ranging search throughout the world that resulted in a selection of features from German, French, and American educational systems that would advance Japan's modernization and complement her culture. While uniform, centralized schooling was an import, it eventually brought out Japan's already refined powers of adaptation—not the ability to adapt to a

[1] Thomas Rohlen, *Japan's High Schools* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), p. 277.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

new mode as much as *the ability to adapt the foreign mode to Japanese needs and conditions.*

Also striking was the rapidity with which Japan developed a modern educational system and made it truly universal. In 1873, one year after the Education Act, there was 28 percent enrollment in primary schools, but by 1904 enrollment had already reached 98 percent—one percent less than the current rate. The rush to educate children was buttressed both by the wish to catch up with the West and by a cultural interest in schooling.

A truly national system

Tradition, ideology, and international competition are not, however, the only motive forces in Japanese education; other factors are as significant. First, Japan has a relatively homogeneous population. Racially and economically there is little variety. Minority groups, such as Koreans and the former out-castes, exist and do suffer some discrimination, but all children have equal access to good schooling. Income is more evenly distributed in Japan than in America and most people (96 percent in a recent Prime Minister's Office poll) consider themselves middle class. There are few remaining regional differences that affect the educational system, except perhaps local accents.

Second, educational financing and planning are centralized. While American educational policy sees the responsibility for schooling as a local matter, Japanese planners can rely on a centralized source of funding, curriculum guidance, and textbook selection. In terms of educational spending as a percentage of total GNP, the U.S. and Japan are not so far apart: the U.S. devotes 6.8 percent of its GNP to education, and Japan devotes 8.6 percent. But in Japan about 50 percent of this is national funding, while in the U.S. the federal government provides only 8 percent of the total expenditure on education, most of which is applied to special education, not to core schooling. Moreover, in the U.S. there exist no national institutions to build a consensus on what and how our children are taught. The most significant outcome of centralization in Japan is the even distribution of resources and quality instruction across the country. National planners and policymakers can mobilize a highly qualified teaching force and offer incentives that make even the most remote areas attractive to good teachers.

Third (but perhaps most important in the comparison with the United States), teachers enjoy respect and high status, job security, and good pay. More than in any other country, teachers in Japan

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

are highly qualified: Their mastery of their fields is the major job qualification, and all have at least a bachelor's degree in their specialty. Moreover, they have a high degree of professional involvement as teachers: 74 percent are said to belong to some professional teachers' association in which teaching methods and curriculum are actively discussed.[2]

Teachers are hired for life, at starting salaries equivalent to starting salaries for college graduates in the corporate world. Elementary and junior high school teachers earn $18,200 per year on the average, high school teachers $19,000. Compared to other Japanese public sector workers, who earn an average of $16,800, this is a high salary, but it is less than that of managers in large companies or bureaucrats in prestigious ministries. In comparison with American teachers, whose salaries average $17,600, it is an absolutely higher wage. The difference is especially striking when one considers that over all professions, salaries are lower in Japan than in the U.S. In fact, American teachers' salaries are near the bottom of the scale of jobs requiring a college degreee. Relative status and prestige correlate with salary in both countries. Japanese teachers' pay increases, as elsewhere in Japan, are tied to a seniority ladder, and older "master teachers" are given extra pay as teacher supervisors in each subject.[3]

Japanese teachers see their work as permanent: Teaching is not a waystation on a path to other careers. Teachers work hard at improving their skills and knowledge of their subject, and attend refresher courses and upgrading programs provided by the Ministry of Education. While there are tendencies, encouraged by the Teachers' Union, to downplay the traditional image of the "devoted, selfless teacher" (since this is seen as exploitative), and to redefine the teacher as a wage laborer with regular hours, rather than as a member of a "sacred" profession, teachers still regularly work overtime and see their job's sphere extending beyond classroom instruction. Classes are large: The average is about 40 students to one teacher. Teachers feel responsible for their students' discipline, behavior, morality, and for their general social adjustment as well as for their cognitive development. They are "on duty" after school hours and during vacations, and supervise vacation play and study. They visit their students' families at home, and are available to parents with

[2] William Cummings, *Education and Equality in Japan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 159.

[3] There is a debate in Japan today concerning rewarding good teachers with higher pay: Professor Sumiko Iwao, of Keio University, reports that when quality is measured in yen, the commitment of teachers to good teaching declines.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

questions and anxieties about their children. The Teachers' Union protests strongly against this extensive role, but both teachers and parents reinforce this role, tied as it is to the high status of the teacher.

Fourth, there is strong ideological and institutional support for education because the occupational system relies on schools to select the right person for the right organization. Note that this is not the same as the "right job" or "slot": A new company recruit, almost always a recent graduate, is not expected to have a skill or special identity, but to be appropriate in general educational background and character for a company. The company then trains recruits in the skills they will need, as well as in the company style. Of course, the basic skill level of the population of high school and college graduates is extremely high. But the important fact is that the social consensus supports an educational system that creates a committed, productive labor force. And although the emphasis seems to be on educational credentials, the quality of graduates possessing these credentials is indisputably high.

Mom

The background I have presented—of national consensus, institutional centralization, and fiscal support—alone does not explain the successes of Japanese education. There are other, less tangible factors that derive from cultural conceptions of development and learning, the valued role of maternal support, and psychological factors in Japanese pedagogy, and which distinguish it from American schooling.

The role of mothers is especially important. The average Japanese mother feels her child has the potential for success: Children are believed to be born with no distinguishing abilities (or disabilities) and can be mobilized to achieve and perform at high levels. Effort and commitment are required, and, at least at the beginning, it is the mother's job to engage the child. One way of looking at Japanese child development is to look at the words and concepts related to parental goals for their children. A "good child" has the following, frequently invoked characteristics: He is *otonashii* (mild or gentle), *sunao* (compliant, obedient, and cooperative), *akarui* (bright, alert), and *genki* (energetic and spirited). *Sunao* has frequently been translated as "obedient," but it would be more appropriate to use "open minded," "non-resistant," or "authentic in intent and cooperative in spirit." The English word "obedience" implies subordination and lack of self-determination, but *sunao* assumes that what we call

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

compliance (with a negative connotation) is really cooperation, an act of affirmation of the self. A child who is *sunao* has not yielded his personal autonomy for the sake of cooperation; cooperation does not imply giving up the self, but in fact implies that working with others is the appropriate setting for expressing and enhancing the self.

One encourages a *sunao* child through the technique, especially used by mothers and elementary school teachers, of *wakaraseru*, or "getting the child to understand." The basic principle of child rearing seems to be: Never go against the child. *Wakaraseru* is often a long-term process that ultimately engages the child in the mother's goals, and makes her goals the child's own, thus producing an authentic cooperation, as in *sunao*. The distinction between external, social expectations and the child's own personal goals becomes blurred from this point on. An American might see this manipulation of the child through what we would call "indulgence" as preventing him from having a strong will of his own, but the Japanese mother sees long term benefits of self-motivated cooperation and real commitment.

Japanese mothers are active teachers as well, and have a real curriculum for their pre-school children: Games, teaching aids, ordinary activities are all focused on the child's development. There are counting games for very small babies, songs to help children learn new words, devices to focus the child's concentration. Parents buy an average of two or three new books every month for their pre-schoolers, and there are about 40 monthly activity magazines for preschoolers, very highly subscribed. The result is that most, at least most urban children, can read and write the phonetic syllabary before they enter school, and can do simple computations.

Maternal involvement becomes much more extensive and "serious" once she and the child enter the elementary school community. In addition to formal involvement in frequent ceremonies and school events, PTA meetings and visiting days, the mother spends much time each day helping the child with homework (sometimes to the point at which the teachers joke that they are really grading the mothers by proxy). There are classes for mothers, called *mamajuku*, that prepare mothers in subjects their children are studying. Homework is considered above all a means for developing a sense of responsibility in the child, and like much in early childhood education, it is seen as a device to train character.

The Japanese phenomenon of maternal involvement recently surfaced in Riverdale, New York, where many Japanese families have settled. School teachers and principals there noted that each Japanese family was purchasing two sets of textbooks. On inquiring,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

they found that the second set was for the mother, who could better coach her child if she worked during the day to keep up with his lessons. These teachers said that children entering in September with no English ability finished in June at the top of their classes in every subject.

The effort mothers put into their children's examinations has been given a high profile by the press. This is called the *kyoiku mama* syndrome—the mother invested in her children's progress. In contrast to Western theories of achievement, which emphasize individual effort and ability, the Japanese consider academic achievement to be an outgrowth of an interdependent network of cooperative effort and planning. The caricature of the mother's over-investment, however, portrays a woman who has totally identified with her child's success or failure, and who has no separate identity of her own. The press emphasizes the negative aspects of this involvement with accounts of maternal nervous breakdowns, reporting a murder by a mother of the child next-door, who made too much noise while her child was studying. But the press also feeds the mother's investment by exhorting her to prepare a good work environment for the studying child, to subscribe to special exam-preparation magazines, to hire tutors, and to prepare a nutritious and exam-appropriate diet.

High-schoolers from outlying areas taking entrance exams in Tokyo come with their mothers to stay in special rooms put aside by hotels. They are provided with special food, study rooms, counselors, and tension-release rooms, all meant to supply home-care away from home. The home study-desk bought by most parents for their smaller children symbolizes the hovering care and intensity of the mother's involvement: All models have a high front and half-sides, cutting out distractions and enclosing the workspace in womb-like protection. There is a built-in study light, shelves, a clock, electric pencil sharpener, and built-in calculator. The most popular model includes a push-button connecting to a buzzer in the kitchen to summon mother for help or for a snack.

"How do you feel about cubing?"

Not much work has been done yet to analyze the relationship between the strongly supportive learning atmosphere and high achievement in Japan. In the home, mothers train small children in a disciplined, committed use of energy through what Takeo Doi has called the encouragement of "positive dependency"; in the schools as well there is a recognition that attention to the child's emotional relationship to his work, peers, and teachers is necessary for learning.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A look at a Japanese classroom yields some concrete examples of this. Many Westerners believe that Japanese educational successes are due to an emphasis on rote learning and memorization, that the classroom is rigidly disciplined. This is far from reality. An American teacher walking into a fourth grade science class in Japan would be horrified: children all talking at once, leaping and calling for the teacher's attention. The typical American's response is to wonder, "who's in control of this room?" But if one understands the content of the lively chatter, it is clear that all the noise and movement is focused on the work itself—children are shouting out answers, suggesting other methods, exclaiming in excitement over results, and not gossiping, teasing, or planning games for recess. As long as it is the result of this engagement, the teacher is not concerned over the noise, which may measure a teacher's success. (It has been estimated that American teachers spend about 60 percent of class time on organizing, controlling, and disciplining the class, while Japanese teachers spend only 10 percent.)

A fifth grade math class I observed reveals some elements of this pedagogy. The day I visited, the class was presented with a general statement about cubing. Before any concrete facts, formulae, or even drawings were displayed, the teacher asked the class to take out their math diaries and spend a few minutes writing down their feelings and anticipations over this new concept. It is hard for me to imagine an American math teacher beginning a lesson with an exhortation to examine one's emotional predispositions about cubing (but that may be only because my own math training was antediluvian).

After that, the teacher asked for conjectures from the children about the surface and volume of a cube and asked for some ideas about formulae for calculation. The teacher asked the class to cluster into its component *han* (working groups) of four or five children each, and gave out materials for measurement and construction. One group left the room with large pieces of cardboard, to construct a model of a cubic meter. The groups worked internally on solutions to problems set by the teacher and competed with each other to finish first. After a while, the cubic meter group returned, groaning under the bulk of its model, and everyone gasped over its size. (There were many comments and guesses as to how many children could fit inside.) The teacher then set the whole class a very challenging problem, well over their heads, and gave them the rest of the class time to work on it. The class ended without a solution, but the teacher made no particular effort to get or give an answer, although she exhorted them to be energetic. (It was several

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

days before the class got the answer—there was no deadline but the excitement did not flag.)

Several characteristics of this class deserve highlighting. First, there was attention to feelings and predispositions, provision of facts, and opportunities for discovery. The teacher preferred to focus on process, engagement, commitment, and performance rather than on discipline (in our sense) and production. Second, the *han*: Assignments are made to groups, not to individuals (this is also true at the workplace) although individual progress and achievement are closely monitored. Children are supported, praised, and allowed to make mistakes through trial and error within the group. The group is also pitted against other groups, and the group's success is each person's triumph, and vice versa. Groups are made up by the teacher and are designed to include a mixture of skill levels—there is a *hancho* (leader) whose job it is to choreograph the group's work, to encourage the slower members, and to act as a reporter to the class at large.

Japanese teachers seem to recognize the emotional as well as the intellectual aspects of engagement. Japanese pedagogy (and maternal socialization) are based on the belief that effort is the most important factor in achievement, and that the teacher's job is to get the child to commit himself positively and energetically to hard work. This emphasis is most explicit in elementary school, but persists later as a prerequisite for the self-discipline and effort children exhibit in high school.

American educational rhetoric does invoke "the whole child," does seek "self-expression," and does promote emotional engagement in "discovery learning." But Japanese teaching style, at least in primary schools, effectively employs an engaging, challenging teaching style that surpasses most American attempts. In the cubing class, I was struck by the spontaneity, excitement, and (to American eyes) "unruly" dedication of the children to the new idea, and impressed with the teacher's ability to create this positive mood. It could be a cultural difference: We usually separate cognition and emotional affect, and then devise artificial means of reintroducing "feeling" into learning. It is rather like the way canned fruit juices are produced—first denatured by the preserving process and then topped up with chemical vitamins to replace what was lost.

The role of competition

The frequent accusation that Japanese education involves children in hellish competition must also be examined. In the elementary school classroom, competition is negotiated by means of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

han. The educational system tries to accommodate both the ideology of harmony and the interest in hierarchy and ranking. The introduction of graded, competitive Western modes of education into societies where minimizing differences between people is valued has often produced severe social and psychological dislocation (as in Africa and other parts of the Third World). In Japan, the importance of the modern educational system as a talent selector and the need to preserve harmony and homogeneity have produced complementary rather than conflicting forces. The regular classroom is a place where the individual does not stick out, but where individual needs are met and goals are set. Children are not held back nor advanced by ability; the cohesion of the age group is said to be more important. Teachers focus on pulling up the slower learners, rather than tracking the class to suit different abilities. For the most part, teachers and the school system refuse to engage in examination preparation hysteria. Part of the reason for this is pressure from the Teachers' Union, a very large and powerful labor union which consistently resists any moves away from the egalitarian and undifferentiating mode of learning. Turning teachers into drill instructors is said to be dehumanizing, and the process of cramming a poor substitute for education.

So where is the competitive selection principle served? In the *juku*. *Juku* are tough competitive classes, often with up to 500 in one lecture hall. The most prestigious are themselves very selective and there are examinations (and preparation courses for these) to enter the *juku*. Some *juku* specialize in particular universities' entrance exams, and they will boast of their rate of admission into their universities. It is estimated than one third of all primary school students and one half of all secondary school students attend *juku*, but in Tokyo the rate rises to 86 percent of junior high school students. The "king of *juku*," Furukawa Noboru, the creator of a vast chain of such classes, says that *juku* are necessary to bridge the gap of present realities in Japan. He says that public schools do not face the fact of competition, and that ignoring the reality does not help children. The Ministry of Education usually ignores this non-accredited alternative and complementary system, and permits this functional division to take the pressure off the public schools. While there is considerable grumbling by parents, and while it is clear that the *juku* introduce an inegalitarian element into the process of schooling (since they do cost money), they do, by their separation from the regular school, permit the persistence of more traditional modes of learning, while allowing for a fast track in the examinations.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It is important to note that in Japan there really is only one moment of critical importance to one's career chances—the entrance examination to college. There are few opportunities to change paths or retool. Americans' belief that one can be recreated at any time in life, that the self-made person can get ahead, simply is not possible in Japan—thus the intense focus on examinations.

The problems—in context

This rapid tour through the Japanese educational system cannot neglect the problems. However, two things must be kept in mind when considering these well-publicized difficulties: One is that although problems do exist, the statistical reality is that, compared to the West, Japan still looks very good indeed. The other is that the Japanese themselves tend to be quite critical, and educational problems are given attention. But this attention should be seen in context: Not that people are not truly concerned about real problems, but that the anxiety seems related to a sense of national insecurity. The Japanese focus on educational issues may emanate from a sense of the importance of intellectual development in a society where there are few other resources. Any educational problem seems to put the nation truly at risk.

Japanese parents are critical and watchful of the schools and are not complacent about their children's successes. There was a telling example of this in a recent comparative study of American and Japanese education. Mothers in Minneapolis and in Sendai, roughly comparable cities, were asked to evaluate their children's school experiences. The Minneapolis mothers consistently answered that the schools were fine and that their children were doing well, while the Sendai mothers were very critical of their schools and worried that their children were not performing up to potential. Whose children were, in objective tests, doing better? The Sendai group—in fact so much better that the poorest performer in the Japanese group was well ahead of the best in the American group. Mothers in Japan and the U.S. have very different perspectives on performance: Japanese mothers attribute failure to lack of effort while American mothers explain it as lack of ability. Japanese children have an external standard of excellence to which they can aspire, while an American child normally can only say he will "do his best."

Problems have surfaced, of course. Psychotherapists report a syndrome among children related to school and examination pressure. School phobia, psychosomatic symptoms, and juvenile suicide are most frequently reported. Japan does lead the world in school-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

related suicides for the 15- to 19-year old age group, at about 300 per year. Recently, the "battered teacher" and "battered parent" syndromes have received much attention. There are cases where teenagers have attacked or killed parents and teachers, and these have been related to examination pressure. The numbers involved in these cases are very small—at least in comparison with American delinquency patterns and other juvenile pathologies. Dropouts, drug use, and violent juvenile crimes are almost non-existent in Japan. The crimes reported in one year among school-age children in Osaka, for example, are equal to those reported in one day in New York.

Criticism leveled at Japanese education by Western observers focuses on what they regard as a suppression of genius and individuality, and a lack of attention to the development of creativity in children. The first may indeed be a problem—for the geniuses—because there is little provision for tracking them to their best advantage. There has been discussion of introducing tracking so that individual ability can be better served, but this has not been implemented. The superbright may indeed be disadvantaged.

On the other hand, creativity and innovation *are* encouraged, but their manifestations may be different from those an American observer would expect. We must look at our own assumptions, to see if they are too limited. Americans see creativity in children as a fragile blossom that is stifled by rigid educational systems or adult standards. Creativity involves a necessary break with traditional content and methods, and implies the creation of a new idea or artifact. Whether creativity is in the child or in the teaching, and how it is to be measured, are questions no one has answered satisfactorily. Why we emphasize it is another question, probably related to our theories of progress and the importance we attach to unique accomplishments that push society forward. The fact is that if anything, our schools do less to encourage creativity than do the Japanese, especially in the arts. All children in Japan learn two instruments and how to read music in elementary school, have regular drawing and painting classes, and work in small groups to create projects they themselves devise. It is true, though, that if everyone must be a soloist or composer to be considered creative, then most Japanese are not encouraged to be creative.

It is not enough to claim that the Japanese have been successful in training children to take exams at the expense of a broader education. And it is not at all appropriate to say that they are unable to develop children's individuality and create the geniuses who make scientific breakthroughs. The first is untrue and the second remains

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to be shown as false by the Japanese themselves, who are now mobilizing to produce more scientists and technologists. In fact, the scales are tipped in favor of Japan, and to represent it otherwise would be a distortion.

The success of the Japanese model has led to its use in other rapidly developing countries, including South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. There, education is seen as the linchpin for development, and attention to children has meant the allocation of considerable resources to schools. The results are similar to those seen in Japanese schools: highly motivated, hard-working students who like school and who have achieved very high scores on international achievement tests.

Seeing ourselves through Japanese eyes

What *America* can learn from Japan is rather an open question. We can, to begin with, learn more *about* Japan, and in doing so, learn more about ourselves. Japanese advancements of the past 20 years were based on American principles of productivity (such as "quality control"), not on samurai management skills and zen austerities. Looking for Japanese secrets, or worse, protesting that they are inhuman or unfair, will not get us very far. They have shown they can adjust programs and policies to the needs and resources of the times; we must do the same. We need to regain the scientific literacy we lost and reacquire the concrete skills and participatory techniques we need. We should see Japan as establishing a new standard, not as a model to be emulated. To match that standard we have to aim at general excellence, develop a long-term view, and act consistently over time with regard to our children's education.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

How to Make Bail Safer

MARTIN D. SORIN

PERHAPS the most popular issue in the field of criminal justice today is "selective incapacitation"—the policy of singling out for detention those criminals who are most likely to repeat their crimes. Given the limited capacity of prisons and jails, it is impossible to incarcerate all those who deserve it. Thus, it is argued, particular attention must be paid to detaining those who pose the greatest risk of repeated, serious offenses. The question, of course, is how to identify these offenders, and one answer is through statistical "prediction." Sophisticated batteries of predictive variables have been developed to try to determine whether a given defendant is likely to offend again. Advocates urge the use of forms of prediction tests both before adjudication (to detain the most likely offenders) and after (to incarcerate them).

As James Q. Wilson has pointed out in these pages, predictions of recidivism have always shaped judicial decisions.[1] Despite the attention given to prediction, this approach to incapacitation has two major flaws. First, it rests on the assumption that we can identify and isolate so-called "career criminals" from the rest of the population —and no matter how sophisticated our variables become, prediction will always be guesswork. Second, prediction-based incapacitation creates a false sense of security. It is one thing to believe that the most dangerous offenders can be identified and incapacitated; it is quite another to assume that those who have been released are comparatively harmless. Simply put, we have no way of knowing whether a given defendant or convict will commit more crimes upon release.

For this reason, advocates of selective incapacitation should consider alternatives to prediction. In particular, there is much to be said for identifying high-rate offenders on the basis of their *actual* offenses. As it happens, many such offenders are easily identified,

[1] James Q. Wilson, "Dealing with the High-Rate Offender," *The Public Interest* 72 (Summer 1983): 52-71.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

yet slip through the criminal justice system again and again: those who, having been released before their trials, commit what are known as "pre-trial" crimes.

THE evidence nationwide suggests that, on the average, *one in six* released defendants is re-arrested for a new offense during the period of pre-trial release. In Washington, D.C., the re-arrest rate of released defendants is 22.2 percent; in Tucson, Arizona, it is 22.1 percent. Moreover, almost one third of those re-arrested once before their trials are re-arrested more than once. In a study I conducted a few years ago, for example, we obtained the following results: Of a national sample of 2,977 released defendants in eight jurisdictions, 470 were re-arrested before their trials. Of these, 141 were arrested twice; 43 were arrested three times; and 12 were arrested four times.[2] More recently, we found defendants who were re-arrested as many as seven times in the months during which their initial cases were pending adjudication.[3]

While judges often do use the current arrest charge as a guide to the defendant's likely criminality after release, this method is usually unsuccessful. In our most recent sample of 42 pre-trial offenders in Tucson, for example, we found that 47.6 percent were initially arrested, or were re-arrested, for a misdemeanor—arrests that almost always lead to release with only pro forma hearings. Yet of these 42 offenders, fully 70 percent were later re-arrested for one or more pre-trial felonies. Simply put, criminals usually do not specialize only in misdemeanors, or only in felonies. Thus current charges are poor predictors of subsequent offenses.

Two general results of our research suggest the importance of preventing pre-trial criminality. First, these offenses are more serious than first offenses: 29.2 percent of initial arrests, 38.2 percent of first re-arrests, and 41.3 percent of multiple re-arrests are for FBI Part I offenses.[4] Second, *pretrial criminality may account for as much as one fifth of our nation's total crime problem*. Our random sample of 2,977 released defendants produced 667 re-arrests. A subsample of 388 released defendants in Washington, D.C., produced the pre-trial crime rates described in Table I.

The defendants who commit offenses after their initial releases have a substantial impact on crime rates. These defendants are aided, however unwittingly, by the criminal courts that repeatedly

---

[2] See Martin D. Sorin and Mary Toborg, *Pretrial Release: A National Evaluation of Practices and Outcomes*, Vol. I (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, 1981), ch. VI.

[3] Martin D. Sorin, "Judicial Responses to Multiple Pretrial Re-Arrests." The draft report from this project funded by the National Institute of Justice from 1981-1983 is now being reviewed by the Institute.

[4] Sorin and Toborg, *Pretrial Release*, Vol. I, p. 235. The so-called Part I offenses are murder and voluntary manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny and theft, and auto-theft.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE I. RE-ARREST RATES FOR RELEASED DEFENDANTS (WASHINGTON, D.C., 1977)[a]

	Number of arrests	*Number of re-arrests*	*Percent re-arrested*
CRIME			
Felony	182	50	27.5%
Misdemeanor	206	36	17.5
Total	388	86	22.2
TYPE OF RELEASE[b]			
Non-financial custody	47	18	38.3
Own recognizance (non-program recommended)	31	8	25.8
Own recognizance (program recommended)	116	27	23.3
Bail	60	11	18.3
Citation	134	22	16.4
Total	388	86	22.2

[a] *Source:* Martin D. Sorin and Mary Toborg, *Pre-Trial Release—A National Evaluation of Practices and Outcomes*, Vol. I (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, 1981), pp. A-27–A-29.

[b] Our sample included five types of release. (1) Under "non-financial custody release," the defendant is released by a judge and placed in the custody of a third party (usually a relative). (2) "Non-program recommended own recognizance" means that the defendant has been released by a judge after promising to appear in court. (3) "Program-recommended own recognizance" occurs when a release program recommends that a defendant be released on his own recognizance and the judge concurs with the request. (4) Under bail, a defendant is released after paying a fee (usually 10 percent) on a surety bond. In most cases, these bonds are held by commercial bondsmen. (5) Citation releases are given by policeman for relatively minor offenses. The offender is ticketed and released without formal arrest and booking procedures.

release them. The decision to release a defendant is often based solely on the likelihood of his later appearance in court; thus, the defendant who fails to appear is chastised, while one who dutifully appears after every armed robbery is released again and again. Indeed, in many jurisdictions, the commission of a crime after pre-trial release does not even violate the defendant's release conditions.[5] Many systems place a higher priority on the defendant's appearance in court than on his criminal offenses after release. (Thus, for example, the Pre-Trial Services Agency in Washington, D.C., whose jurisdiction includes the sample of defendants cited in Table I, was recently designated "exemplary" by the National Institute of Justice.[6])

IF a defendant commits multiple offenses during his initial bail period, he must have been repeatedly released. It should come as no surprise that the particular release conditions a defendant receives at his first hearing after re-arrest become a major factor in the likelihood of his subsequent pre-trial criminality. Yet many defendants who commit multiple pre-trial offenses are released after their first

[5] Sorin, "Judicial Responses."

[6] See G.P. Rikowski and D. Whitcomb, "D.C. Pre-Trial Services Agency, Washington, D.C.—An Exemplary Project" (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, 1982).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE II: EFFECT OF RELEASE CONDITIONS ON MULTIPLE RE-ARRESTS[a]

	Conditions unchanged after first re-arrest (percent)	*Rank*	*Multiple arrests as a percentage of all arrests*	*Rank*
San Jose	61.5%	1	38.6%	1
Tucson	51.0	2	33.9	2
Santa Cruz	42.9	3	25.0	6
Washington, D.C.	40.5	4	29.1	5
Baltimore County	36.7	5	33.3	4
Louisville	30.0	6	33.8	3
Baltimore City	27.8	7	13.7	8
Miami	23.8	8	21.9	7

[a] *Source:* See footnote 3.

re-arrests without any change in their initial release conditions. (Indeed, very often judges do not alter release conditions until the defendant's *third* re-arrest.) Our research indicates that much of the variation in the rate of multiple bail offending among jurisdictions occurs precisely *because* of the fact that in some jurisdictions, release conditions are less often changed after a first re-arrest (Table II). The numbers show that the highest rates of multiple pre-trial offending take place in jurisdictions that most often release defendants after a first re-arrest without changing their initial release conditions. Conversely, jurisdictions with a lower rate are those in which release conditions are usually made more stringent after a first re-arrest.

In our most recent study, we compared two jurisdictions with low rates of multiple pre-trial offending (Baltimore and Miami) with two jurisdictions that showed higher rates (Tucson and San Jose). We wanted to see whether differences in court practices accounted for the differences in rates of offending. According to our research, the release agency's assessment of the defendant (and its resulting recommendation) is the major factor in a judge's decision to release him. *And judges frequently are not told that a defendant has already been released, or given sufficient details upon which to base a decision.*

We reached this conclusion after experiments in three different areas with a total of 25 magistrates and 102 defendants. First, we altered defendant dossiers and distributed them to judges for simulated hearings and release decisions. In jurisdictions where information about the defendant (such as whether and for what charges he had already been released) was not usually available in time for his bail hearing, we provided complete information for those defendants randomly assigned to our experimental groups. In cases where information was routinely available and relatively complete, we experimented by withholding it. Our control groups consisted of defendant dossiers which we left as we found them. The defendants in our experiments had been re-arrested once or more before their

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

trials; some had had their release conditions altered after the first re-arrest, others had not. The results we obtained were then compared to the release conditions that the same defendants actually were granted. In addition, we were able to obtain explanations from the judges —which are not given at an actual hearing—about their decisions in the experimental cases.

The results were impressive. In the sites with cases in which complete information about the defendant was usually unavailable, but presented by us in the simulated hearings, bail amounts rose dramatically. In San Jose, for example, the average amount of bail set in the actual hearings was $2,786; with the supplemental information we provided, it rose to $6,636, or by 238 percent. Meanwhile, the average bail set for our control group either fell or remained the same, depending on the extent to which the supplemental information was presented during the actual hearing. Conversely, in cases in which information was usually provided, but now withheld, average bail amounts plummeted. In Baltimore, the average fell from $7,220 to $1,658, or by 77 percent. Again, average bail set for the control group remained stable.

But most telling were the results from those few cases in which judges re-decided release conditions they had handed down themselves. Because of the information we provided about defendants' pre-trial offenses, these judges were much more likely to base release decisions on their perceptions of the offenders' future criminality and danger to the community, regardless of the statutory support for these criteria in their own jurisdictions. Our new evidence suggests that such an approach—one based on curbing multiple bail criminality, rather than adhering to strict, "blindfolded" release criteria—would result in cost savings compared to the costs now incurred by repeated release. For although detaining offenders is expensive, the cost of detention is far surpassed by the cost to criminal justice agencies of multiple pre-trial crimes. In short, detaining the minority of defendants who commit multiple bail crimes is cheaper than releasing them. Thus, there is much to be said for a more selective approach to curbing bail crime—one based not on current charges or faulty predictions, but on the incidence of crime itself.

We can begin by adopting the practices of jurisdictions in which the rates of single and multiple bail offenses are low. These rates vary widely among jurisdictions. In Baltimore City, one in 13 released defendants is re-arrested, and less than one seventh of these becomes a multiple offender. Yet 40 miles away, in Washington, D.C., more than one in five released defendants is re-arrested, and almost one third of these commits multiple bail crimes. In San Jose (Santa Clara County), fully two in five re-arrested defendants become multiple bail offenders. In Tucson and Louisville, the ratio is one in three. The pattern is clear: In jurisdictions that assign the same or even laxer release conditions to re-arrested defendants,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

multiple offending results. Keeping in mind the practices of our more successful jurisdictions, as well as proposals of my own, I recommend that we curb bail crime through the following types of reform:

Obedience to the law as a condition of release. As noted earlier, in many jurisdictions, refraining from crime is not even a condition of release. This policy, which encourages both multiple offending and public cynicism toward the criminal justice system, is simply ridiculous.

Instead, released defendants should and can be required to refrain from felonies and misdemeanors alike. If the defendant proves untrustworthy, then appropriate statutory provisions (already passed and invoked in our more successful jurisdictions) can be brought to bear on revoking his release. In short, as judges in Baltimore are fond of saying, defendants should be given "one bite of the apple." Violations such as pre-trial felonies or misdemeanors can be treated as analogous to contempt of court, as Senator Edward Kennedy, among others, has suggested.

Critics have protested that such reforms would breach the presumption of innocence, but this objection cannot stand. At a release hearing, the judge must consider only "probable cause for arrest"; the presumption of innocence is a *trial* consideration. Moreover, pre-trial release is a privilege, not a right. As such, it is subject to certain conditions—such as the defendant's appearance for trial—that could easily include the requirement of good behavior, especially since we have found that almost a third of those who fail to appear for trial also commit bail crimes. Because bail offenders commit both misdemeanors and felonies, and because these violations so undermine the authority of the law, courts must respond to bail crimes more stringently than they do today—either by tightening the initial release conditions, or by detaining the defendant. This is most defensibly done following his first re-arrest.

Jurisdictional guidelines. Most jurisdictions provide no written guidelines for judges about the prevention of pre-trial crime. The result, as we discovered in our experiments, is that judges in the same jurisdiction will disagree significantly about a single case. Thus, bail decisions now depend more on who conducts the hearing than on general policy. In some jurisdictions, judges automatically tighten release conditions when a defendant is re-arrested; in others, where judges are not guided by the policy of curtailing bail crime, release orders remain unchanged despite repeated arrest.

Clearly, court guidelines aimed at preventing bail crime are needed. Such guidelines should recommend specific reactions to offenses committed under the various types of release. Because of their great impact on release and release decisions, similar guidelines must be developed for determining the likelihood of defendants' pre-trial "dangerousness" and for implementing the many federal jail overcrowding orders. The necessity for such rules becomes even more apparent when we consider that judges and assistant prosecu-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tors often alternate their roles at bail hearings. Surely it is wiser to base bail policy on agreed-upon conditions, rather than on the mere rotation of courtroom personnel.

Timely information about the defendant's status. As we have seen, a judge often does not know that the defendant before him has already been released. In Miami, a defendant is given a "jail card" each time he is booked into the Dade County jail. At his hearing, these cards, which give complete details of his pending cases and releases, are presented to the magistrate. Consequently, judges in Miami seldom release defendants who have been re-arrested without imposing new conditions on the release. Often, for example, a re-arrested offender has been assigned an "alternate bond" which is invoked when he is arrested again with probable cause. And far from being regarded as sacrosanct, prior non-financial release decisions are automatically revoked under certain conditions of re-arrest.

Obviously, this system—which is vastly better than that in most jurisdictions—depends on the reliability and timeliness of the information provided to the hearing judge. When information about the defendant is unavailable or incomplete, judges are more likely to issue "no change" release orders—orders which, as we have seen, have a substantial impact on crime rates. Thus, jurisdictions need to design and employ what we will call ALERT (Automated Law Enforcement Release/Re-arrest Tracking) systems to ensure that such information is compiled and presented to the judge before each hearing. While almost all major court systems already have computerized management information systems, only the successful ones use them to keep track of defendants. If each jurisdiction obtained a simple computer program to identify and cross-reference all active cases, and if each paid more attention to the timely entry of relevant data, it could do more to curtail bail offenses than scores of uninformed judges do today.

Monitoring high-risk defendants. Oddly enough, defendants who are released via a surety bond are subject to much less supervision than those who are released outright. In both Baltimore and Miami, defendants released without bond are required to make weekly telephone calls to a release agency, and to report to addiction treatment agencies where indicated. The call-in requirement not only minimizes the number of defendants who fail to appear for trial; it also reduces the likelihood that a re-arrest will go unnoticed. Thus, information about these defendants is often more complete and reliable than information about defendants released on bond. Given that bail-bonded defendants, in addition to often having been charged with more serious crimes, are frequently career criminals and high-rate offenders, they should be required to comply with the same post-release supervision as those released for lesser offenses. By ensuring that more information is available about bail-bonded defendants, this requirement would reduce the likelihood of repeated release for high-rate offenders.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

More time for judges and less for defendants. Magistrates are usually given 24 to 48 hours to arrive at a release decision. These time constraints are highly unrealistic, particularly in dealing with multiple offenders in jurisdictions where the means of collecting information are inadequate and slow. By permitting extensions of the time allotted for release decisions, courts could reduce the number of decisions based on inadequate knowledge of the defendant's status.

A related problem, and one equally in need of reform, is that re-arrested defendants are often released again without even facing a judge. Depending on the re-arrest charge, defendants in many jurisdictions are eligible for ticketed release by a policeman, or release at the stationhouse following a formal arrest, or release by paying a set amount of bond from a uniform bond schedule. A prohibition should be placed on releasing re-arrested offenders without a judge's decision. Having violated the trust of the court by committing pre-trial offenses, these defendants should be denied the more automatic forms of release.

Miami and Baltimore also employ so-called "competency" orders that detain defendants who exhibit bizarre or menacing behavior until psychiatric evaluations can be arranged. These orders, which protect both the community and the defendant himself, could be usefully exercised in any jurisdiction.

Finally, courts should consider reforming the trial regulations that govern the order in which cases are presented. In most jurisdictions, defendants who are already detained are brought to trial before those on release. The purpose of this arrangement, of course, is to minimize any unwarranted detention. Still, given the number of offenses committed by defendants on bail, courts should consider the alternative of a *triage* system based on the seriousness of *all* outstanding charges, regardless of whether a defendant has been detained or released. Since multiple bail offenders are often career criminals, a system that ensures them a speedier trial may do more to curb crime than a system that favors those already detained.

Reforming the release agencies. Trial release agencies, which compute such release violations as the failure to appear in court, often do not bother to keep tabs on rates of re-arrest. There is no reason why they should not, or why judges should not also receive information on the extent to which their decisions result in new arrests. In addition to serving the public interest in reducing bail crime, such record-keeping could also provide standards for assessing and reviewing the agencies and courts themselves. If agency employees paid more attention to the importance of curbing crime, and less to the single goal of an offender's appearance in court, they would enhance their own reputations as public servants —a reputation now threatened by their tendency to appear as mere advocates for offenders.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TAKEN together, these recommendations provide for a more prudent release policy than that now practiced in many jurisdictions. Of those we have reviewed, the jurisdiction of Baltimore—which already has adopted many of the approaches mentioned above—has a far more impressive record than most. Its single and multiple re-arrest rates are quite low, as is its percentage of defendants who fail to appear in court. Note, however, that Baltimore's success does not depend on the wholesale detention of offenders; indeed, proportionately speaking, Baltimore releases 14 percent more of its defendants than Tucson, whose single and multiple re-arrest rates are three times those for Baltimore. Rather, the success of Baltimore's pre-trial release program is a direct consequence of the jurisdiction's dedication to the principle of allowing defendants "one bite of the apple." Given the seriousness of pre-trial offenses, and the extent to which reforming release procedures can prevent them, it is a principle that other jurisdictions would do well to adopt.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The French Population Debate

RICHARD TOMLINSON

It has generally come to be recognized that Western Europe faces serious, if not intractable, economic difficulties. What Western European leaders have been slower to appreciate is that underlying their economic problem is an equally grave demographic crisis. In order to maintain population size at a constant level, without resorting to immigration, the birth rate needs to be 2.1 per woman. Among Western European countries only Spain (2.1), Portugal (2.1), Greece (2.3), and Ireland (3.2) attained or exceeded this figure in 1982.[1] The lowest birth rate was registered by West Germany, with 1.4 per woman (in Munich the rate fell to 1.2). Demographers predict that if the German birth rate remains at its current level, within fifty years total population will decline from 61.7 to 39.4 million. In the same period, the number of Germans over age 65 will increase to 23 percent of the population, while only 13 percent will be below age 15. Though the German case is especially severe, this demographic trend exists throughout Western Europe. Between 1960 and 1980 the size of the European Economic Community (EEC) population relative to the total world population fell from 7.8 percent to 5.9 percent; by the year 2000 the population is expected to fall to 4.9 percent.

So far France has been the only member state to sound the alarm about this demographic decline. In December 1983 the French Minister for Social Affairs, Pierre Bérégovoy, called for collective action by his EEC colleagues to reverse the falling birth rate. His appeal was received politely, but no joint program was approved. The French preoccupation with *dénatalité*—as they describe the falling birth rate—is at first sight rather curious. Their birth rate, at about 1.8 per woman, is relatively high compared with other EEC countries. Yet the problem of *dénatalité* is an important subject of public

[1] Unless otherwise stated, all figures are taken from *Le vieillissement démographique et ses conséquences économiques et sociales. Rapport du Conseil Economique et Social. Journal Officiel, 13 Dec. 1983.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

debate, both by politicians and in the press. At the beginning of 1983, President Mitterrand announced that the falling birth rate would be one of his government's major priorities during the coming year. Mitterrand, like his Gaullist predecessors, has appointed a minister, Georgina Dufoix, who is specifically responsible for population questions. In a recent interview Mme. Dufoix, who has four children of her own, declared that *dénatalité* put at stake France's place in Western civilization. A majority of the French public seems to agree. In November 1983 the magazine *Paris Match* conducted a public opinion poll on the issue of *dénatalité*. Out of a sample of 1,000 people, 59 percent thought the birth rate was insufficient, while 54 percent thought *dénatalité* would diminish French influence in the world. It is difficult to imagine any other European country conducting such a survey, or receiving these responses.

THE reason France provides such a striking exception to general European indifference towards population problems lies in her history. Until 1800 France, with a population of about 28 million, was demographically one of the three largest countries in the Western world. Only the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Russia matched her in demographic size. At the same time France was indisputably the dominant continental power in Europe. From the reign of Louis XIV to the Napoleonic Empire this supremacy was challenged, but never overthrown, by rival nations. Yet between the Battle of Waterloo and the outbreak of World War II French political power gradually declined. Defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 cost France her position as the pivotal continental state; by the end of the nineteenth century it was clear that she had lost out to Britain in the race for colonies. This political decline was matched by a corresponding demographic decline. Between 1870 and 1940 the total French population remained stagnant at about 40 million, while the German population—not counting the territories that Hitler annexed—increased from 40 million to almost 70 million. French commentators drew an obvious but simple conclusion from this comparison. They believed that the rise of Germany proved that political power was critically dependent on demographic weight: Indeed, at their most pessimistic they argued that population size was the only criterion of whether a nation merited great power status. The fate of Russia in World War I ought to have told them this was not true. Russia in 1914 had easily the largest population of any of the combatant nations, yet she was almost overrun in a matter of weeks by the German army. As the United States demonstrated in 1917, and again in 1944, it is industrial strength rather than crude manpower that determines the outcome of modern wars.

The French failed to learn this lesson because of their own experience during World War I. Apart from Serbia, the French lost more men in this war (relative to the size of their population) than any other nation. According to French government statistics, ap-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

proximately 1,325,000 men lost their lives during the conflict, of whom 675,000 were killed in battle, 225,000 disappeared or died in captivity, 250,000 died from wounds, and 175,000 died from war-related illnesses. In addition, over three million French soldiers were wounded without being killed, more than a million of whom were subsequently classified as war invalids. This decimation of a whole generation had profound demographic consequences that are felt even today. A gap appeared in the population which led demographers to describe inter-war France as a nation of old men. Equally significant was the fact that between 1915 and 1919 the annual number of births fell by almost 50 percent. The children born in these years became known as the "hollow" generation; when they reached adulthood in the 1930s it was a foregone certainty that the number of marriages and births would fall accordingly. This created a formidable and ultimately insoluble problem for military planners. In 1935, when the first of the "hollow" generation became eligible for conscription into the army, the recruitment level fell by over half, a situation that repeated itself for the next five years. While the French high command was struggling to make ends meet, across the Rhine Hitler had renounced the Treaty of Versailles and embarked on a program of massive military expansion. This program was still incomplete when Germany defeated France in the space of six weeks in 1940. But Marshal Pétain, who signed the armistice with Hitler, spoke for many of his compatriots when he declared (and the order of his words is important): "Too few children, too few arms, and too few allies—those were the reasons for our defeat."

PÉTAIN was only one in a long line of French statesmen who lamented what they inaccurately described as the "depopulation" of France. In 1919, Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau announced that the Treaty of Versailles would be a worthless guarantee of national security if the French did not undertake to have more children. In 1937, the former Finance Minister Paul Reynaud argued in a parliamentary debate that France was in danger of losing the next war because of her low birth rate. When he became Prime Minister in April 1940 he warned the French in a radio broadcast that *dénatalité* would cost them a war with each generation. It is not exaggerating to say that the fear of depopulation was a national obsession between 1900 and 1940. The American economist Joseph Spengler estimated that in 1921 there were more than 80 national and regional organizations dedicated to increasing the French birth rate and defending the interests of large families. The most important of these was without doubt the National Alliance for the Increase of the French Population, which at its peak in the 1920s claimed a membership of 40,000. It was officially patronized by the President of the Republic, and among its most prominent members were the novelist Émile Zola, the industrialist André Michelin, and Prime

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Ministers such as Raymond Poincaré, Georges Clemenceau, and Paul Reynaud. The National Alliance lobbied tirelessly for the introduction of what it called a *politique de natalité*, including financial aid to large families, punitive taxes for childless couples, and an outright ban on all forms of contraception. This last demand led to the passing of a stringent anti-abortion law in 1920, whose penalties were progressively strengthened during the next 20 years. In 1942 abortion was decreed a crime against the state equivalent to treason, which resulted the following year in the execution of a midwife from Cherbourg.

This somber event marked a watershed in the history of populationism in France. Since World War II successive French governments have favored social welfare measures, rather than pointless repression, to encourage the birth rate. In March 1945 General de Gaulle declared that France needed "twelve million beautiful babies in ten years." To this end de Gaulle established a new Population Ministry, incorporating a National Population Council, whose task was to draft a comprehensive *politique familiale*. A massive housing program was launched for young married couples, and generous financial aid was offered to help them bring up their children. For whatever reason, the French birth rate did begin to increase dramatically, creating an authentic baby boom in the late 1940s and 1950s. It should be stressed that this phenomenon was occurring throughout Western Europe at the same time, but because of her long history of demographic stagnation the effect of the baby boom was especially striking in France. Between 1946 and 1962 the French population increased from 39,848,000 to 46,500,000, an astonishing expansion in so short a period.

Paradoxically, because France's population increase was so rapid, political concern was all the more intense when a steady decline in the birth rate became perceptible in the mid-1960s. Contemporary populationists, like their Third Republic predecessors, do not hesitate to reach the most pessimistic conclusions about the consequences of *dénatalité*. For instance, the distinguished historian Pierre Chaunu has declared several times that the contraceptive pill poses a greater threat to Western society than the nuclear arms race. Chaunu is supported in parliament by Michel Debré, a former Prime Minister and a consistent advocate of populationist policies. Other French leaders are less extreme than Debré and Chaunu, but no less convinced that the falling birth rate is an issue of major national importance. Former President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing stated, in his political testament *Démocratie Française*, that *dénatalité* was one of the four key problems affecting the nation's future.

In this context it is hardly surprising that the present Socialist government has made the birth rate a major political priority. Indeed François Mitterrand, when he was still a deputy in 1978, declared

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that *dénatalité* was the only issue on which he was in total agreement with the Gaullist Michel Debré. Yet historically there have always been serious ideological problems for the left in supporting populationism, which is conventionally regarded as a conservative cause. Ironically, these problems have never been as severe for the Communists as for the more moderate Socialists. As early as 1887 the French Marxist leader Jules Guesde declared that *dénatalité* was a national tragedy which threatened to undermine France's status as a great power. If this sounded rather strange coming from a revolutionary, when the French Communists broke with the Socialists in 1919 they found their own ideological reasons for espousing populationism. In the first place the neo-Malthusian leagues that wanted to legalize contraceptives were dominated by anarchists, who were anathema to the Communists. Second, Communists such as Maurice Thorez, who led the party from the mid-1930s till his death in 1964, argued that if the proletariat systematically practiced birth control they would be too depleted in numbers to win the impending class struggle with the bourgeoisie. Thorez's attitude was largely dictated by Stalin, who outlawed all forms of contraception in the Soviet Union in 1935, fearing that the declining birth rate was a threat to national security. Since 1935 the French Communists have followed the same line, while attacking the reactionary nature of most populationist propaganda.

If this is an ambivalent attitude, the position of the Socialists is even more delicate. Traditionally the problem for the Socialists has been that populationism, at least as it is expressed by organizations like the National Alliance, has always been seen as an attack on individual liberty, and therefore repugnant to the party of the rights of man. Léon Blum, who led the Socialists from 1919 to 1947, was himself the author of a book which advocated the right of couples to conduct extramarital relationships. Blum and his supporters were particularly receptive to the neo-Malthusian argument that it was not the state's business to outlaw birth control, since couples should be free to choose how many children they have. More recently, the claims of populationists like Debré and Chaunu have been construed by the Socialists as attacks on the rights of women. There is some justice to this criticism. Debré argues that the single most important reason for the decline in the French birth rate since 1965 has been the increase in the number of women who go out to work. To discourage them from pursuing careers, he would like to see the state pay them a "family salary" to stay at home and look after their children. In this way he hopes not only to encourage women to rediscover their traditional role as wives and mothers, but also to reduce unemployment. The Socialist government, which includes a Ministry for Women's Rights, has been at pains to dissociate itself from Debré's position. In a recent interview Mme. Dufoix argued that any *politique familiale* has to take into account the modern woman's

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dual identity as both mother and worker. She also made clear that the government had no intention of repealing the laws legalizing contraceptives and abortion.

YET in other respects the government's support of populationism is indistinguishable from that of its conservative opponents. This is particularly true of its nationalist justification for a *politique familiale*. Mitterrand publicly agrees with both Mme. Dufoix and Michel Debré that *dénatalité* puts the future of French civilization in jeopardy. He takes this position not merely because he is a nationalist in the Gaullist tradition, but also because, like his opponents, he is acutely concerned about France's immigrant problem. Nobody knows for certain how many immigrants there are in France. The most recent figures published by the government's statistical service (INSEE) estimate that at the end of 1982 France contained about 4.5 million immigrants, or over 8 percent of the population. Within this figure, the largest single national group are the Portuguese, with about 865,000, followed by the Algerians, with about 805,000. Other important national groups include the Italians (490,000) the Moroccans (440,000), the Spanish (395,000), and the Tunisians (212,000). These statistics are only approximate because the French government is unable to control immigration properly, which means that many people enter the country illegally. This is one reason why the immigrant population in France is still expanding. The other is that the immigrant birth rate, particularly among women from the Maghreb countries of North Africa, is much higher than that of the native French population. According to INSEE, 38 percent of all families with three or more children have at least one immigrant parent. INSEE also calculates that between 1975 and 1981, the proportion of children born with at least one immigrant parent, relative to the total number of births, rose from 10.8 percent to 11.8 percent.

These figures have been exploited by the extreme right in France to bolster its argument that the country is being swamped by people of an alien culture. The most important racist organization is the National Front, which achieved a string of electoral successes in the autumn and winter of 1983-1984. Yet the National Front's demand for repatriation has also been made by conservative populationists who deny they are racist. In a recent interview Pierre Chaunu declared baldly that immigrants from the Third World had insurmountable problems adapting to the French way of life, and should therefore be encouraged to return home. Michel Debré is on record as distinguishing between inter-war immigrants, who have been assimilated, and post-war immigrants, who have not. Jacques Chirac, the Gaullist Mayor of Paris and former Prime Minister, stated in July 1983 that as far as immigration is concerned "the threshold of tolerance has been passed."

Such menacing statements tend to skirt around the question of what makes France French. The eminent French demographer Alfred

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Sauvy pointed out in a recent newspaper article that "a native of La Réunion who comes to France is both a Frenchman and an immigrant." This is also true of natives of the Caribbean islands of Guadeloupe and Martinique, which like La Réunion—whose parliamentary deputy is Michel Debré—remain part of metropolitan France. In a broader sense, the French never developed a formal relationship with their colonies in the same way as the British. De Gaulle always argued that the colonies were part of a "greater France," which was united by common bonds of language and culture. Even after the colonies won independence in the 1950s and early 1960s it was an article of Gaullist faith that a native of Algeria, just as much as a native of Provence, belonged to the same French civilization.

It is precisely this wider view of Frenchness that is being threatened by the current wave of hostility to the immigrants. While he has deplored the spread of racism, Mitterrand has not hesitated to imply that *dénatalité* and the immigrant question are two sides of the same problem. Speaking at a ceremony honoring French mothers, he declared: "The nation cannot remain indifferent to the number of births. The decline in the birth rate constitutes a grave menace for the West, and we must take action."

THE message may be coded but the meaning is clear. Mitterrand evidently sees a direct correlation between the decline of the West and the population shift to the Third World. At the same time, in company with more conservative populationists, he has chosen a narrow definition of Frenchness, by introducing stricter immigration controls and by facilitating the return of immigrants to their home country. In this respect the present French government conforms to a European pattern. The British government has recently passed a Nationality Act which excludes subjects of Commonwealth countries from full citizenship rights. In Germany Chancellor Kohl has followed the example originally set by Giscard, offering financial incentives for immigrants (mainly Turks) to return home. What makes the French case unique is that for Mitterrand immigration controls are not enough. Only the introduction of a comprehensive *politique familiale*, leading to a rise in the native birth rate, can protect France—and by extension Western Europe—from demographic and political eclipse.

Unfortunately, there is no firm evidence that government attempts to raise the birth rate have ever succeeded. As early as 1913 the French government offered financial aid to large families, and by 1939—when a Family Code was introduced—a comprehensive *politique familiale* was in place. Yet the French birth rate continued to decline relentlessly, reaching a record low in the late 1930s. After the war de Gaulle was quick to take credit for the resurgence of the French population, but the truth is rather more complex. The birth rate actually began to rise in 1942, at the height of the German occu-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pation, when the Vichy government was long on populationist rhetoric but short on aid to the family. Moreover, the birth rate peaked in the late 1940s, before the measures introduced by de Gaulle, particularly better housing, had taken full effect. This suggests that, if the post-war *politique familiale* had any influence on the birth rate, it was to reinforce a demographic trend that would have occurred anyway.

Such a conclusion is supported by an examination of the traditional features of French population policy. Conservative populationists like Debré and Chaunu have always argued that the legalization of contraception and abortion removed one of the major defenses against a declining birth rate. They are almost certainly wrong. Even when France had laws banning all forms of birth control, these conspicuously failed to achieve their purpose. It was widely believed, though impossible to prove, that in the inter-war period at least 500,000 abortions were performed each year in France. Ironically, the legalization of contraceptives might have reduced this figure, since abortion as a form of birth control is a last resort. There are more recent examples to prove that it is virtually impossible for even the most repressive government to legislate effectively in this area. In 1966 the Rumanian government became so concerned about the declining birth rate that overnight it banned all forms of contraception and outlawed abortion. Within a year the birth rate increased from 14.3 to 27.4 per thousand of the population, but by 1973 the figure had fallen to 18.2. The reason was simple: Denied access to modern forms of birth control, the Rumanian people had resorted to traditional contraceptive methods, such as *coitus interruptus*, to limit the number of children.

If repressive measures to raise the birth rate have failed, there is still controversy over whether other, incentive-based social policies can stimulate population growth. In a general sense it is obvious that the improvement in living standards in the post-war era must have made raising a family easier. It is when the details of pronatalist policies are studied that the picture becomes blurred. The present French government has introduced two measures that it hopes will encourage couples to have more children. Families with three children are now entitled to a state subsidy of 1,000 francs ($125) per month for two years. In addition, from the third month of pregnancy to the child's third birthday, all families can claim an allowance of 700 francs ($85) per month. Yet it is hardly plausible that this level of child benefit will act as an incentive to families with two children to have another, even considering the extra financial aid they receive if they do. The opposition argues that the government should go much further in granting aid to young couples. There is no evidence to suggest this would achieve the desired result. When in 1977 the East German government introduced a "family

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

salary" of the kind advocated by Debré, it had no perceptible impact on the birth rate, which is only slightly higher than in France.

Paradoxically, it is the right in France that consistently advocates greater state intervention to raise the birth rate, while the left is much more modest in its aims. Mme. Dufoix repeatedly declares that all the government is trying to do is create a "favorable environment for family life." This is partly to neutralize the criticism of some feminists, who claim the government's *politique familiale* threatens the progress made by women towards full equality. But it also arises from a genuine confusion about what causes the birth rate to decline. In the past the French have produced numerous theories to explain *dénatalité*. The nineteenth century social scientist Frédéric Le Play believed the French were encouraged to limit their offspring by the inheritance system of *partage forcé*, which obliged the father to divide his property equally between his sons. By only having one son it was possible to prevent the disintegration of the family estate, and so accumulate wealth for future generations. The novelist Émile Zola argued that *dénatalité* was caused by the flight from the land, since he assumed that peasants were naturally more fertile than city dwellers like himself. This was certainly untrue. Until World War II France not only had one of the lowest birth rates among developed nations, but also one of the largest rural populations. According to the 1936 census, 46 percent of the French population still lived in communes of less than two thousand people, and their birth rate was about the same as that of urban inhabitants. Yet this did not stop French legislators from perpetuating the myth of the fertile peasant. The 1939 Family Code offered marriage loans to young couples on condition that they remain in the agricultural sector. After the Liberation, de Gaulle demanded that the National Population Council study means to halt the rural exodus. Yet in France maximum population growth actually coincided with massive urbanization, a "contradiction" that the General was unable to appreciate.

Perhaps the most potent myth about *dénatalité* was that it was connected with de-Christianization. In the late-nineteenth century, French demographers tried to prove that Catholic areas of France had higher birth rates than anti-clerical regions. Before 1940 there was some evidence to support this view. For instance, the birth rate was significantly higher in Catholic Brittany than in the anti-clerical Midi. But it was also true that economically Brittany was a very backward region, and that the Nord—also staunchly Catholic, but with a more developed economy—had only an average birth rate compared to the rest of France. Populationists believed that Catholic areas ought to have higher birth rates because of the Church's unequivocal teaching on the duty to procreate. The truth was probably more complex. Catholic doctrine concerning family life may well have been influential, but so too was the simple fact of economic hardship.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In general, the present French government has avoided these ideological debates about the causes of *dénatalité*. The most Mme. Dufoix is prepared to say is that the birth rate is affected by certain material factors: inflation, unemployment, and above all poor housing conditions. To this extent the Socialists have emancipated themselves from the unavailing past of French populationism. But in placing so much importance on a *politique familiale* they show that in other respects they are prisoners of the populationist tradition. Such policies have failed before, and offer little hope of working in the future.

This raises the question of whether other countries have anything to learn from the measures being taken by the Mitterrand government to raise the birth rate. The short answer is that they do, but the lessons to be learned may be sobering ones. There is no doubt that if the birth rate in Western Europe continues to decline at its present speed, or even remains at its current level, the social welfare system of the EEC countries will be under enormous pressure. And it is not simply a matter of paying for pensions: A recent French government report concluded that those aged over 65 already "consume" about a quarter of the nation's health care resources. Similar figures could be produced for Britain and Germany. The burden this places on the working population will grow rapidly if the proportion of old people continues to expand. At the same time, France's own history—as well as that of some Eastern European countries—shows there is very little governments can do directly to reverse this trend.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DEFENSE BOOKS

•

contents

Nick Eberstadt on Mobilizing the Defense Industries
p. 122

Patrick Glynn on Just-War Theorists and Theory
p. 129

Diana West on Press Coverage of Wars
p. 136

Jeffrey Record on Weapons and Combat
p. 142

Mary Tedeschi on Citizenship's Obligations
p. 148

Mackubin T. Owens on Defense Organization and Reform
p. 153

•

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Managing the War Industries

NICK EBERSTADT

Lee D. Olvey, Henry A. Leonard, and Bruce Arlinghaus, editors: **Industrial Capacity and Defense Planning.** *Lexington Books. 169 pp. $20.00.*

Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. and Uri Ra'anan, editors: **The U.S. Defense Mobilization Infrastructure: Problems and Priorities.** *Archon Books. 292 pp. $32.50.*

THE current debate over the merit of an "industrial policy" for the American economy has to date avoided a simple but important fact. Today's "new ideas" about strategic cooperation between governments and business are not untested abstractions. Quite the contrary, they have actually been put into practice for many decades in a large and vital sector of our national economy: the "military-industrial complex." Far-reaching collaborations of the public and private sectors in the name of innovation and productivity are standard operating procedure in the armaments business. To the defense planner, federal investments to stimulate technological breakthroughs, government-supported and -guided "structural reorganization" of multibillion dollar markets, direct governmental participation in private companies' design, development, and manufacture of new products, are all quite familiar. If the American government's involvement in directing and channeling the development of our war industries sounds reminiscent of the "nurturing" that Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) targets at favored industries, this is hardly a coincidence: In an earlier incarnation, Japan's now-fabled MITI was known to American GIs as the Ministry of Munitions.

The U.S. war industries wed two of the fundamental truths that shape the contemporary American economy: first, that governmental involvement in our industrial economy has proved consistent with (if not indispensible to) technological innovation and the improvement of public welfare; second, that it has proved expeditious for America to preserve peace in the modern age by constantly upgrading its warmaking capacity. "Liberals" and "conservatives," proud parents respectively of the first and the second of these truths, seem deeply uncomfortable with the union of the two, and as yet do not appear to have faced up to it. "Conservatives" have no problem

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with the idea of "peace through strength," but they cannot bring themselves to acknowledge that they are advocating the expansion of the sector of the economy that is most flagrant in its deviation from the principles of the free market. Nor, seemingly, can they bear to admit that the performance of a group of industries almost entirely conditioned by state planning is, in practice, highly satisfactory to them. On the other hand, "liberals," who are not famously intolerant of inefficiency in government spending programs and investment projects, often respond almost viscerally to what they see as the "waste, fraud, and mismanagement" in the national defense effort. Their charges here, while more accurate than "conservatives" would like to think, nevertheless betray a misunderstanding of the criteria by which the military must be judged. The point that "liberals" grasped so well in the War on Poverty is not applied when it comes to confronting a foreign enemy: The attainment of national political objectives must be measured by effectiveness, *not* by efficiency.

It is no wonder, then, that these particulars confuse the ideologically impassioned. They are not much less troublesome to the analysts and policymakers who are charged with strengthening America's military-industrial base—at an acceptable cost. Two recently published volumes provide insight into the current state of professional thinking about the conversion of American economic power into military might. *Industrial Capacity and Defense Planning* is the result of a conference convened at West Point in the summer of 1981; *The U.S. Defense Mobilization Infrastructure*, the more thoughtful collection of the two, evolved from a conference held at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in May 1981. Within these books one can find a wealth of information on specific aspects of the military economy, and some valuable, even brilliant, suggestions for improving the control and utilization of resources. But these books are also interesting for what they miss about the workings of the war economy and the strategic purposes to which it must be harnessed.

ALTHOUGH both books were published only last year, they have the tone of a very different era. The sense of extreme agitation and anxiety that "defense planners" felt in the final years of the Carter administration comes through in these writings with force. Toward the end of the 1970s, American defense experts, like their Soviet counterparts, perceived that the "correlation of forces" was shifting against the United States at an even faster pace. But unlike Moscow's America watchers, many U.S. students of defense issues had come to doubt the ability of the American *economy* to respond to Soviet military challenges.

Toward the end of 1980 a series of influential studies on America's war industries appeared in a burst; all of them concluded that the U.S. "defense industrial base" was in deep trouble. Lead-times for procuring new equipment were rising, and production delays

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ran into years for some critical weapons and badly-needed components; prices of defense materiel were increasing far more rapidly than prices in the civilian sector; the stock of machine tools responsible for turning out military hardware was being allowed to age, much of it falling unreplaced into obsolescence; quality control was said to be declining, and overall, it was alleged, "productivity" in the defense industries was on the wane.

These reports seem to have had a profound emotional impact on some of the authors in these two volumes. Many of the writers in *Industrial Capacity and Defense Planning* see these difficulties in the defense industries as the frontispiece to a grander edifice of national malaise, whose structure has included the decline of the automotive and steel industries, the seeming inability of American manufactured goods to meet foreign competition, and the purported unwillingness of the American people to make even short-term sacrifices for their long-term well-being. One writer in *U.S. Defense Mobilization* even questions the feasibility of mounting a successful military defense of the "pecuniary, hedonistic, fragmented society" he takes America to be.

Fortunately, though, one need not turn to pop psychology—or Spengler—to explain the difficulties of the American war industries in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The problem was really a matter of basic economics. In the early 1970s, America's war industries went through a monumental, but little noticed, crisis. Between 1969 and 1975 the American government's demand for military equipment plummetted. Measured in constant dollars, procurements fell by nearly two thirds over those six years. By the time of the American withdrawal from Vietnam, this prolonged crash in the war industries—a drop far more severe than the subsequent slumps in the American auto or steel industries—was beginning to affect the long term planning of all corporations dependent on the Department of Defense for revenues. Plants geared to military production were mothballed, retooled to serve civilian markets, or scrapped entirely; inventories of raw materials and semi-finished goods were slashed; and new investments were postponed or cancelled. But the defense industries rely heavily on specialized capital goods, which must be designed and bought long before they are intended for use. Because of the earlier collapse in orders, then, bottlenecks in production capacity quickly developed when demand increased in the late 1970s. Until those bottlenecks were widened, increases in demand for many military goods meant longer lead times and higher prices, rather than a clean expansion of output. In no small degree, the war industry's troubles in meeting the requirements of the past few years speak to a failure of demand management in the Nixon and Ford administrations, rather than to a crisis of managerial competence during the Carter administration.

This is not to say that the military industries might not be managed better; some reform of government procedures would make for

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

many improvements in the performance of the war industries in peacetime. Jacques Gansler's article in *Industrial Capacity and Defense Planning* highlights some of the general measures that might make military production more economical: These include multiyear contracting and authorizations (which cut costs both by stabilizing production runs and by reducing year-to-year uncertainties); requiring continued competition *during* production on large defense contracts; and encouraging further industrial reorganization in those areas within the defense industry where technological innovations have dramatically altered economies of scale.

Gansler's implicit premise is that government monopsonies, if they act carefully, can simulate the best results of the competitive marketplace. But getting the best performance out of the war industries can only come from an understanding of the workings of these markets—including their technical and bureaucratic peculiarities. What will *not* do is to assume that the problems of defense production will be resolved simply by making military contracting more lucrative, as Henry Leonard seems to say in the chapter that follows Gansler's. Leonard argues that defense work is less appealing to the corporate sector than civilian projects because it generally offers a lower margin of profit on sales. Coming from a military man, this sort of analysis seems astonishingly naive. As is well known, defense contracting follows the "cost plus" principle, which constrains profits but not expenses. Under such conditions, it will make sense for an aircraft manufacturer or a designer of precision systems to assign many of his general research and development costs to his war contracts, thus substantially increasing the margin of profit in his complementary civilian activities. Given the sophistication of today's techniques of cost accounting and tax planning, there is no reason to expect profit margins and returns on investment to be the same in a contractor's defense and non-defense assignments.

THE effectiveness of the war industries should be judged not only by their current levels of peacetime production, but also by the speed and facility with which they can turn out substantially increased supplies of munitions and materiel in a time of crisis. An underlying theme in both *Industrial Capacity* and *U.S. Defense Mobilization* is that the reserve military potential of the American economy is a vital factor in the balance of world power and plays an active role in the process of deterrence. The faster America's economic potential can be converted to tasks of war, the less likely an enemy will be to challenge the United States on the basis of existing military imbalances.

In the past, America has needed years to shape its economy to the exigencies of war: Mobilization took five years for World War II (beginning two years before Pearl Harbor), and never really succeeded in Korea (motorized weaponry manufactured for the front was just shipped to the Pacific when the armistice brought fighting

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to a halt). Since wars can escalate more quickly today than in the past, our capability to expand the production of munitions and military supplies on short notice has become an increasingly important element of national security.

The Western peacetime economy passes through at least two distinct stages before it is converted into a machine for total war. The first makes use of the slack in existing war industries (so-called "surge capacity"), while leaving the civilian economy and the federal budget process essentially unaffected; the second sets the entire economy on a wartime footing through the imposition of comprehensive command planning and the massive transfer of resources away from consumers and into the war-winning effort.

Both *Industrial Capacity* and *U.S. Defense Mobilization* contain useful recommendations for improving America's preparations for a "surge": these include contracting for a certain amount of "wasteful" excess capacity in key war industries, preparing stockpiles of strategic materials, upgrading our Civil Reserve Air Fleet (the plans by which passenger planes would be diverted to military service in times of national emergency), and improving manpower policies for both skilled and unskilled personnel in war-related areas. "Surge planning" provides defense on the cheap: It allows a country to deter an attack with smaller standing armies and a lower military budget than would otherwise be required. In its posture, it is also arguably defensive rather than aggressive. For these reasons it would seem well suited to the temperament of the Western democracies, whose peoples generally resent spending any more money on the military than they absolutely must, and who sometimes agonize over the ulterior purposes of the forces ostensibly emplaced to protect them.

Surprisingly, though, neither *Industrial Capacity* nor *U.S. Defense Mobilization* pays attention to what would seem to be the most obvious economic priority during a crisis of national survival: the transformation of the peacetime system into a war-winning economy. This lacuna is all the more striking because both Soviet and American military thinkers have increasingly been considering the possibility that a superpower clash might take not days, but rather years, to resolve. In such a drawn-out conflict, the importance of harnessing America's full industrial strength to the goal of ending the war can hardly be exaggerated. America currently devotes about 7 percent of its GNP to military activities; the fraction was over 40 percent for three years during World War II. Understanding how to channel this potential effectively should be a major concern for those who are trying to protect us against foreign attack.

Today's defense planners do not have to start from scratch. Forty years ago, during our last full mobilization, the War Production Board managed the American industrial base quite effectively. Understanding its achievements—and identifying the problems it did not solve—would seem to be a starting point for assessing the ability

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the modern American economy to function in a major war. Remarkably, for all their talk of meeting the Soviet military challenge on a global basis, none of the authors in these volumes so much as mentions the War Production Board, the Controlled Materials Plan, or any of the other milestones in the American experience of organizing a wartime economy. In this case, the idea of deterrence seems to have deterred these defense experts from taking the possibility of a real war seriously. Some may find it morbid or even wicked for military men to "think about the unthinkable," but it would be even more wicked for them not to do so. As an earlier generation of proponents of deterrence understood in their bones, the neglect of contingency plans makes those contingencies one should be planning against *more* likely to occur.

THIS is not the only point at which the authors let basic strategic issues pass them by. Thoughtful essays by Colin Gray and Norman Friedman (both in *U.S. Defense Mobilization*) notwithstanding, these two books generally fail to take heed of Churchill's dictum that "it is sometimes necessary to take the enemy into consideration". The defense planners represented in these two volumes seem to have given surprisingly little thought to the economics of a NATO-Warsaw Pact war in Europe.

The Soviet Union runs an economy that is perpetually on a semi-war footing. Comparisons are necessarily inexact, but the fraction of GNP going to the military is about the same in the USSR today as that in Japan in 1937 or Germany in 1938—these last two, of course, being Great Powers that were preparing to be at war in the near future. This is not to say that the Soviet Union is getting ready to march across Western Europe, but beyond the borders of the Soviet Empire, the Red Army is of more use in bullying concessions out of the intimidatable than in extracting them from the resolute by force. Indeed: the value of the Soviet Union's military apparatus might well be substantially diminished if it were ever put to the test against a modern adversary. Munich, not Danzig, appears to be the goal of Soviet military policy toward Western Europe.

Assuming that, for some terrible reason, war breaks out there, what then? Conventional wisdom holds that there would be a "short war," in which NATO forces, overwhelmed in short order by the superior conventional strength of the Warsaw Pact armies, would force the decision of whether or not to unleash nuclear weapons to offset the imbalance. But this is a vision of a possible war *as seen through Western eyes*. We can consider how different things would look to the Soviet Union. Even under circumstances most favorable to the Soviet Union—NATO forces crushed and routed, a failure of Western nuclear nerve, surrender and occupation of several Western European nations—Soviet leaders could not feel the security of ultimate victory. Thousands of miles away, protected by two oceans, the world's largest, most productive, and most techno-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

logically advanced economy would be undamaged. Its economy already operating on a semi-war footing, and the economy of Western Europe a shambles, the Kremlin could expect to manage only small increases in its production of war materials, and it would already be "locked in" to most of its major weapons systems. By contrast, the United States would only just be starting to turn its economy to the tasks of war, and would enjoy not only superior technology, but the advantageous flexibility that comes with setting up new plants and industries. Within a few years, an American war economy might well be capable of overwhelming the Soviet war economy. To spare itself the fate of Japan after Pearl Harbor, the Soviets might well conclude that it would be necessary to destroy America's industrial base. Absent that, the ultimate outcome of a NATO-Warsaw Pact war would, from the Soviet standpoint, still be in question.

Of the many implications which flow from this understanding of Soviet options in a "central war," two are of central importance. The first is that civil defense in the United States is far more important to preserving peace in Europe than almost anyone in America seems to realize. Assuring the Soviet Union of the "survivability" not only of our missiles, but also of our basic industries, would play an enormous part in deterring Soviet agression against our allies. Much can be done to reduce the human, economic, and military damage that a Soviet attack would wreak on the United States, and in a way that would not alter the rhythm or character of daily life in America. The dispersal of industry and an upgrading of U.S. communications systems, for example, are trends already in evidence; encouraging "multiple sourcing" of critical strategic goods may already make sense as a cost cutting measure in many military markets; and providing the public with information about surviving attack could be done in such a way as to avoid either frightening or militarizing our society (it could, for example, be part of every soldier's basic training—nearly a quarter of America's young men still do military service).

The second implication is more subtle: European anxieties about NATO center principally on the twin worries that the United States might divorce itself from its Atlantic partners in a time of crisis, and, alternatively, that it might force them into a war in which America itself would bear no losses. American reservations about NATO focus on the apparent unwillingness of Europeans to defend themselves against Soviet attack. For their size and wealth, Western European societies seem to have surprisingly little military strength.

One reason for this is that their military economies are "protectionist": In large measure, they are isolated from those of their neighbors and allies. This deprives Europeans of large markets for their defense products, thereby limiting their ability to invest in the development of effective new systems, and reducing their ability to supply—and defend—themselves. There are of course many reasons

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for this failure to seize an obvious opportunity, but the overriding consideration is surely the fear that if an effective defense base against Warsaw Pact aggression should be developed on Western European soil, then the U.S. may desert Europe. As we have seen, though, the notion that America could somehow "sit out" a war in Western Europe seems entirely mistaken. The United States could not do so, even if it wanted to: The "correlation of forces," from the Soviet point of view, would simply not permit this. Efforts in Western Europe to integrate and thereby revitalize defense industries would by no means imperil America's strategic commitment to its transatlantic allies; to the contrary, a more efficient, effective, and politically sound division of labor in the war industries of the NATO countries would certainly strengthen the American commitment.

MANY other points about the economics of defense planning are worthy of pursuit. How, for example, will a Western nation finance and pay for a major war when the cost of war has been rising by roughly an order of magnitude every decade? What is America's "legitimate security interest" in protecting its basic industries, and to what extent are security interests served by forcing readjustments on them through exposure to foreign competition? To what extent will good economic policy alone suffice in bringing health to the infrastructure we would rely upon in times of crisis? Unfortunately, the reader will not find these questions asked, let alone answered, in either *Industrial Capacity and Defense Planning* or *The U.S. Defense Mobilization Infrastructure*. Colin Gray notes that ideas can play an important role in increasing a nation's ability to defend itself with any given amount of physical resources. He refers specifically to ideas for the battlefield, but his comment may apply more broadly as a critique of these two books.

Nick Eberstadt is a visiting fellow at the Center for Population Studies, Harvard University.

Reflecting on War and Morality

PATRICK GLYNN

William V. O'Brien: **The Conduct of Just and Limited War.** *Praeger. 495 pp. $15.95.*

Geoffrey Best: **Humanity in Warfare.** *Columbia University Press. 400 pp. $30.00 cloth, $10.00 paper.*

NOT long ago, in a speech at Fordham University, Cardinal Bernardin, the Chicago Archbishop, attempted to enunciate the principles common to contemporary Church positions on abortion,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

capital punishment, and nuclear war. Of abortion the Cardinal noted, "It is because the fetus is judged to be both human and not an aggressor that Catholic teaching concludes that direct attack on the fetal life is always wrong." Over the years there have been a variety of justifications offered for the Catholic prohibition on abortion; suffice it to say that nonagression on the part of the fetus has until now not been prominent among them.

There is a cynical explanation for such statements on the part of Catholic prelates—namely, that the Church is attempting to win credibility for its unpopular teachings on subjects like abortion by stressing its more congenial pronouncements on subjects like nuclear war. Whether such motives were at work behind Cardinal Bernardin's observation is impossible to say. What is clear is that the Cardinal's statement is symptomatic of a broad cultural shift that in the past two decades has tended to reverse the priorities customarily accorded to private and public moral decisions. Increasingly, for believers and non-believers alike, questions of private conduct have been effectively emptied of moral content; as personal conscience has been "liberated," moral energies have become increasingly focused on issues of public life. In this way, Church teaching on "just war," once a subsidiary branch of Catholic doctrine, has come to be seen as the centerpiece of moral theology.

All of this arises as part of the growing tendency in recent years to regard the political realm as a kind of vicarious field for personal moral fulfillment. The result has been a habitual confusion of the perspectives appropriate to private and public ethical questions. This may be the central failing of the bishops' pastoral letter on war and peace—that it is written more often from the perspective of people occupied with the problem of attaining personal goodness than from the perspective of leaders faced with the practical exigencies of ensuring the survival of a nation. "The Sermon on the Mount," Churchill once observed, "is the last word in Christian ethics. Everyone respects the Quakers. Still, it is not on these terms that Ministers assume their responsibilities of guiding states."

It is a clear grasp of the perspective of the policymaker that distinguishes William V. O'Brien's treatment of Catholic "just war" principles from that of the bishops. O'Brien's is not the most engaging book ever written on this subject. From the standpoint of style and interest, it compares unfavorably both with Paul Ramsey's 1968 collection, *The Just War: Force and Political Responsibility*, and Michael Walzer's absorbing 1977 volume, *Just and Unjust Wars*. Nonetheless, for the reader with the fortitude to plow through it, O'Brien's text is filled with sound judgments about matters of policy, ranging from the morality of nuclear deterrence to the justice of the Yom Kippur War and the war in Vietnam. In addition, the book fills in much of the older historical background to the Church's recent teaching on war. There is no direct reference in the book to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the bishop's pastoral—the study was completed before the letter was issued—but O'Brien covers much of the same ground as the bishops, though from a different, and generally more sober, Catholic perspective.

The formalism inherent in most presentations of just-war doctrine renders it a little off-putting, particularly to secular-minded people; but within the limits of its usefulness, the theory is closely related to common sense. At the heart of the doctrine is the distinction, dating from medieval times, between the so-called *jus ad bellum*—the law governing the decision to go *to* war—and the *jus in bello*—the rules governing conduct *in* war. Implicit in this distinction is the recognition that, as Walzer puts it, "it is perfectly possible for a just war to be fought unjustly and for an unjust war to be fought in strict accordance with the rules." The value of these terms lies in keeping alive a healthy tension between the end and the means. Thus the end may be acknowledged as just even as the means are condemned as unjust, and vice versa. In this way, just-war thinking avoids the extremes embodied in pacifism—which denies the good of the end based on the evil of the means—and of Communism—which has always assumed that practically any means, however heinous, is justified by the end of creating the perfect society.

Nonetheless, just-war theory is no substitute for a broader understanding of politics and morality, and on the most critical contemporary issues, it fails to offer unambiguous guidance. Thus, as Robert W. Tucker has pointed out, Catholic just-war theorists end up on both sides of the debate over the morality of nuclear deterrence. At issue, in particular, are different applications of the central just-war principle of "proportionality." This principle requires that the means used to fight a war be morally "proportionate" with the end fought for. The bishops' moral objections to nuclear deterrence rest on the implicit conviction that, given the inherent indiscriminateness of nuclear warheads, it is impossible to imagine any use of them that would satisfy the proportionality requirement.

Yet as O'Brien's analysis shows, this conclusion depends on judgments not only about the morality of war but about the nature of politics:

> The problem in the literature and in the social teaching of the churches is that [the] fundamental fact of survival of a society as just cause is ignored or downplayed. Both legal and moral prescriptions concerning recourse to war are addressed to anonymous states irrespective of their characteristics and, ironically, irrespective of their justice . . . . [T]here is no way that a responsible just-war analysis of just cause can avoid the character of the societies in conflict and the implications for human rights and dignity if one side subjugates the other.

According to O'Brien this essentially apolitical perspective prevails in much modern moralizing about war:

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> It is unfortunate that modern moralists have generally been so concerned with the issue of putatively disproportionate means in modern war that they have neglected the prior question of the ends for which these means might have to be used . . . . Specifically, one must ask whether the political-social order of a country like the United States is sufficiently valuable to warrant its defense in a war against a country like the Soviet Union, which, if victorious, would impose its political-social order on the United States.

The language here is a little abstract, but the point has relevance to the bishops' letter. The bishops' preoccupation with moral misgivings about deterrence goes hand in hand with a less than wholehearted appreciation of the differences—moral and practical—between democratic and totalitarian regimes. It is true that the letter acknowledges "the Soviet system of repression and the lack of respect in that system for human rights." But these phrases are immediately followed in the text by the observation that "[t]o be sure, our own system is not without flaws." In the same passage that describes the various ills of the Soviet regime we are told that "to pretend as a nation we have lived up to all our own ideals would be patently dishonest" and that U.S. "support for regimes that continue to violate human rights is all the more morally reprehensible in its hypocrisy." (That alliances with such regimes might be essential to the safety of the world's few democracies is never considered.) In short, while the document is critical enough of Soviet practices, the general impression left is that the moral difference between the United States and the Soviet Union is one of degree rather than kind.

But the failure of the bishops to form an adequate image of the realities of totalitarian rule emerges nowhere more clearly than in their praise of "non-violent" methods of resisting conquest. Under such methods, the bishops inform us, "[c]itizens would be trained in the techniques of peaceable non-compliance and non-cooperation as a means of hindering an invading force or non-democratic government from imposing its will." These visions of "peaceable non-compliance" with a conquering regime that, in the process of consolidating and preserving power in its own land, managed to slaughter 60 million of its own people and send millions more to slave-labor camps are, to put it mildly, less than persuasive. It is by positing such a series of Quixotic alternatives to existing policies that the bishops manage to talk themselves into the implicit idea that American leaders actually have a choice between nuclear deterrence and other, more appealing options.

There is validity, however, to the bishops' argument that nuclear weapons are horribly indiscriminate—especially when one takes into account the historical reliance of U.S. strategy on the threat of counter-city retaliation. The obvious response to this circumstance is the one proposed by Albert Wohlstetter, among others: that we take advantage of existing targeting technologies and build smaller, more accurate weapons capable of striking and destroying military targets. O'Brien makes substantially the same recommendation.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The bishops reject this course on the grounds that "'counterforce targeting,' while preferable from the perspective of protecting civilians, is often joined with a declaratory policy which conveys the notion that nuclear war is subject to precise rational and moral limits." This objection owes less to just-war than to arms-control theory—the supposition in arms control doctrine that the mere possession of more effective weapons will make a government more disposed to use them, regardless of that government's character. In this outlook there is something of the same blindness to political distinctions that O'Brien finds in modern thinking about the just war. Whatever the merits of the arms control hypothesis, however, its relevance fades in the face of existing Soviet counterforce deployments. The fact that the American Catholic bishops have declared they "oppose Soviet deployment of such weapons" has not thus far deterred the Kremlin from producing them on a massive scale and is not likely, one suspects, to do so in the future.

Yet the most important reasons to increase the accuracy of the U.S. arsenal are probably less immediately moral than practical. After all, precision of targeting will never decisively solve the problem of civilian casualties. Use of strategic nuclear weapons on almost any scale would involve millions of civilian deaths. Indeed, as O'Brien notes, modern technology has rendered even conventional firepower vastly and indiscriminately destructive. To paraphrase Bernard Brodie, the point of the U.S. nuclear arsenal ought not to be simply to limit a possible nuclear war, but to prevent it from occurring. The real value of counterforce weapons lies in their ability to strengthen deterrence by rendering the threat of U.S. retaliation to Soviet attack more credible and by directing the threat against Soviet war-fighting capacity, rather than against Soviet society as a whole. The most certain way to deter war is to deny the Soviet military the hope of victory in any form. But, of course, it is largely the failure of many people, including the bishops, to accept such reasoning that has led to the current national controversy over nuclear strategy.

GEOFFREY Best's volume is concerned more narrowly with what just-war theorists call *jus in bello*. *Humanity in Warfare* is essentially a historical account of the development since the Enlightenment of international conventions governing belligerent conduct in battle. Best begins with a summary of late Enlightenment writing on proper conduct of war and goes on to consider the impact of the Napoleonic wars on this eighteenth-century "consensus." He reviews, somewhat unsystematically, ideas about the regulation and limitation of war that developed in the nineteenth century—he is especially interested in the emergence of the Red Cross movement—and then discusses a number of issues raised by "total war" as experienced in World Wars I and II. The account concludes with an examination, and endorsement, of the Geneva Protocols of 1977, which expanded the rules covering both international and revolutionary conflict.

The book is written in a lively—one is tempted to say overly

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lively—manner, and in fact the informality and lack of order in Best's account undermines its usefulness as a history. His description of the War of 1812 is not atypical of the narrative: "It was a vicious little war, with enough instances of misconduct and destruction early committed by both sides to set going as nasty a spiral of vindictive reprisals as there has ever been. The unravelling of such is almost impossible and always thankless, and I shall not attempt it here." In light of such passages, it is easy to be puzzled by Best's conception of his book as somehow "scientific" in character. Early on in the text, he states that he takes it "for granted that conventional patriotic considerations are out of place in scientific inquiry." The implication is that by taking a critical view on occasion of his own country's conduct in war (Best is British), he has solved the problem of historical objectivity. One might have thought that words like "nasty" and "vicious" are equally out of place in scientific inquiry, but apparently Best's conception of science is capable of accommodating some forms of moral fervor even if it excludes others.

In fact, from the outset, *Humanity in Warfare* is less science than advocacy. Best opens with the assertion that the book is about "the idea that, if there are to be wars, and so long as wars go on, it is certainly better for the warring parties, and probably better for mankind at large, that the persons fighting should observe prohibitions and restraints on how they do it." The basic premise of the text is spelled out shortly thereafter:

> Almost all international wars, and some major civil wars, since the eighteenth century have been softened by the operation of the law of war. There has often been room for further softening. Even vestigial recollections of the law seem to have disappeared at some bad moments and on some dark fronts. Beastliness occurred even when everyone had apparently been trying to behave well. But the weight of the evidence is unmistakable, that the law of war has done nothing but good, and the implication is clear, that wars where it was not enforced, known, or even dimly apprehended, were the more horrible for their lack of it.

There is an appearance of self-evidence to this assertion—but only because it evades all the difficult questions. The really intractable problem, which Best's approach tends to overlook, is that there is a world of difference between having an international law "known" or on the books, and having it "enforced." It is worth remembering, for example, that the Hague Conference of 1907 declared against the use of poison gas, the bombardment of unprotected places, the deployment of floating mines, and the use of torpedoes. It is difficult to see what discernible effect these fine sentiments had on the conduct of World War I. George Orwell's verdict, offered amid the debate over Allied strategic bombing of Germany in World War II, still holds: "As to international agreements to 'limit' war, they are never kept when it pays to break them."

This is not to say that international rules governing conflict are worthless, but rather that the control of war is not simply a legal or

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

moral but a military task. Conventions prohibiting certain kinds of conduct are useless if there is no military force to back them. Best, on the contrary, has a tendency to write as if the whole problem boiled down to a struggle for moral self-renovation, a conflict pitting "the peace-and-progress side of civilian opinion" against the outlook of what he at one point refers to as the "mentally-dulled militarist."

THE key difficulty in our own times lies in the likely Soviet response to any unenforced international "law" governing conduct in battle. To say the least, the Soviet record in the last great war is less than heartening. Not only did the USSR fail to subscribe to the 1929 Geneva convention regarding prisoners-of-war, and ignore all attempts by the International Red Cross to intervene even on behalf of its own captured soldiers (who were shot or imprisoned upon repatriation), but its army's conduct made nonsense of the supposed distinction between combatants and innocent civilians. The cruelty of the Soviet invasion of Eastern Europe is legendary. Of the Red Army's entry into Prussia, Nikolai Tolstoy has written that scarcely a German woman, from four-year-olds to grandmothers, survived unraped East of the Elbe. When Stalin was informed that Red Army tanks in Prussia were shelling civilian refugees, he replied jovially: "We lecture our soldiers too much; let them have some initiative!" In our own day, the remorseless response of the Soviet general staff to the destruction of a Korean passenger jet by the Soviet Air Force is fresh evidence of the regard in which the Soviet leadership is wont to hold international conventions. This is to say nothing of the prosecution of biological warfare against Laotian tribesmen and Afghan rebels.

These last scandals have burst upon us since Best finished his book, but even when dealing with earlier periods, he writes in strange obliviousness to Soviet malfeasance. Thus we are told that before World War II "the Soviet government perceived that [the law of war] contained valuable humanitarian substance of universal value as well as matter more helpful to 'bourgeois' than socialist societies, and by no means cut off from it." He even makes the astonishing claim that "the USSR's performance as a member of the society of states did not conspicuously depart from the average between the wars, even being in some respects—e.g., in concern for collective security against fascism in the later thirties—rather better." How perplexing that this noble "concern for collective security against fascism" blossomed in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1939, which sealed the Soviet alliance with Nazi Germany. Such fatuity in a writer who presents himself as a serious historian is hardly excusable. Best's only acknowledgement of the Soviet Union's historically flagrant disregard of international law is his good-natured observation that "the USSR's allegiance to the existing international law and institutions of international society has in it a certain number (what that number might be, no outsider could be sure) of reserva-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tions and equivocations proceeding from its radically different ideological point of view."

On subjects more distant from present concerns, Best is more reliable. His consideration of the moral issues at stake in Sherman's "march to the sea" during the American Civil War is extremely fair-minded; his account of Allied area bombing of Germany in World War II pays a good deal of attention to the military realities at issue. Yet one weakness of this history, like so much writing on the morality of war, lies in its exclusively Western focus. At one point Best mentions the "western European orientation" and "linguistic limitations" that prevent him from considering events in Eastern Europe. But in a general history of humane conduct in warfare, this is a rather striking omission. To dwell at length on the moral quandaries raised by Allied strategic bombing while totally neglecting the wholesale persecution of civilian populations that attended German and later Soviet conquests further east, is to offer a necessarily lopsided vision of the world that the law of war proposes to regulate. In this sense, the problem with Best's book is not so different from that which besets much Western thinking these days on the subjects of war and peace.

Patrick Glynn is co-editor of the Journal of Contemporary Studies.

The War Goes to Press

DIANA WEST

***Robert Harris:* Gotcha! The Media, the Government and the Falklands Crisis.** *Faber and Faber. 158 pp. $5.95.*

BOTH the British war in the Falklands and, more recently, the American invasion of Grenada have prompted an energetic renewal of the tug-of-war between the media and the government over the role of the media in times of war. In the United States, the "news blackout" enforced by the Reagan administration so incensed the nation's media that several major national press organizations made preparations to sue Defense Secretary Weinberger, abandoning their plans only after it became clear that such a lawsuit could easily fail and might even set a precedent allowing for tighter restrictions. Katherine P. Darrow, the general counsel to the *New York Times*, put it this way: "I'm not sure that there is a First Amendment right to be on the beachhead. Reporters are there because the Government lets them be there." Short of taking the Secretary of Defense to court, the press groups finally settled on a statement calling for the government to ensure that reporters be present during

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

U.S. military operations. They addressed this to Army Major General Winant Sidle, whom Army General John W. Vessey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, appointed to chair a committee on the question of press access to military operations. As of yet, the committee has not released its findings.

Two years earlier, on the other side of the Atlantic, the British government found itself in a similar situation: While the war in the Falklands was overwhelmingly popular among the people, victory, to say the least, was not the only concern of the British media. Government censors and technical difficulties severely limited the flow of information from the South Atlantic. In the aftermath of the campaign, the anger and frustration felt by many members of the media were compounded by the growing evidence of wholesale bungling on the part of the Ministry of Defense in its dealings with task force correspondents. In an attempt to sort out the grievances of both the press and the government, the House of Commons held an inquiry into how Whitehall had handled the coverage of the war in the Falklands.

Robert Harris, a British reporter, has written *Gotcha! the Media, the Government and the Falklands Crisis*, a book which is based on the written and oral evidence collected by the House of Commons Defense Committee, and on interviews with the leading protagonists in this so-called "information war." Although the Committee confined itself to the record of the Ministry of Defense, Harris also focuses on Fleet Street's coverage of the war, including the lively duels among the tabloids, as well as on the political row sparked by the BBC's television contribution to the fray, which was criticized by many as being pro-Argentinian.

Before too long, the Falklands campaign had been tagged "the worst reported war since the Crimea." (Later on, the American media would make a similar complaint with regard to the invasion of Grenada.) Newspaper dispatches often arrived too late to be used; others never arrived at all. The first still photograph did not appear until three weeks after it was taken. Pen-and-ink illustrators were called out of retirement, and newspapers were forced to rely on general impressions of what was happening. As for the television news, Harris drily reports that "the situation was on occasion marginally *worse* than it had been during the Crimea. In 1854 the Charge of the Light Brigade was graphically described in *The Times* twenty days after it took place. In 1982 some TV film took as long as twenty-three days to get back to London."

In the television era, when the living rooms of the world have become box seats to international events, the difficulties of the Falklands newsgathering campaign sound incredible. Over the past 20 years, television viewers have watched a revolution transform news reporting, and nowhere are its effects more striking than in the coverage of war. Nevertheless, as Harris observes, "for the bulk

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the Falklands war, the camera might as well not have been invented. The crisis lasted for seventy-five days, and for the first fifty-four there were no British pictures of any action."

Despite the suspicions of many members of the media that their efforts to cover the war were deliberately scuttled by the British officials, Harris maintains that the reason for the lack of pictures was "primarily a technical one." Because of the formidable difficulties involved in transmitting film via satellite from a speeding warship, and the problem of finding a satellite available to receive transmissions from that particularly obscure corner of the earth, the most impatiently awaited film of the spring of 1982 ended up steaming homeward at a steady 25 knots aboard any ship headed the right direction. Whether or not the technical difficulties blocking satellite transmissions could have been overcome, the fact remains that the British officials did not exactly exhaust themselves trying. At the same time, they were unabashedly thankful that the problems went largely unsolved. The nature of the Falklands crisis ensured that the government—and not the media—had complete control over how the war appeared on telly and what news reached the papers. As Harris writes, "the MoD [Ministry of Defense] could . . . deodorize the war in a way that few other democratic Governments—especially in recent Administrations in the USA—have been able to get away with."

Although the British government was severely chastised for its censorship policy, for what outraged editors considered to be unwarranted incursions into the realm of "taste" and "tone," government officials considered themselves to have been lucky. When Harris interviewed Sir Frank Cooper, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Defense, Cooper remarked:

> To be quite frank about it, if we had had transmissions of television throughout, the problems of what could or could not be released would have been very severe indeed. We have been criticized in many quarters, and will no doubt go on being criticized in many quarters, but the criticism we have had is a small drop in the ocean compared to the problems we would have had in dealing with television coverage.

The exclusion of the press during the invasion of Grenada indicates that Cooper's American counterparts share his sentiments.

At a couple of points during this very readable and clear explication of the Falklands war as a media non-event, Harris attempts to place the British media's misadventures in their historical context, and it is here that he loses his way. The government's policy was, as he correctly observes, deeply influenced by America's experience with the press in Vietnam. As early as 1970, the British had begun grappling with the notion of the televised war. The then-Director of Defense Operations, Plans, and Supplies at the Ministry of Defense, Brigadier F.G. Caldwell, told an audience that after Vietnam, if Britain were to go to war again, "we would have to start saying to ourselves, are we going to let television cameras loose on the battle-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

field?" Harris, however, scoffs at these concerns, finding the so-called "lessons of Vietnam" to be inappropriate to the Falklands crisis, and in the main devoid of wisdom altogether.

After listing the obvious differences between the Falklands and Vietnam wars—the scope, the duration, etc.—Harris notes the fact that they were both fought in the age of television and, he writes, "because America's first major military defeat coincided with the advent of TV, there was a tendency, especially among the armed forces, to connect the two." Without even mentioning the arguments that, at the very least, associate American television with the American defeat, Harris goes on to insist that the media, including television, merely reported events as they happened, accurately reflecting the current state of affairs. In Vietnam, he tells us, "the costs, human and economic, proved too great to be borne. Television merely reflected this . . . . It did not create it." For the sake of his argument, Harris should have stopped at this point. In any event, he should not have gone on to cite the Tet offensive as an example of reporting accuracy, when today in all quarters the coverage of Tet is conceded to have been notoriously misleading.

HARRIS next directs his attention to the issue of war information and its effects on public morale. The Commons Defense Committee found the military commanders in the Falklands in agreement that they and their men were relieved that the campaign's coverage was as limited as it was. "Thank heavens we did not have unpleasant scenes shown," said Brigadier Tony Wilson, the commanding officer of 5 Brigade. "It would have been singularly debilitating to our wives and families." Although Harris understands this sentiment, he worries that "such concerns, based on a partial view of the American experience in Vietnam, may . . . prevent television coverage of war on the grounds of its possible effects on morale rather than for clearly understood reasons of operational security."

At the same time, however, Harris believes that the morale of the citizen at home is, in certain instances, a vital consideration. During World War II, when the very existence of Britain was imperiled, Harris notes that some freedoms were temporarily suspended, and that examples of official concealment and outright lying abounded; this, however, does not trouble him. Why? Presumably because victory, which in this case also meant survival, was ultimately more important than those suspended freedoms were. "But," he asks, "in relatively limited operations like the Falklands, can the same criteria be applied?"

Some thirty pages later, Harris says no, attempting to justify his answer by making a rather fragile distinction between "Total War" in which all, or nearly all, is fair, and "limited action" which must be fought according to the rule of law. Of course, from a practical point of view, morale along the homefront is a vital concern to a democratic government waging a war of any size. From a purely

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

philosophical standpoint, it is inconsistent of Harris to excuse such measures as censorship once in a while and to castigate them at other times.

For the British, the most dangerous moment of the war was the landing on the Falklands. Twelve hours before the landing, the defense correspondents in London were briefed by Sir Frank Cooper, and the following morning the Fleet Street press was unanimous in its descriptions of Britain's next military move. The gist of the reports was that there would be no single, massive landing along the lines of the invasion of Normandy. Instead, there would begin a series of hit-and-run raids, a war of attrition. As the reports were being distributed around the country, 3,000 British troops landed on the Falklands in Britain's biggest amphibious landing since D-Day. The briefing had been thoroughly misleading.

When Cooper testified before the Commons Defense Committee, he contended that while he had not revealed the entire truth to the correspondents, he had not lied:

> I certainly said I did not expect a D-Day type of invasion, and I did not expect a D-Day type of invasion because the whole aim of the operation was to get forces ashore on an unopposed landing. A D-Day type invasion in my mind is actually an opposed invasion . . . . I am delighted there was a good deal of speculation, and it was really very helpful to us, quite frankly . . . .

Cooper's facile showmanship aside, the fact remains that Britain's situation at that stage of the war was critical, and the number of men at risk was substantial. The question is, as Harris phrases it: "If Cooper did deliberately mislead the press—and his defense is more a matter of nuance than outright denial—was he justified? . . . If the deliberate planting of false stories could mislead the enemy for a crucial twenty-four hours while the bridge-head was being established, why *not do it*?"

Unfortunately, Harris refrains from discussing the interesting implications that such a policy of misinformation has for a democracy and for its free press. Instead, he warns us about what he considers to be "the obvious practical danger that the long-term damage of such a policy will far outweigh any short-term benefits." He contends that such examples of misinformation did lasting damage to press relations and to Britain's image abroad. In truth, the "short-term benefits" of the government's policy were formidable—a successful landing with minimal casualties which expedited the war's conclusion— and they certainly outlasted the faded memory of any "long-term damage" that may have been done. Britain's international image has been far more enhanced by its victory than it has been tarnished —if at all—by its press policy.

WHAT is most striking about this episode, as well as about the experience of the American press during the invasion of Grenada, is not the news that appeared incorrectly or did not appear at

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

all in the morning papers. In both instances, nothing more serious than a certain amount of temporary confusion resulted from the way the British and Americans handled their respective media. What is most striking about these events is how they illustrate the complete lack of trust that the governments have in their nation's media.

During the Falklands war, this lack of trust manifested itself in countless ways, from the misinformed briefing described above to the wariness on the parts of warships' captains who, mindful of the presence of journalists aboard, felt compelled to censor their briefings to their own crews for fear that the information would somehow be wired home. This predicament brings to mind a remark made by the noted military journalist, Drew Middleton. Speaking on the subject of censorship during World War II, Middleton observed that censorship enabled the correspondents to be much better informed about the war than, say, their colleagues would be in Vietnam 20 years later. "As long as all the copy was submitted to censors before transmission, people in the field, from generals down, felt free to discuss top secret material with reporters. On three trips to Vietnam I found generals and everyone else far more wary of talking to reporters precisely because there was no censorship."

While the trust between press and military professionals during World War II may not have been complete, it certainly was substantial, based not only on the press's "right to know" but also on the military's acknowledged need for the public to understand. This consideration was significant enough to the military that it provided the press with transportation and communications equipment—everything it needed to get its job done. By 1982, the recent history of the press, its instinctive adversary posture, had made these considerations far more trouble than they were worth to the defense establishment: When the British task force prepared to sail, the first word from fleet headquarters was that no members of the press would go along. What followed that statement was a two-and-a-half month free-for-all over who would control the information about the Falklands war. "Whitehall fought the Navy, the Government fought Whitehall, all three fought the media, and the media . . . fought among themselves," Harris writes. Although the troops have long since returned home, this information war, as books like *Gotcha!* prove, is still going on.

Diana West is Assistant Editor of The Public Interest.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Weapons and War

JEFFREY RECORD

William McNeill: **The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society Since A.D. 1000.** *University of Chicago Press. 450 pp. $20.00.*

Brian Beckett: **Weapons of Tomorrow.** *Plenum Press. 160 pp. $14.95.*

Thomas Karas: **The New High Ground: Strategies and Weapons of Space-Age War.** *Simon and Schuster. 336 pp. $14.95.*

A prominent underpinning of the American style of warfare is a persistent faith in the power of technology to overcome most problems encountered on the battlefield. It is a faith shaken neither by the contrary lessons derived from a close reading of military history, for which few of the managerial technocrats who run the U.S. military have the time or inclination, nor by defeat in Vietnam at the hands of a technologically inferior adversary, a defeat that many Americans in uniform still ascribe mainly to unwarranted political intrusion on the conduct of the war.

The curricula of West Point, Annapolis, and Colorado Springs —long on engineering, short on military history—suggest that war is a science, not an art, and that it can, given proper techniques, be managed like any other enterprise. And in the corridors of the Pentagon dance visions of technological "fixes" to a host of seemingly intractable military problems, ranging from Europe's forward defense against a massive Soviet blitzkrieg to America's longstanding vulnerability to nuclear devastation. Soviet tanks are to be mowed down well before reaching NATO territory by long-range "smart" weapons; Soviet ICBMs headed for Omaha or Grand Forks are to be zapped in mid-air by space-based laser guns.

Faith in technology is understandable in a gadget-infatuated society that highly values individual life and in which the cost of military manpower accounts for half of total defense expenditure. In combat Americans always have sought to substitute firepower for blood, and their remarkable success in doing so, often aided by allies willing or condemned to bear the brunt of the fighting on the ground, is reflected in probably the lowest proportional casualty rates of any Great Power in history.

Unfortunately, those wont to believe that military salvation lies in superior weaponry tend to forget that war as we know it remains first and foremost a human encounter; that its outcome, notwithstanding staggering increases in the range, speed and accuracy of weapons, is still determined primarily by numbers and by such intangibles as leadership, training, unit cohesion, strategy, tactics, and what Frederick the Great called "His Sacred Majesty Chance."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Weapons are tools, nothing more. Even the most effective count for little in the hands of ill-trained or demoralized troops, or under the governance of military leaderships incapable of grasping the operational and tactical opportunities afforded by them. The Germans had fewer and less powerful tanks in 1940 than the French Army and British Expeditionary Force.

NONE of this is to belittle the value of technological superiority. Weapons are essential in war, and it is always better to have better weapons than one's opponent. It is simply to remind ourselves that war is a human institution, waged by men and not by machines, and that the quality of weaponry is but one of myriad influences at work on the battlefield, and rarely decisive. The key to the Israeli victory over the Syrian air force in 1982 was not the superiority of the F-16 and F-15 over Soviet MIGs, but the incomparable training, combat experience, innovativeness, and esprit of Israeli pilots; similarly, in the Falklands War, there was no contest on the ground between raw and wretchedly-led Argentine conscripts and long-service British regulars whose regimental system has for centuries yielded a unit cohesion impervious to anything short of decimation.

Only in cases of gross technological disparity between opposing sides have weapons alone proven decisive. *Assagai*-wielding Zulus were no match for British Martini-Henry rifles, nor could mounted Polish lancers hope to prevail over German tanks. History nonetheless records victories of the technologically inferior over the technologically superior: the Little Big Horn, Adowa, Vietnam. Indeed, technological primitiveness can be its own reward against military modernity. It was precisely the lack of a network of modern, hard-surfaced roads that finally brought to a halt in 1941 the German panzers that a year earlier had quickly overrun France and the Low Countries. In Vietnam, where the United States and its allies enjoyed a crushing preponderance in all of the measurable indices of military power, massive American firepower went a-begging for targets deliberately denied it by a dispersed and elusive enemy.

There are several reasons why technology has only rarely been decisive in determining war's outcome. First, the very idea of consequential technological advantage did not emerge until the Industrial Revolution. Pre-industrial armies and navies, at least in Europe, relied on virtually the same weaponry, and what passed for technological innovation was slow and incremental. The "Brown Bess" musket remained the standard British infantry weapon for 160 years.

Second, new technology, even in the post-Industrial Era, is not synonymous with greater combat effectiveness. The range, accuracy, reliability, and rate of fire of the "revolutionary" arquebus never exceeded that of the crossbow; only with subsequent advances in metallurgy did firearms achieve an effectiveness exceeding pre-gunpowder weapons. Moreover, what looks decisive on the drawing board, in the laboratory, or on the test range may prove unaffordable

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in peacetime or ineffective on the battlefield; such has been the fate of no small number of complex "smart" weapons.

The third reason lies in the social, intellectual and institutional conservatism of most military establishments, which serves to block or delay full appreciation and exploitation of even the most effective new weapons. Truly revolutionary technologies threaten to upset established military order and ways of doing business on the battlefield. In 1828 the British Admiralty issued a memorandum discouraging the use of steam vessels because the introduction of steam was "calculated to strike a fatal blow at the naval supremacy of the Empire." Horse cavalry charged on long after the appearance of the magazine rifle and machine gun, which by depersonalizing combat, threatened cherished pre-industrial warrior values. Nuclear weapons continue to confound the military art because of the premium they place on avoiding wars (at least with those who possess them) rather than the military's traditional mission of winning them.

Finally, the obvious: The introduction of new weapons almost invariably breeds development of effective countermeasures. All weapons have inherent vulnerabilities that lend themselves to technological or tactical exploitation. The German U-boat was defeated by the convoy system, sonar, and the hedgehog depth charge. An even better and more contemporary example is the Soviets' neutralization of the potentially decisive impact of NATO's current generation of antitank guided missiles, once believed by many the final answer to the threat posed by the Soviet army's massive array of armor. Rather than develop a new counter-weapon, which would have been the Pentagon's first impulse, the Soviets simply altered their tank tactics to exploit the two innate weaknesses of the missile systems: the need for the antitank gunner to see his target visually, and then to remain physically exposed, through dependence on optical terminal guidance, for the several seconds separating launch from impact. To exploit the first weakness, the Soviets increased a longstanding emphasis on night operations, use of smoke and camouflage and employment of terrain to block the antitank gunner's vision; to exploit the second, the Soviets increased the amount of fast-moving mechanized infantry and self-propelled artillery in their tank units. The Soviets thus have largely succeeded in outwitting this particular category of "smart" weapons without developing a single new technology.

Whether these judgments on the role of weaponry in war hold true for nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction can never be answered conclusively in the absence of historical referent experience. The most salient fact about the nuclear age has been the absence of nuclear war. Although much is known about the effects of nuclear weapons, virtually nothing is known about nuclear war. It is for this reason that what passes for nuclear "strategy" is little more than theology: a jumble of untestable hypotheses and fanciful

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

speculations, made all the more disturbing by the failure of some nuclear strategists to recognize them as such.

In all likelihood, a nuclear war would be neither conducted nor decided as have been wars past. If war as we know it remains an art, with man still the dominant influence on the battlefield, a nuclear war promises to entail little more than mutual and swift administration of immense quantities of firepower against which there is little discernible defense or room for human influence once the detonations begin. The outcome of such a war is likely to be determined in advance rather than be decided after the outbreak of hostilities. It is instructive that nuclear-armed states have refrained from waging even non-nuclear war directly against one another.

THE prospect of man losing control of his ever more destructive tools of violence and ultimately being devoured by them is a theme common to three recent works on military technology: William H. McNeill's *The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society Since A.D. 1000*; Brian Beckett's *Weapons of Tomorrow* and Thomas Karas's *The New High Ground: Strategies and Weapons of Space-Age War*.

The Pursuit of Power, which treats war as a form of "macroparasitism," is, in McNeill's words, "meant to be a twin" to his earlier and superb *Plagues and Peoples*, which sought to identify the major landmarks in the interaction of human populations and microparasites. The present work addresses the interaction of patterns of social and economic organization, weapons, and military endeavor since the Middle Ages. McNeill convincingly argues that Europe's subsequent military domination of the world was attributable to an "uninhibited linkage between military and commercial enterprise," a "merger of market and military behavior" that was blocked elsewhere, notably China, by the persistence of prevalent cultural values hostile to the ethos of the marketplace. Europe's military prowess was further enhanced by the subsequent emergence of "command technology" (state-sponsored and -orchestrated technological innovation) as a substitute for reliance on the products of undisciplined private inventors. However, because Europe, unlike China, was not an empire but rather a collection of warring states, advances in weaponry stimulated a dynamic, uncontrollable arms race, which culminated in two titanic wars and in the development of weapons so destructive as to compromise war itself as a continuation of politics by other means.

McNeill contends that nuclear weapons have "changed the rules" of warfare because they threaten the "sudden and total annihilation of the human species." Unfortunately, he fails to note that nuclear weapons have (at least so far) eliminated direct combat as a means of resolving disputes between states that possess them, perhaps because he is not alone in his respect for the awesome power of nuclear

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

weapons and recognition of the inherent difficulty of controlling their use in war. Nor does McNeill spend any time discussing how handsomely non-nuclear war has thrived since 1945. For McNeill the only alternative to human extinction is creation of "a global sovereign power willing and able to enforce a monopoly of atomic weaponry." One wonders whether McNeill remembers that in 1946, when the United States still enjoyed a monopoly of nuclear weapons, the Truman administration proposed this very idea to the Soviet Union, only to have it rejected out of hand.

While *The Pursuit of Power* does not reflect as sure a grasp of "macroparasitism" as *Plagues and Peoples* does of microparasitism, it is nevertheless an engaging and insightful work by a master historian, deserving a prominent place on the bookshelves of serious students of history.

For a concise exposition of present and future developments in nuclear, chemical, biological, and other weapons of mass destruction, one may turn to Brian Beckett's *Weapons of Tomorrow*. The book's discussion, attended by excellent diagrams, of the technical principles underlying the weapons may be rough going for the general reader. And Beckett's tendencies to pooh-pooh the Soviet military threat (he questions the existence of a massive Soviet chemical weapons arsenal, and asserts that the Soviet Union has but a "slight edge" over the United States in strategic counterforce capabilities), and to assign to the United States most of the blame for the global arms race of the past decade (Beckett claims that the United States is seeking "to re-acquire a clear strategic superiority" over Moscow) will put many readers off.

Nonetheless, he has succeeded in providing an enlightening if chilling journey through the darkest corners of modern science. The grim panorama stretches from anticipated refinements in nuclear weapons that could "make their use more likely," to an already developed biological toxin (botulin toxin A) so lethal that a mere ounce theoretically would suffice to kill every man, woman and child on earth. *Weapons of Tomorrow* ends with an equally unsettling discussion of potential covert and terrorist uses of chemical, biological and nuclear warfare. The book's lack of a balanced political perspective does not loosen its firm grip on the technical and military implications of tomorrow's weapons.

PROMINENT among tomorrow's weapons are technologies that would extend combat beyond the traditional mediums of land, sea and air. Such technologies range from killer satellites already at hand to futuristic space-based laser and particle beam weapons theoretically capable of quickly destroying a high proportion of hostile ballistic missiles in flight.

Space has for many years been utilized by the United States and the Soviet Union for such military purposes as surveillance and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

reconnaissance, attack warning and assessment, communication (some 70 to 80 percent of all U.S. overseas military communications are relayed by satellite) and navigation. But if space has been militarized beyond the point of no return, it has yet, in the parlance of the Pentagon, to be "weaponized," that is to say transformed into an arena in and from which to conduct combat operations; it is the prospect of it becoming so that prompted Thomas Karas to write *The New High Ground*. The prospect is a very real one: both the United States and the Soviet Union are on the verge of deploying large numbers of anti-satellite weapons, and President Reagan has proclaimed, in his "Star Wars" speech of March 23, 1983, a determination to pursue the vision of space-based defenses capable of insulating the United States from nuclear attack.

Karas questions (as do many in the scientific community) not only the technical feasibility of the more exotic space weapons now being promoted by "spacemen" who see in space "the way to regain lost military superiority over the Soviets," but also the military and political wisdom of extending the arms race to space. He argues that the United States would have more to lose in such a race than the Soviet Union, because the United States is inherently more dependent on secure space-based surveillance and communications systems for the purposes both of conducting war and of monitoring compliance with important arms control agreements. No less persuasive is Karas's conclusion that attempts to gain a decisive military advantage in space are not likely to succeed, because of the availablility to both sides of an array of potentially effective countermeasures; the end result would be less security at greater cost.

Karas concludes that the "time for national debate about the direction of our space policy is now," and that "we should think twice before . . . moving weapons into space." While conceding that an arms control agreement designed to block the "weaponization" of space would be difficult to negotiate and even more difficult to verify, he nonetheless believes that even a "loose" arms control regime in space would be far better than no regime at all.

The New High Ground is a thoughtful and timely work. Like *Weapons of Tomorrow*, it raises the prospect of war's potential evolution into an exact science, in which the role of man is confined to that of spectator and, ultimately, victim. Such a prospect is not to be welcomed.

Jeffrey Record is a senior fellow at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Service Without Arms

MARY TEDESCHI

Morris Janowitz: **The Reconstruction of Patriotism: Education for Civic Consciousness.** ***University of Chicago Press. 220 pp. $22.50.***

MUCH concern has been expressed, of late, about the condition of our civic spirit. There is no denying that some of the moralizing is tendentiously political; "student apathy," for instance, tends to be lamented by those who prefer their campuses agitated and politicized. The fact remains, however, that in addition to such cant there is a serious and widespread preoccupation with the health of the body politic. And no one in recent memory has treated this preocuppation with the precision and subtlety of Morris Janowitz. *The Reconstruction of Patriotism* takes its definition of citizenship from the classical tradition: a citizen, in modified Aristotelian terms, is one who shares for any period of time in judicial and deliberative office. This formulation, as Janowitz points out, assumes a delicate balance between the rights and obligations of citizenship. In recent decades, the scales have so tipped in favor of rights as to leave the side of obligation dangerously spare.

This imbalance follows from the ascendency of the "rights-oriented" view of citizenship, which Janowitz traces to the convergence of several contributing causes. There is, for one, the ongoing erosion of the legal distinction between citizen and alien. In recent years, the Supreme Court has struck down statutes limiting alien property ownership and access to employment, and has entitled the children of illegal immigrants to free public schooling. Meanwhile, the literacy and residency requirements for citizenship have grown laxer. As the legal definition of citizenship has thinned out, immigrant groups have insistently claimed new-found privileges; bilingual education is but one example, if a particularly telling one, of the prevailing emphasis on rights and the neglect of obligation.

Of all the trends contributing to a view of citizenship skewed toward rights, it is the contemporary practices of intellectuals and teachers that Janowitz criticizes most. Public schools, formerly among the major institutions responsible for civic consciousness, have been failing in that task for decades. Pre-1920s "civics"—an amalgam of history, political philosophy, and the study of political institutions—has been replaced by "social studies" that treat the student not as a citizen who governs, but as a consumer who is manipulated. Then there is the continuing decline in the "mental caliber, prestige, and authority" of the high school teacher. Demoralized teachers make poor pedagogues; as Janowitz drily notes, "in the past, mass education proceeded on the principle that basic education was required for citizenship; today, a sense of national civic sentiment is required to assist education."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

JANOWITZ'S concern with the adverse effects of this truncated view of citizenship leads him to examine in some detail a concept that, throughout American history, has served to balance rights against obligations: the ideal of the citizen-soldier. It is crucial to note that, for Janowitz, the distinguishing characteristic of the citizen-soldier is the obligatory nature of his service; in a key sentence, he writes that "obligatory service highlights the difference between eighteenth-century standing armies based on repressive authority and mercenary forms of incentive and armed forces created as a result, or under the influence of, the American and French revolutions." Of course, authoritarian regimes have also made use of compulsory service, but their troops are not "citizen-soldiers," for "the basic element of consent, that is, popular support for the military, is missing." The citizen-soldier, unlike his counterpart in the non-democratic state, is created out of explicit popular consent to the idea that a citizen has a duty to his state.

Since, for Janowitz, the ideal of the citizen-soldier cannot be understood apart from compulsory service, his historical account of that ideal follows the American experience of conscription. It begins with the Revolution, in which "all able-bodied persons were required to register and were potential soldiers," and ends with the war in Vietnam, in which military exemptions, particularly college deferment, were attacked for being non-democratic. His account is intriguing, not least because it emphasizes those cases in which military service, far from threatening individual rights, has aided in securing them. The citizen-soldiers of the Revolution, for example, won two rewards unthinkable to the mercenary forces of the day: civilian control of the military, and political power balanced between local and central authorities. The experience of black soldiers in the twentieth century is a similar example of securing rights through service. It was black spokesmen who lobbied during World War I for arming black soldiers, and again during World War II for integrating them into white combat units. This integration—which, in the face of a recalcitrant military establishment, was not fully instituted until the Korean war—contributed to the acceptance of black citizens as nothing else before or since. Like the citizen-soldiers of the Revolution, black soldiers in this century bear witness to the fact that, as Janowitz puts it, "to be armed is the essential symbolism of equality and full citizenship."

Janowitz is surely right to turn to the tradition of American military service as a counterbalance to the contemporary emphasis on rights. Still, his definition of the citizen-soldier seems incomplete. It is one thing to say that the ideal of the citizen-soldier is founded on a conception of citizen obligation; it is quite another to imply that a citizen-soldiery cannot exist without compulsory service. In conflating the two, Janowitz does not do justice to the persistence of that ideal in the more voluntary forms of service, particularly the American reserves. By treating compulsory service as the very essence of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the citizen-soldier, rather than as the most compelling example of the ideal as practiced, Janowitz unnecessarily limits his history of that ideal.

Still, his emphasis on the practical shape of citizen obligation has the virtue of reminding us how distorted the American view of citizenship has become. This raises an important question: how to redress the imbalance between rights and obligations?

JANOWITZ'S answer is one that he has urged for 35 years: a system of national service. He believes that such a system could impart at least some of the lessons in civic consciousness that have always been learned through military service. In his opinion, however, national service need not be military—indeed, he believes this to be politically impossible—though it could include a military option. Most participants would serve instead in fields already tested by some state-run service programs: for example, conservation, health and child care, recreation, and aid to the elderly and handicapped.

The idea of national service, whose champions have included William James and Eleanor Roosevelt, has been debated for decades. Janowitz omits much of that history here, and offers instead his own reflections on the form that such service should take. He pays particular attention to the lessons of the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), an outdoor program for jobless young men that was created under the New Deal and operated from 1933 to 1942. Under the direction of the U.S. Forest Service and the National Park Service, and with some supervision from Army officers, participants engaged in a broad range of conservation and construction programs. They left an impressive record: among its other achievements, the CCC planted 2 billion trees, constructed over 100,000 miles of roads, and introduced erosion control to 40 million acres of farmland. But the most enduring accomplishment of the CCC, and, to Janowitz's mind, the most instructive, was its distinct *esprit de corps*. His summary of that spirit is an excellent example of the purposes he envisions for a system of national service:

> They [participants in the CCC] developed a collective consciousness—not to be exaggerated, but one that was realistic. What they were doing was not an egotistical act, although it supplied them with the basic necessities of life . . . . Work in these CCC camps was a form of civic education because it joined together rights and obligations. The participants believed they were exercising their rights when they were given a job in a period of unemployment. In turn, they had an obligation to perform in the conservation of resources . . . . Herein lies the essential lesson of the CCC: meaningful work on behalf of the larger collectivity was the basis of success and the means of reinforcing the social and moral meaning of work.

The CCC was also distinguished among relief programs for its flexibility, a quality which Janowitz sees as essential to a system of national service. Thus, he favors organization on a state-by-state or even metropolitan basis, and advises that service begin as a volun-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tary institution. At the same time, however, he stresses that the service must be broadly based. In particular, it must include participants from the middle class, both because they are the most easily disaffected and because, without them, the program would be seen simply as an employer of last resort. To ensure such representation, Janowitz endorses, for example, a recommendation to make federal aid to college students dependent on national service.

As with the CCC, the purpose of national service is to instruct participants in balancing rights against obligations. Public schools, the traditional guardians of that instruction, have been failing in their task for decades, and for Janowitz, they can no longer be expected to play the role they once did. Thus, patriotism must be "reconstructed" through a system of national service. On this point, Janowitz is adamant: The fabric of rights and obligations is now so undone that, in his opinion, "there can be no reconstruction of patriotism without a system of national service."

National service would be opposed by a predictable battery of interest groups. Politicians would be reluctant to endorse its costs; and there is considerable support for Milton Friedman's claim that national service amounts to a type of tax on a society that is overtaxed already (though as Janowitz points out, "the thought that such a tax might be justified is frequently dismissed out of hand"). But of all the barriers to national service, it is college students themselves who concern Janowitz most; they have "the very attitudes that William James sought to avoid—self-interest and narrow concern with their own careers." Since college-bound students would be crucial to the program's success, he assesses their opposition carefully, and suggests that it is mitigated by other findings. He is particularly encouraged by popular support for some sort of service; youthful interest in similar programs (positions in the Peace Corps, for instance, are oversubscribed eight to ten times); and the increasing number of students who leave college for a year or two in order to clarify their objectives.

STILL, while Janowitz anticipates and answers most of the criticisms to a system of national service, there is one that he does not address, and that is the civilian nature of the service itself. Several problems suggest themselves. First, who will administer it? Most of the tasks that Janowitz describes fall under the rubric of "human services." The "natural" leadership for such a system would seem to be the professionals themselves, and their experience with the welfare state is far from encouraging. Self-perpetuating bureaucracies, ever-increasing budgets, and the familiar charges of "unfairness" in the face of program cuts or alterations—human services professionals in the welfare state have brought us this much and more, and one is loath to provide new avenues for their careerism. The purposes at stake in a program of national service only underline this concern.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Janowitz might reply that national service, like the CCC, could be administered by a fruitful coalition of military and highly-placed civilian advisors. But even if human services professionals are prevented from controlling the program—and one doubts that they could be excluded, at least at the middle level of management—we are left with another problem, and that is the participants themselves. However decentralized, the national service that Janowitz describes would mobilize an unprecedented number of youthful civilians. At its best, of course, the service would be compulsory; but this means that some participants will be disaffected, others strongly inclined toward the politics of the educational elite—and all working within a vast network of people like themselves. What, in short, will prevent such a program from devolving into a series of nationally-based, coordinated protests and agitations? The problem of politicization is serious; it already exists in some government agencies and programs whose scope is far more limited than that of national service. It is significant that Janowitz does not broach, for instance, the phenomenon of politicization in the Peace Corps and VISTA. This concern, it should be noted, did not apply to the CCC; close to desperation themselves, its participants had neither the luxury nor the temptation of political agitation. Nor does this objection apply to compulsory *military* service, for the military has proven its ability to control internal dissent. But who will discipline the new civilian servicemen?

These questions reflect a deeper problem with Janowitz's analysis. As he rightly points out, compulsory military service has been a powerful agent in the inculcation of civic consciousness. Yet in trying to transpose the ideal of the citizen-soldier from the military context to one that is civilian, Janowitz overlooks the importance of the circumstances in which military conscription occurred. With the exceptions of Korea and Vietnam, the wars that made use of compulsory service posed vital threats to the United States itself. The heightened civic consciousness of those eras proceeded not from the fact of conscription, but from the seriousness of those threats *per se*. This is not to deny that the American military has played a vital role in the creation of civic spirit—indeed, one is tempted to think that Janowitz dismisses too quickly the possibility of peacetime *military* conscription—but rather to suggest that the lessons of conscription are more rooted in the American military itself than Janowitz appears to admit. Perhaps Janowitz will answer these questions elsewhere. It is an encouraging thought, for no one is better qualified to do so. In the meantime, *The Reconstruction of Patriotism* will serve as a timely and compelling reminder of how skewed the American conception of citizenship has become. And those who, like Janowitz, seek to remedy this problem through a system of national service —a proposal now favored, for instance, by Gary Hart and some neo-liberals—will profit from the vision behind his book.

Mary Tedeschi is Assistant Managing Editor of The Public Interest.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Post-war Defense Reforms

MACKUBIN T. OWENS

Douglas Kinnard: **The Secretary of Defense.** *University of Kentucky Press. 252 pp. $24.00.*

Victor H. Krulak: **Organization for National Security.** *United States Strategic Institute. 141 pp. $8.00.*

Adam Yarmolinsky and Gregory Foster: **Paradoxes of Power: The Military Establishment in the Eighties.** *Indiana University Press. 154 pp. $15.00.*

THE performance of the U.S. military since the end of World War II has led some people to question its ability to defeat an enemy in war. Critics have claimed that the Pentagon cannot devise successful military operations; they cite Korea, Vietnam, and the aborted Iranian hostage rescue mission as examples of our post-war military malady.

One consequence of these failures has been the emergence of a "military reform" movement: a loose alliance of defense analysts, members of Congress, congressional staff members, journalists, and some military officers. These reformers are critical of established policies in a number of areas, including strategy, tactics, doctrine, force structures, weapons acquisition, and defense organization.

The reform movement is hardly monolithic. Reformers themselves disagree on many fundamental issues—and in some cases, military reform has become a smokescreen for those who simply want to reduce the defense budget. But it is clear that the reformers are having an impact on the defense establishment that cannot be ignored, particularly in the areas of weapons procurement and defense organization. The latter has been especially susceptible.

Indeed, even military men such as General Maxwell Taylor have claimed that organization, not leadership or weapons, is the key to improving military strategy. The two major specific targets for reorganization have been the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the bureaucracy of the Defense department.

THREE recent books have examined some of the questions of defense organization. *Paradoxes of Power*, essentially an updated version of Adam Yarmolinsky's influential 1971 book *The Military Establishment: Its Impact on American Society*, provides a broad overview of the American military, and probes the assumptions of those who have molded the military establishment over the last two decades. Douglas Kinnard's *The Secretary of Defense* is a historical examination of an office that, since its creation in 1947, has in many respects become second only to the Presidency in terms of power and influence. And Gen. Victor H. Krulak's book, *Organization for*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

National Security, is a military man's critique of the evolution of the civilian bureaucracy and the growth of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The evolution of the Defense department is a fascinating but little known part of post-war American history, and Krulak's *Organization for National Security* and Kinnard's *The Secretary of Defense* each provides an excellent overview, thus giving us a context within which to examine the claims of the present crop of organizational reformers. Kinnard's is a straightforward analysis of the way that human and institutional factors have combined to shape American defense policy in the post-war era. Krulak, himself a participant in the organizational battles of the late 1940's, offers us a critical look at the changes that have occurred since 1947, and his own prescriptions for reform.

Both Kinnard and Krulak describe how the United States fought World War II with an ad hoc national security apparatus. Under this arrangement, the three executive departments concerned with the development and execution of national defense policy—State, War, and Navy—formed the basis of the national security establishment. Also during the war, a non-statutory Joint Chiefs was established, consisting of the chiefs of the Army, the Navy, the semi-autonomous Army Air Corps, and Roosevelt's own Chief of Staff, Admiral William Leahy. FDR dealt directly with the Chiefs on major military matters, for the most part bypassing the Secretaries of War and the Navy.

This system worked suprisingly well, but there were many obvious shortcomings. The most important was interservice rivalry: Although its excesses were mitigated in the interest of fighting a war, it never entirely disappeared. Thus, it took a presidential directive to get the Chief of Naval Operations, who was responsible for the allocation of amphibious assets, to divert a sufficient number of landing craft from the Pacific to Europe so the Army could execute the Normandy invasion.

Both Kinnard and Krulak show how such instances provided some of the impetus for a unified defense establishment. There were other causes as well. According to Kinnard, the more important world role of the U.S. during and after World War II made it necessary to have a unified national security policy, requiring a full time deputy modeled on the Secretary of State. Also, the larger military forces that emerged after the war required greater coordination. And finally, there was a need for economy, and avoidance of duplication among the services. The diminished resources for defense meant that there had to be some single official who could determine priorities and allocate resources among competing service claims.

In 1943, George C. Marshall, the wartime Army Chief of Staff, made the first proposal for post-war unification. Although the proposal was not adopted, it served as the basis for later organizational reforms: He called for a single defense department, with ground,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

naval, and air components, with a civilian Secretary, and with a single military Chief of Staff.

WHILE there was general agreement that some sort of centralized defense establishment was required, there continued to be heated debate over the form this establishment would take. Most important, the Navy opposed the idea of a single, strong Secretary of Defense and the imminent loss of its own cabinet-level secretary. The powerful Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal, though he would eventually assent to establishing a single secretary of common defense, continued to prefer a defense establishment that remained a loose or federated body, in which each service maintained much of its autonomy.

The National Security Act, passed in July 1947 after two years of controversy, was a compromise between Forrestal's Navy and the Army, which strongly desired centralization. The act provided for the creation of a National Military Establishment (NME) headed by a Secretary of Defense, who would establish general policies and programs, and direct the NME. But the services, including the newly established Air Force, retained their separate cabinet seats and all powers not specifically conferred upon the Secretary of Defense. The JCS at last became a statutory organization, to consist of the chief military officers of each of the services; they would serve as principal military advisors to the President and Secretary of Defense, and be assisted by a Joint Staff of not more than 100 officers. The act also established within the NME a Munitions Board, a Research and Development Board, a War Council, and two outside agencies, the National Security Council (including a Central Intelligence Agency), and a National Security Resources Board.

The Institution we now call the Department of Defense is a far cry from the NME of 1947. Krulak suggests the reason for this:

> The resultant law . . . was a compromise, unsatisfactory to most of the protagonists. Almost from the first moment, and for the twelve years that followed, it was subject to pressures for change. And the changes did take place—profound and detailed changes that have left the United States with an organization for national security embodying a philosophy almost the precise reverse of that underlying the 1947 law.

For instance, the first Secretary of Defense, Forrestal himself—who as Secretary of Navy had opposed the centralized department—was by 1949 helping to formulate amendments to the National Security Act that strengthened the role of the Secretary of Defense. These 1949 revisions were important in determining the direction that the defense establishment would take in the future: The amendments downgraded the service secretaries from the cabinet level, and denied them their direct access to the President and the Bureau of the Budget. The reforms vested even more of their former power in the single person of the Secretary of Defense. And in addition, the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

amendments established the office of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These represented major changes in the United States's philosophy of defense, and would prove to have fateful consequences.

Further reforms followed. In 1953, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) was enlarged, by substantially multiplying the number of Assistant Secretaries and enhancing the various OSD staffs. In 1958, changes were made that essentially transformed the defense establishment into the institution we know today: The Secretary of Defense would hereafter be more involved in the day-to-day operations of the services, and the JCS's role would be diminished into little more than that of advisory committee. It remained only for Robert McNamara and his managerial approach to complete the transformation.

Both Kinnard and Krulak agree that the results were revolutionary. Even though McNamara's tenure was the high water mark of centralized civilian control of the department, the operation of the Pentagon is still greatly influenced by his reforms.

NcNamara introduced the Planning Programming Budgeting System (PPBS), a system that cut across service lines in assessing major programs; the Five Year Defense Program, designed to project defense expenditures; and an Office of Systems Analysis, the purpose of which was to provide civilian decision-makers with a tool for analyzing the cost of various alternatives in the areas of force structure, material, or training. Krulak is a severe and effective critic of the McNamara reforms; he charges that these changes overcentralized the defense establishment and allowed the civilian leadership to intrude too deeply into the formulation of strategy—hitherto, the responsibility of the military. In addition, he argues that the reforms led to the debilitating civilian control of military operations that came to characterize the Vietnam war.

PERHAPS even more costly to the national security process were two other consequences of the McNamara reforms. The first of these was the effect the reforms had on the morale of the officer corps, and on its ability to fight a war.

Henry Kissinger has described the effect that the rationalist, economic approach to national security had on military officers:

> They were demoralized by the order to procure weapons in which they did not believe and by the necessity of fighting a war whose purpose proved increasingly elusive. A new breed of military officer emerged: men who had learned the new jargon, who could present the systems analysis arguments so much in vogue, more articulate than the older generation and more skillful in bureaucratic maneuvering. On some levels [the McNamara system] eased civilian-military relationships; on a deeper level it deprived the policy process of the simpler, cruder, but perhaps more relevant assessments which in the final analysis are needed when issues are reduced to a test of arms.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Krulak describes, to brutal effect, the consequences of fighting a war in such an atmosphere:

> 57,900 Americans died in the Vietnam War. A fair case can be made that the number of dead would have been fewer and the results more favorable had we fought the war the way our military leadership wanted. That we failed to do so was a product of many things, not the least of which was a defective organization for national security, one where strategic plans were more likely to be products of ad hoc civilian reasoning than of professional military judgment.

Another crucial consequence of the McNamara reforms, which Krulak does not address, was an escalation in the battle between the Congress and the executive branch over control of the defense budget. The result was the alarming "micro-management" that continues to this day. The McNamara reforms were, in an important respect, a response to congressional pressures to "get control of the defense budget." But those reforms in turn elicited a counter-response on the part of the Congress. Congressional staffs began to grow and to focus on the details of the defense process. And now the Budget Act of 1974 subjects every decision on every part of the department's budget to the relentless scrutiny of Congress. This congressional oversight is, in effect, delegated to congressional staff members. But, as Edward Luttwak has written, the problem is that the Congress's emphasis is wrong:

> . . . [it] is on the cost-accounting and legal details rather than on the purpose and meaning of our defense decisions . . . . Congress offers no rewards whatever for tactical or operational innovation or for the development of a better strategy, while it penalizes most severely any error in micro-management.

This is a crucial point, and one frequently ignored by the military reformers: the defense establishment is heavily influenced by Congress, and so it is that the proposed reforms will be ineffective if congressional emphasis remains only on organization per se, at the expense of a consideration of the *purpose* of the defense establishment. The fact that there is, at present, a proposal before Congress to alter the structure of the JCS may mean very little if, in the end, the assumptions about the utility of military force and the role of the military in the implementation of American foreign policy do not change.

We should not be optimistic about the efficacy of military reform, organizational or otherwise, if the assumptions about the military that Adam Yarmolinsky and Gregory Foster make in *Paradoxes of Power* are shared by the political leadership of the United States. In fact, though, Yarmolinsky, a special assistant to McNamara during the Kennedy administration and a principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Johnson years, is a member of a very important segment of that leadership.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It should be remarked that *Paradoxes of Power* is a very strange book. The title derives from four so-called "paradoxes" of America's national security policy, which, having been announced and treated as axioms by the authors, are then dropped, never to be heard from again. Perhaps this is for the best, since they are little more than cliches, which are never supported by any analysis, and which indeed have no basis in reality. The main contribution this book makes to the issue at hand is to demonstrate the questionable intellectual basis of much of today's defense analysis, including that which is called reformist.

THERE are two remarkable characteristics of *Paradoxes of Power*: a strong distrust of the military, and an attachment to the view that the U.S. and the USSR are not really very different, at least when it comes to world affairs. According to this view, the internal dynamics of both countries are similar. Thus both have "military-industrial complexes," which, if not controlled by peace-loving civilian bureaucrats (like Yarmolinsky), would not hesitate to unleash a war that could destroy the world. In a very revealing passage Yarmolinsky and Foster write:

> Beyond the horizons of current arms control efforts lies the distant prospect of a world in which the rule of law does in fact prevail, and, even without general disarmament, the United States military can be converted from a war-fighting to a constabulary force . . . [a force] that considers war both as an interruption of its normal duties and as an indication of failure in a system of relations in which it has a significant continuing responsibility.

Of course it is true, as Yarmolinsky and Foster say, that the size and shape of the American military establishment are functions of political, economic, and social factors, which are, in turn, affected by the interplay of the forces within and around that establishment. But it is also true that if what the United States really needs is a military that, if called upon, can fight and win a war, then attitudes like Yarmolinsky's on the part of the national leadership provide an obstacle of major proportions to an effective American foreign policy.

How can the very real problems of the defense establishment be rectified? Part of the answer lies in recognizing what Kinnard, Krulak, and Yarmolinsky have really described for us: the "demilitarization" of the establishment, particularly through an increase in the status and influence of the Secretary of Defense at the expense of the service Chiefs. This, in turn, has been based on the false assumption that military force is of no ultimate utility in the nuclear age, a belief summed up by Bernard Brodie forty years ago: "Thus far, the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on, its chief purpose must be to avert them." But contra Brodie and Yarmolinsky, the variety of conflicts raging at any moment throughout the globe surely indicates that a nation will find itself at

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a severe disadvantage if, in a world of drawn swords, it denies itself the use of military force.

Thus while organizational or doctrinal changes may have some marginal impact on the operational or strategic capability of U.S. military forces, the assumptions of the political leadership concerning the use of military force are far more important. Assumptions, after all, influence both ends and means; the latter includes both organization and doctrine.

No one can doubt that many of the assumptions that informed the organization of the defense establishment in the years following World War II—primarily U.S. strategic superiority and economic dominance—are no longer valid. But there is a more significant danger: Many who are now pushing for defense reforms do not seem to recognize how much they share the assumptions of those who created the establishment that the reformers criticize: assumptions such as a disdain for strategic thinking; a belief that wars cannot be won (because of the possible use of nuclear weapons); and an emphasis on cost-effectiveness of some sort. If this is the case, and if, as we have seen, these assumptions are false or inadequate, the reformers will have little real impact on the success of our forces on the battlefield, and may do much actual harm.

But, in fact, there is some indication that the current American leadership understands that military force is indeed useful, and that when the occasions for its use arise, the military commanders are the best judges of actions to be taken given the political ends to be achieved. Under such circumstances, and only under such circumstances, military reform is a real possibility.

Mackubin T. Owens, a Senate staff member, writes on foreign affairs and military policy.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Back Issues Available @ $4.50

No. 73 (Fall 1983)

Robert B. Reich An Industrial Policy of the Right
Peter Skerry The Charmed Life of Head Start
Bernard D. Davis Neo-Lysenkoism, IQ, and the Press
Richard H. Thaler Illusions and Mirages in Public Policy
David L. Kirp & Donald N. Jensen What Does Due-Process Do?
Kathleen Engel & Stanley Rothman Prison Violence and the Paradox of Reform
James P. Scanlan Employment Quotas for Women?
Michael A. Ledeen Learning to Say "No" to the Press

Fall Books: A Special Supplement
William Kristol Conservative Statecraft
Mark Lilla The Phantom of Democratic Socialism
Richard N. Langlois A Theory of Economic Evolution
Edward C. Banfield The Economist's Public Library
Jeremy Rabkin The Charismatic Constitution
Mary Tedeschi The Couch in the Courtroom
John Mueller A Supply-Side Scorecard
William A. Schambra Reviving Civic Republicanism
Lawrence M. Mead "Policy Science" Today
Delba Winthrop Domestic Politics
Neal Devins Integration and Local Politics

No. 74 (Winter 1984)

ARCHITECTURE AND PUBLIC SPACES
Roger Scruton Public Space and the Classical Vernacular
William Hubbard A Meaning for Monuments
Nathan Glazer Paris—the View from New York
J.B. Jackson The American Public Space
Roger Starr The Motive behind Olmsted's Park
Donlyn Lyndon Public Buildings: Symbols Qualified by Experience
Michael A. Scully The Triumph of the Capitol
Charles T. Goodsell The City Council Chamber: From Distance to Intimacy
Joseph B. Rose Landmarks Preservation in New York

Review Essays:
Gavin Stamp Victorian Public Sculpture
Christopher Knight L.A. Freeway: The Automotive Basilica

No. 75 (Spring 1984)

Eliot A. Cohen When Policy Outstrips Power—American Strategy and Statecraft
Samuel P. Huntington Defense Organization and Military Strategy
Philip Gold What the Reserves Can—and Can't—Do
Jacques S. Gansler Reforming the Defense Budget Process
Nathan Glazer The Social Policy of the Reagan Administration: A Review
Richard Rose Meta-Policies for Mega-Government
Irwin Garfinkel & Elizabeth Uhr A New Approach to Child Support
R. Shep Melnick Pollution Deadlines and the Coalition for Failure
Peter Reuter The (Continued) Vitality of Mythical Numbers
Stephen Jay Gould/Bernard D. Davis The *Mismeasure of Man* Controversy

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED